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INYUVESI  
**YAKWAZULU-NATALI**

Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An Analysis of Kogi State, Nigeria and  
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 1994-2017

BY

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This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor  
of Philosophy (Political Science) in the Graduate Programme in the College of Humanities,  
School of Social Sciences, of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard, South Africa.

2019

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## DECLARATION

I, Ibrahim Yusuf (Student Number 216075844), declare that:

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to the only wise God, the maker and the redeemer of my soul, who led me through this arduous journey and lifted me to this level. You upheld Your words and kept your promise, Lord. Therefore, I shall live to share the story of Your faithfulness with others.

And

To my kids: Shams, Shim and Shia. Thank you for your patience and endurance during this difficult time.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

To undertake a research journey of this magnitude to its conclusion would be practically impossible without the superior guidance of a great intellectual mind. First, I wish to acknowledge and commend my supervisor, Dr Sybert Mutereko, an erudite scholar whose intellectual depth and skills have shaped this thesis for public consumption. Additionally, his mentorship, even after I had given up on this study, is commendable. Also, his work ethics, patience, discipline, and humble demeanour is inestimable and has provoked a deep desire for intellectual excellence in me. I say a big thank, you sir.

I owe immense gratitude to my parents, Mr Yusuf Audi and Mrs Ladi Yusuf, for the inspiration to succeed despite all the limitations in my life. They motivated me to pursue my dream without depending on anyone. Without doubt, I am a product of their endless prayers, desires and high expectations. Special thanks go to my wife, Christy Onyisi Didamson, who despite her demanding academic schedules, stood firm and kept the home front going and continues to do so to this day. God bless you. And to my beautiful kids; Shams Daniel Didamson, Shim Deborah Didamson and Shia Divine Didamson, their presence was a constant drive for me to pursue this noble objective to the end. I appreciate you, and indeed you are a gift to me.

Also, worthy of appreciation are my family members who played a significant role in my life during this study. To Victor Yusuf, my brother, and my sisters: Sarah Kazzachiang, Christiana Mercy Richard, Dorcas Yusuf, I say thank you for the constant calls and encouragement. God will remember your labour of love! And to my in-laws: Simon Uzoka, Ruth Yunana Paul, Justina Utabor, aunty Bridget Uzoka, and most importantly my mother-in-law, Mrs Roseline John Uzoka, you have made my study a memorable one. God will remember all your prayers and other sacrifices towards the completion of this thesis.

To Barrister Samuel Obaka, Dr Tanko Dauda, Sarah Yani, who were a great inspiration to me, I say thank you. Also friends like Haruna Daniel, Ephraim, Bulus, Stephen Yabo, Philip Tawai, Mrs Nankyer Nanle Geoffrey, Grace Amaka Udeji and Pastor and Mrs Emeka Ogbuju, for their prayers and material support during the course of this study. Also worthy of mention is my team of research assistants: Mr Moyosore Olarewaju, Sani Mohammed, Inda Bello, Khulani, Khayile, Sifiso, Thenjiwe, Pastor Nkosi, Mrs Govender and Sphiwe Zondi. God bless you all.

## LISTS OF ACRONYMS

ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
AD	Alliance for Democracy
AG	Action Group
ANC	African National Congress
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
APC	All Progressive Congress
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COSATU	South African Trade Union
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
DA	Democratic Alliance
DFID	Department for International Development
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DM	District Municipality
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EU	European Union
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
KGS	Kogi State
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
MEC	Member of Executive Committee
MM	Metropolitan Municipality
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCNC	The National Council of Nigerian Citizens
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NFP	National Freedom Party
NP	National Party
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigeria People's Party

PDP	People's Democratic Party
PMB	Pietermaritzburg
RSA	Republic of South Africa
UN	United Nations
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria

## **ABSTRACT**

Since the introduction of electoral democracy in South Africa in 1994 after the demise of apartheid, and Nigeria in 1999 following years of military interregnum, democracy has been threatened by many factors, among which election violence is one of them. However, elections in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa have been plagued by political intrigue, manipulation, violence and destruction. Although tireless efforts are being made to consolidate democracy in Nigeria and South Africa, election violence appears to be impeding this effort. This study "Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An Analysis of Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa 1994-2017" sought to understand the extent to which election violence undermines democratic consolidation. The study adopted a qualitative research approach using case studies. A structured interview and focus group discussion (FGD) was used to gather data from ten locations- five each from Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively. Twenty people were interviewed for this study, among whom the participants included politicians and electorates. In addition, three focus group discussions were conducted in equal proportions: two in KwaZulu-Natal and one was carried out in Kogi State. Thematic and descriptive analyses were both used in aiding to the analysis of the data from this study. Results obtained from the study revealed that election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Also identified is that election violence affects the pace and space of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. Similarly, election violence does not only affect the credibility of elections but is also responsible for the quality of leadership and governance in Nigeria and South Africa. Adding to this constraint is the incorporation of Africa into the international capitalist world through colonialism which is why conflict and electoral violence in Africa cannot be divorced from the current relations with the international system, especially the capitalist west. The study further discovered that most of the politicians in Nigeria and South Africa lack the required qualifications, both political and educational qualifications, and the competence to rule, which best explains the irrational behaviour among the political elite. The study then recommends that election violence must be addressed; the current relations with the West would need to be reviewed and that all politicians must be properly educated headlong if Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa want to make inroads into democratic consolidation.

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## **CHAPTER ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY**

### **1.1 Introduction**

Electoral violence remains one of the challenges confronting democracy since the wave of democratisation in Africa began in the 1990s, after many decades of one-party governments and authoritarianism (Alence, 2009; Misau, 2009). Since the introduction of democracy in South Africa in 1994 and Nigeria in 1999, KwaZulu-Natal and Kogi State have witnessed a series of election violence which is seen as having a negative effect on democracy and democratisation. Hardly ever are elections conducted without some forms of violence either before, during or after the election results are announced. This is believed to constitute a real setback to the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State (KGS) and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), respectively. The primary goal of this study is to examine election violence and how it constitutes a setback to the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. The goal of this section is to give an outline of the study. This part has traced the root/foundation of the study and framework of the research problem, election violence in KGS and KZN, the research questions and the research objectives. The section concludes by showing the design of the chapters of this thesis.

### **1.2 Background to the study**

The democratisation of the political space in Africa in the 1990s was generally not just seen as a welcome development, but a pathway to development and solving some of Africa's problems following years of rampant conflicts, dictatorship and military interregnum (Ake, 1991; Kpundeh, 1992). The collapse of apartheid in South Africa and the rejection of military rule in Nigeria in the 1990s, the death of Samuel Doe in Liberia in the 1980s, and the popular constitutional removal of Kerekou of the Benin Republic in the 1990s are an excellent example of the demonstration of the continent's intentions and desire to democratise the political space (Ake, 1991; Chege, 1994). Similarly, the gains of pluralism and multi-partyism in some African countries in the 1990s and the democratisation attempts by many African states was also conceived as a good step in the furtherance of democracy and the economic recovery/development of the continent. However, with democracy taking shape across the continent, new forms of conflicts are emerging, including electoral violence, which seems to be pushing democracy into total regression (Ibrahim, 2014). It is true that democracy and democratisation and all forms of government come with their own challenges. Sadly, however, electoral violence has become a common trend and is assuming a dangerous dimension in the continent's democracy. Moghalu (2008:33) remarked, "Once considered as the solution to

Africa's problems; democracy has become a major source of violence and conflict in countries with some of Africa's big economies", Nigeria and South Africa inclusive.

A recent global study on elections and violent electoral conflict have revealed that from the total of 57 countries that conducted elections in the year 2001, election violence was witnessed in fourteen of those countries (indicating 24.5 per cent from the survey) (Fischer, 2002:11). Fischer in his study titled "Electoral conflict and violence: a strategy for study and prevention" in a further breakdown of the survey indicates that out of the 57 countries in which the survey was conducted, 31 countries were rated election free, 24 others were described as either not free or partially free. The study equally shows that out of the 14 countries that witnessed election violence, three of the elections were conducted in places (countries) considered to be free, (which represents 21 per cent), while eleven were undertaken in countries perceived to be partly free or not free (representing seventy-nine per cent).

In the continent of Africa, election violence has been witnessed in nineteen to twenty-five per cent of elections conducted between 2001 to 2010 (Bekoe, 2010:1). Looking at these statistics, they are not just worrisome but very dangerous given its multiplying effect and the implications on the quest for democratic consolidation in the continent. Regrettably, however, new evidence on the spate of election violence shows that the menace is on the increase in eighty per cent of all countries that have conducted elections in Africa within the period under review (Schuld, 2013:1). Despite the fact that some significant successes have been recorded in Africa's democracies, with evidence of where opposition parties are beginning to win elections by defeating ruling candidates, nevertheless, violence still characterises these elections. Supposedly, an election is about the people using the ballot box to determine their destiny, the entrenchment of the rule of law, institutionalisation, reconciliation, development, peace, unity and the capacity of the constitution to domesticate the recklessness of the politicians. Regrettably, due to election violence, it is hampering the efforts at consolidating democracy. It is not surprising therefore that owing to these constraints; it is responsible for the plethora of electoral violence far beyond Nigeria and South Africa, but including countries such as Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and South Africa (Abimbola, 2014; Saka, 2012; Atuobi, n.d; Seifu, 2012; Saka, 2012; ICRtoP, 2015; Cook, 2011; Aljazeera, 2012).

Since the return of democracy in 1999, Kogi State (KGS) and by extension, Nigeria has experienced different forms of electoral violence (Ladan-Baki, 2016). It is crucial at this point

to provide the contextual nature of the political environment in Nigeria and South Africa. This, without doubt, will help serve as a guide to understanding the peculiarity of election violence in Kogi State (KGS) and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Nigeria was replete with a plethora of violent conflicts even before the re-introduction of democracy in 1999. Elaigwu (2005) identifies 138 violent conflicts between 1985 and 2005. There is no doubt that these conflicts had profound repercussions on national cohesion and could have been responsible for some of the electoral violence witnessed (Samson, 2012; Asua, 2013; Oyefusi, 2007; Ijere, 2015). Between 1999 and 2017, all elections conducted in Nigeria have experienced one form of violence or the other (Ladan-Baki, 2015; Cohen, 2015). Even the Nigerian general elections of April 2011 which most observers (local and international) considered to be the fairest in the nation's history (before the 2015 general elections though), yet, there were rioting and destruction that killed hundreds of people in campaign violence (Adesote and Abimbola, 2014; WANEP, 2014).

Without any doubt, the reintroduction of democracy in 1999 in Nigeria opened another chapter of election violence, reminiscent of the experiences of the First Republic where election violence was widespread across the country (Adibe, n.d). There was massive and widespread violence during the first general elections conducted by the civilian administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 which was christened as one of the most fraudulent and corrupt ever conducted (Kurfi, 2005). Evident in the election violence was widespread killings, ballot stuffing, intimidation such that the Human Rights Watch reported that between April and May 2003, about 100 people were said to have been killed with several others sustaining different degrees of injuries (Human Rights Watch, 2004). The same circle of violence also erupted in the 2007 general elections as a result of the irregularities and intimidation of voters, resulting in a severe disorder such as political killings, armed clashes, and bombings (Adesote and Abimbola, 2012; 2014). Between June and August of 2006, three gubernatorial candidates were assassinated (Omotosho, 2007; Ojo, 2017:7-11). The International Foundation for Electoral Systems- IFES-Nigeria (2007) documented evidence of a total of 967 incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria with 180 deaths from January to April 30, 2007. Though the 2015 general elections were relatively peaceful compared to the previous ones nevertheless, there was violence in Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom and Kogi States.

Conducting elections in Kogi State has been problematic to the electoral management bodies as all forms of violence are introduced to mar the polls. The state is a place where gangs and all types of organised violence like muggings, carjackings, kidnappings and armed robberies

are very rife according to the National Working Group on Armed Violence /Action on Armed Violence (NWGAV/AOAV) (NWGAV/AOAV, 2013). Kogi is ranked ninth among twenty-seven states in Nigeria surveyed in terms of the prevalence of political fatalities (Bello, 2014:6). Election violence was witnessed in the state in 2003, 2007, 2008, 2015/16 and the just concluded 2019 general elections. Violence was also recorded during the 2008 local government election (Cohen, 2015; Bello, 2014:6; Human Rights Watch, 2004:35-36; The Cable, April 16, 2015). Furthermore, political thuggery and organised killings by terrorist elements operating under the guise of Boko Haram have been recorded. There is also communal and religious violence, political and electoral contestations; religious and ethnic rivalry, class interests, class antagonism and the recklessness of the politicians which could be among the underlying factors or possible triggers of most election violence in Kogi State and largely in Nigeria (Cleen Foundation, 2011; NWGAV/AOAV, 2013).

Following the violence that greeted the 2003 general elections in Nigeria, the local government elections in 2004 were far more violent than anticipated. In Kogi State, the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Mr Philip Olorunnipa was killed on March 7, and the People's Democratic Party's (PDP) candidate for the Chairmanship of Bassa local government, Luka Shigaba, was also killed on March 3, 2004 (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Several people were killed, and others injured during the elections. It was reported that in Idah local government, a prominent All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) member called Salifu was shot dead while trying to carry away a ballot box (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In Okene local government, fighting between PDP and All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) supporters started early in the morning of April 12. Supporters of both parties used arms to hijack election materials, both in the days preceding the elections and on the election day itself where at least two people were shot dead on April 12.

Fighting between PDP and ANPP supporters had been as common as the one recorded on April 19 in Ogori-Magongo local government, as well as other locations in the state (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Elections had to be halted at several polling stations because of violence and intimidation. An independent election observer reported that in one location, the sounds of gunshots initially scattered voters, who then regrouped to vote. However, Human Rights Watch further stated that there was a stoppage of voting an hour later owing to the smashing of ballot boxes by angry armed thugs at the polling centre. It was further recorded that both the

supporters of ANPP and PDP used weapons to scare voters away by firing sporadically in the air and chanting war songs, says Human Rights Watch 2004. In this particular voting station, the presiding officer was intimidated so that procedures were not properly followed, said the Human Rights Watch. Eventually, some ANPP supporters stole the ballot box under gunfire. A third observer reported that voting at the polling station was stopped after unidentified individuals snatched the ballot box and beat the presiding officer (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 2004). The same cycle of violence has continued up to 2015/2016 and the recently concluded 2019 general elections.

Kogi State, no doubt, has had its share of election violence since the return of democratic rule in 1999 in Nigeria. Election violence in Kogi State is undoubtedly a reflection of the very history, nature and the ethnic composition of the more significant Nigerian state in general and the character of the Kogi people in particular. There are more than ten ethnic groups in the state; however, the dominant ones include Igala, Ebira, and Okun. Whereas the Igalas have held sway to political power since the state's creation, the Ebiras and the Okuns have formed the opposition, and this scenario has changed the political configuration and relations in the state. Omotola (2008) observes that one of the significant causes of election violence in the state is identity. He attributes the problem to the penchant by the Igalas to monopolise and domesticate political power to themselves at the expense of the people.

Idakwoji and Paul (2014) describe election violence in Kogi State as the untamed spread of thuggery. They noted that thugs, used by very powerful elites and supported by the state, have often frustrated attempts at conducting free and fair elections. The existence of thuggery has been made possible because of the failure of the political elites to conform to the ethics and tenets of true democracy. For instance, thugs were used by some powerful political bigwigs to disrupt an Independence Day celebration at a stadium in Lokoja, the state capital, with the State Governor in attendance (Omotola, 2008). Idakwoji and Paul (2014) recorded that, thuggery in Kogi State has been institutionalised to suppress and oppress opposition hence the explosion of violence. On the contrary, Idoko *et al.* (2015) aver that the problem of election violence in Kogi revolves around bad governance and corruption, which has become public policy. They argue that corruption has become a culture such that it has hindered good governance. Thus, any attempt at fighting corruption through the polls by bringing about change in the power equation is always met with violence. The politics of party defection in Kogi State (as common in Nigeria) is adduced to be a factor in fueling election violence (Aloyemi, 2013). Though



political cross carpeting is not a taboo in the real sense of it, however, the manner in which it is done in Kogi State raises many questions. The tradition in Kogi is that politicians defect at any time they perceive their chances of winning an election in a particular political party is slim, to a more saleable party. This in itself destroys trust and is conceived as a betrayal of former party members. The resultant effect is acrimony, hatred, and attacks that are at most times, detrimental to democratic consolidation. Bakare (2013) blames the incessant defection among politicians to a lack of clear political ideology among Nigeria's political parties. It is believed that parties with viable and clear ideologies determine how membership is recruited. However, due to the lack of clear-cut ideology, political parties are always desperate to get members that will facilitate or influence their chances of winning elections.

Since the demise of the apartheid regime and the introduction of democracy, political violence and killings have been frequent in the politics in South Africa generally, and in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Between 1993 to 2008, KZN has witnessed unprecedented levels of violence, including election-related violence (De Waal, 2012). Regrettably, however, between 2009 to date, it is evident that election-related violence has not abated. On a more position note, for instance, the 2009 National and Local elections were surprisingly conducted in a relatively peaceful atmosphere. Nevertheless, events leading to the polls were characterised by violence and intimidation, indicating that violence is still very much part of the political processes in the province (Bruce, 2009). There were several clashes involving supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of the People (COPE). Thus, this has confirmed the argument that intra- and inter-party struggles are the causes of election violence in KZN (Sithole, 2011; de Haas, 2017; Schuld, 2013). It is either because parties are opposed to members of the opposition parties campaigning in the places that they believe to be their territory, or it is the fear of the unexpected (losing elections to the opposition) that is the motivation for the violence. In effect, it can safely be concluded that political parties and their supporters are behind election violence in KZN.

The years between 1993 and 1996, KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN), South Africa witnessed some violent election conflicts. South Africa has had to contend with election violence at different stages of her democratic voyage. While the dimension, spread, and magnitude of election violence may not be the same as that of KGS, Nigeria, nevertheless, it is worth serious consideration. From 1994, when South Africa had its first all-inclusive general elections, pre-election violence, violence during elections and post-election violence were recorded.

Specifically, between July 1993 and April 1994, in the run-up to the elections, 461 people were killed in election-related matters (SAHO, 2016). The post-election period from May 1994 and December of the same year, witnessed the death of 133 people (SAHO, 2016). Violence continued again in 1995, beginning from January to December, where 100 lives were lost (SAHO, 2016; EISA, 2014:95-96).

The circle of violence in KZN continued as there was also violence during the 1999 and 2004 general elections, although with no reported incidents of death. However, intimidation, prevention of electioneering and confrontations among party members were rife. By the 2009 general elections, there were incidences of election violence recorded with one person confirmed dead in a clash between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) while several others sustained injuries in KwaZulu-Natal Province (SAHO, 2016; Schuld, 2013; EISA, 2014). Following the run-up to the 2014 election, 12 political killings were identified in eleven incidents from January 2013 up to the end of February 2014. One person was killed in Limpopo province, while another 11 died in KwaZulu-Natal (EISA, 2014). Data from ISS on the 2014 election violence differ, as 76 incidences of violence were recorded between party supporters and rival communities. Due to the spread of violence, a by-election was consequently conducted in five wards of KwaZulu-Natal province in 2014 after the general elections; violence broke out leading to the deaths of five people (EISA, 2014:95-96). The recently concluded August 3, 2016, local government elections witnessed further electoral violence prior to the elections in five provinces (eNCA, 2016). In Pretoria, there was a violent protest which resulted in the burning of cars with one reported death. Killings were also recorded in Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal province, where at least five persons were killed over a dispute regarding the candidates' list (Haans, 2016).

A study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2016) on a project for the monitoring of public violence, revealed that out of the 76 cases of violence identified since October 1994, at least two-thirds were found to be violent, fifty per cent of the incidences of violence identified happened in metropolitan areas, twenty-nine per cent took place in rural areas while twenty per cent in small towns.

A further breakdown of the indices in terms of percentages show Gauteng (29%) and the Western Cape (21%) experiencing the highest number of election-related incidents, followed by KwaZulu-Natal (15%), the Eastern Cape (14%), Limpopo (8%) and the North West Province (7%). Where the political affiliation of the perpetrators is known, the main

perpetrating party is the ANC (52%), followed by the EFF (26%). Though Gauteng with 29 per cent of public violence was not selected as a sample for this study, instead, KZN was selected. The selection of KZN is predicated on the fact that the province has witnessed perhaps, some frequency of some significant election-related violence than other provinces (Schuld, 2013; EISA, 2014; Mottiar, 2014; US Department of State, 2015; Lancaster, 2016). In addition, the political divide and acrimony between the IFP and the ANC in the province have exacerbated violence has made it a critical subject of interest and investigation, hence the choice of the province. As is common in most unconsolidated democracies, election violence begins with protest actions, which often turn violent, a situation that could be detrimental to the consolidation of democracy.

It is on record that KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Province has had a long history of violence spanning from the colonial/apartheid era to date (Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011; Mottiar, 2010; De Haas, 2016). Violence in KZN is without a doubt connected to the policies of the former apartheid government, particularly with reference to the homelands and recently the hostels (Jarstad and Hoglund, 2015). Between 1994 and 2009, violence in KZN had been fought along political lines (inter-party), mostly involving the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC), the then major opposition party. However, De Haas (2016) noted that election violence in KZN is mostly linked to cadre deployment rather than factionalism. Cadre deployment is a policy by the ANC, and its alliance partners meant to give political power to its loyal members by assigning them to some key government departments and agencies to administer (Twala, 2014b). This kind of deployment has been abused severally by the deployees, a situation that has generated widespread condemnation and criticisms of the policy among South Africans. Also, considering the huge benefits (financial inclusive) that comes with the deployments. There have been intense competitions and lobbying among party members who desire to be deployed too. Consequently, this kind of competition has resulted in rivalry and violence among comrades, leading to killings and assassinations of fellow party members. The author's argument is predicated on the constant conflict that had existed between the IFP and the ANC, which has often resulted in violent confrontations. The 2009 national elections are considered more brutal than ever before witnessed, principally because of the intense and fierce competition between the IFP and the ANC to capture the province at all costs. Eventually, the ANC gained control of the province in the 2009 elections for the first time, but sadly, violence broke out (Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011). In the wake of the 2009 elections, the South African security agencies like the police, the army, the National

Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the traffic police were drafted in to prevent further escalation of violence (Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011).

The years 2014 and 2015 were characterised by a tension between factions within political parties and followed through with threats and killings. Election-related violence in KZN resurfaced again in early 2016 and manifested in the form or context of inter-party tensions in a few contested areas, and intra-party severe tensions over the ANC leadership and 2016 local government election nomination processes. During the first seven months of 2016, 20 politically motivated deaths occurred in the province. Three of those killed – Nompumelelo Zondi, Phosithe Mbatha and Anna Madonsela – were NFP supporters, and another three – Alson Mzwakhe Nkosi, Siyanda Mnguni and Thokozane Majola – were IFP supporters (Eye Witness News, 2016). Fourteen people killed in this incident were affiliated to the ANC.

The continuous occurrence of electoral violence in KZN is a clear sign that the menace has not been carefully addressed. Hoglund and Jarstad (2011) observe that the lack of adequate monitoring of election violence by the government, increases its prevalence. To curtail the spread of election violence, they recommended that strategies of deployment of substantial security personnel to trouble spots and constant voter education on the danger and implications of electoral violence be instituted. Another argument for the spate of electoral violence is the failure by the authority to cater for the victims of electoral violence. Hoglund and Jarstad (2010) posit that a lack of care and support from the government increases the chances of the affected seeking revenge in the subsequent and future elections. However, when these affected individuals and the bereaved are catered for, it reduces their chances of engaging in future violence.

From the preceding, the study hopes to add to the existing body of literature on the unexplored factors contributing to the slow pace of consolidating democracy and the frequent electoral violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa. Importantly, the study has sought to understand the trends of election violence, types and nature, the peculiarities of KGS and KZN to election violence and the similarities and differences of electoral violence, as well as unearth the specific ways through which election violence undermines democratic consolidation efforts in Nigeria and South Africa. Further still, the role of the elites, the politicians, the youths and women, their perceptions, and their disposition towards politics and power has equally added value to this study. On the whole, the general implications of this menace to ensuring that after more than two decades of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa, consolidation of democracy has not been fully achieved has been a vital contribution to this study.

### **1.3 Statement of the Research Problem**

There was an immense joy following the introduction of elective democracy in the Republic of South Africa after the demise of the apartheid regime in 1994. The same excitement existed in the Nigerian political space after the military goons announced their return to the barracks and the reintroduction of democratic rule in 1999. It is important to state here that both the apartheid regime and the long years of military rule were very autocratic and authoritarian with widespread human rights violations, oppression, suppression and the institutionalisation of violence (Mahlokwane, 2018; Gould, 2014; SA News, 2010). Unfortunately, the joy that heralded the introduction of democratic rule in South Africa and the reintroduction of democracy in Nigeria seems to be fading after 25 and 20 years, respectively, of democratic rule with less hope on the horizon owing to election violence. Ideally, the transition from authoritarian regimes is supposed to bring about the consolidation of democracy. This can be achieved through due regard to human rights, respect for the rule of law, strengthening of institutions, constitutionalism and the conduct of periodic, free, fair and credible elections. Democratic consolidation has been described as the "capacity to bring about stability and persistence in a democracy, by imbibing the democratic principles" (Botchway, 2018:4). This democratic principle could be in upholding the constitution, ensuring democratic stability or peaceful coexistence. Corroborating this view, Masipa (2018) agrees that democratic consolidation is when a high premium is placed on the constitution, healing from past wrongs and establishing a society based on democratic values such as social justice, and fundamental human rights.

The current reality is that democracy in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and Kogi State, Nigeria has not been totally free of violence, political killings, intimidation, and suppression of the opposition and citizens alike. There are also the cases of thuggery, disregard to the rule of law, corruption, manipulation of elections through voter rigging, etc. (Steve *et al.*, 2019). These menaces have continued to be a threat to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Efforts have been made by the Nigerian and Kogi State government in collaboration with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations to educate the electorates and the politicians on the need to shun election violence and other forms of election malpractices (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart; 2010:11; Onapajo, 2014:33). For instance, the Alliance for Credible Elections (Ace-Nigeria), an independent election monitor, was central in monitoring and observing elections as an aspect of deepening and consolidating democracy. This was an initiative in collaboration with the Democratic Governance for the Development

(DGD) of the UNDP and the Joint Donor Basket Fund which comprises of the European Union (EU), the Department for International Development (DFID), Korea International Cooperative Agency (KOICA), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These agencies all conducted voter education exercises penultimate to the gubernatorial election in Kogi State, Nigeria (Jimoh, 2011). The same role has equally been played by NGO's and even some religious organisations in KZN, South Africa. Hoglund and Jarstad (2010:2) note that NGOs and other civil society organisations have played the role of preventing election violence, thereby promoting unity, tolerance, and harmony among the political elite and their parties. In addition, Mottiar (2010:110-111) revealed the role played by the KwaZulu-Natal Democratic and Election Forum (KZNDEF) in preventing election related violence in the province.

Despite these efforts at curbing the menace of election violence in the democracies of South Africa and Nigeria, data from several studies suggest that election violence continues to manifest in almost every election (Schuld, 2013a; Fatai, 2017). Recent studies have shown that although the election is central to the consolidation of democracy, its periodical conduct has shown less progress towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria (Fatai, 2017). Fatai attributes the problem to the failure of the institutionalisation of liberal democratic principles such as the rule of law, constitutionalism and political liberty which has been the reason(s) for democratic reversals. Oni *et al.* (2017), alluding to the reasons for the inability to consolidate democracy, said it is due to a lack of effective electoral administration, rampant corruption, manipulation and intrigue from members of electoral management bodies. Interestingly, Ikpe (2014) lamented that election violence has continued to defy every policy put in place to check its occurrence. Ikpe blames the menace on the inept strategies of government and other institutions which have placed too much emphasis on the conduct of elections and administration instead of changing the objectives relating to seeking political office through an election. In another study, Steve *et al.* (2019) noted that electoral offences such as vote-buying, rigging, and thuggery are an albatross to the democratic journey in Nigeria. The authors further argued that these malpractices have often led to election violence, thereby affecting the outcomes of the elections negatively. And sadly, this menace is on the increase instead of abating. Similarly, Ashindorbe (2018) shows that election violence is prevalent especially in Nigeria because of the intense struggles for political power among the political elite. Ashindorbe, in his article, "Electoral violence and the challenge of democratic consolidation in

Nigeria" revealed that election violence has been reversing the previous gains made on the consolidation of democracy.

However, much of the research on election violence and the consolidation of democracy to date has been merely descriptive in nature and has failed to holistically analyse and interpret the role of election violence on the consolidation of democracy. Surprisingly, democratic consolidation and election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa have not been closely examined particularly on an analytical scale. Consequently, not much is known about how election violence contributes to the slow pace of democratic consolidation in these areas. It is also unclear if the different factors and ways through which election violence continues to undermine the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. This, therefore, constitutes the gap which this study seeks to fill, and it is upon this basis that this study was predicated with the aim to help understand and analyse the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

#### **1.4 The Aim of the Study**

Drawing on the case study of Nigeria and South Africa, this study set out to identify and analyse the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa from 1994 to 2017.

#### **1.5 Research Questions**

1. What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa?
2. What is the role of violence in Nigerian and South African electoral processes?
3. What are the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?
4. Drawing inferences from KGS and KZN, how does electoral violence undermine democratic sustainability in Nigeria and South Africa?
5. What are the implications of electoral violence for democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa?
6. How can electoral violence be effectively addressed in Kogi State, Nigeria, and KZN, South Africa to ensure democratic consolidation?

## **1.6 Research Objectives**

1. To identify the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa
2. To examine the role of violence in the electoral processes of KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa.
3. To unpack the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS and KZN.
4. To investigate how electoral violence undermines democratic sustainability in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa using illustrations from KGS and KZN?
5. To analyse the implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria, and South Africa?
6. To propose mitigating strategies for electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa.

## **1.7 Significance of the Study**

This study is very significant as it has helped to reveal ways in which election violence has constituted a real setback to efforts at consolidating democracy, not just in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, but a larger Nigeria and South Africa. Through the data that was generated and subjected to empirical analysis using qualitative, thematic and matrix analyses, the findings of this thesis study have shown how the colonisation of Africa and the subsequent incorporation into the international capitalist system has negative repercussions on election violence. Similarly, the current relations between Africa and the international capitalist world and its high expectations from these former colonies is another motivating cause of election violence in Nigeria and South. Also, important to note is the affirmation by this study of the nefarious activities of the political elite in exacerbating election violence. This study is also significant in that it has been able to help bring about an understanding of how election violence is slowing the consolidation of democracy, and how it breeds bad governance and bad leadership styles. This study has equally contributed to the understanding of how illiteracy and a lack of political and educational qualifications among the ruling elite have not only led to election violence but are detrimental to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

## **1.8 Justification for the Study**

The driving force behind the choice of this topic arises from the fact that the concept of democratic consolidation, though relatively new in the scholarship of political science as well



as democratic study itself, is often ambiguous to understand. Its perception and relevance differ from person to person. Besides, its vague nature has equally impeded a holistic understanding of the concept. What criteria should be used to determine a consolidated democracy from an unconsolidated one? Whereas the concept of electoral violence may have received a wide scholarly interrogation, democratic consolidation is yet to receive the same. Interestingly, most of the scholars who have championed the discourse on democratic consolidation are mostly political sociologists, as such; a contribution from political scientist would be of tremendous importance. Added to this, is the contribution of scholars from Africa on the politics of Africa about which most European and American scholars do not have a proper understanding. Therefore, the major focus of this study is on the application of elite, game, frustration-aggression and the postcolonial constructivist theories to extrapolate the ways through which electoral violence constitutes a setback in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa; with due regards to the peculiarity of Africa and Africans.

An analysis of the nature, dimension and the impact of electoral violence on both countries is appropriate for investigation. It has, as a matter of fact, added a significant contribution to the body of knowledge and expected value to academic discourse, by filling the intellectual void in the literature *vis-à-vis* democratic consolidation and electoral violence in two of Africa's leading economies. The justification for this study was not just to examine electoral violence in both countries but further than that, to unpack the internal security implications of this menace in Nigeria and South Africa, across their sub-regions and the continent at large. Again, the study examined the dangerous trend of electoral violence and the sustainability of democracy in the chosen areas.

## **1.9 Methodology**

The research methodology adopted for this study is a qualitative research technique using a case study. This study identified the qualitative research technique as the best data control method so that findings can be cross-checked as a reliable and valid way to understand complex social realities. The study was further underpinned by the interpretivist research paradigm. Interpretivism gives the researcher permission to carefully study a phenomenon from personal experience rather than based on an acquired one either from within or imposed outside. The research methodology also outlines the research design, research approaches, the research population and the sample used for the study. Similarly, the methodology discusses the method of data collection, data quality control and data analysis used for this study. Among some of the instruments that were used for data collection are: interviews, documentary analysis and

focus group discussions. The data that was collected was analysed using a combination of deductive, thematic and Matrix for better interpretation and analysis.

### **1.10 Definition of Key Concepts**

In all academic research, concepts are often used with the intension of conveying meaning to the readers. A careful and proper operationalised concepts give a better understanding of the relationship between concepts. In this thesis, conceptual clarification/discourse of some concepts relevant to the study among is given, these are democracy, democratic consolidation, election, election violence, pre-election violence, post-election violence, political violence, and political leadership, hoping to bring clarity to the researcher's usage of these terminologies.

#### **1.10.1 Democracy**

The concept of democracy is very contentious among scholars and writers on democracy universally (Omeje, 2001; Sobowale, 2013; Ibietan and Ajayi, 2015). Musau, (2009) shared a similar view saying that democracy is a very elusive and contested concept that means different things to different people. Larok (2011) posits that democracy is not just about the skills of managing society and people, but equally a way of life which people have chosen as being suitable for them. Larok further reasons that democracy as a moral necessity has to do with mankind's inherent natural aspiration for complete freedom, and a more humane social and political order. Democracy from this study's perspective is seen not just as a form of government where the wishes of the people prevail and are accepted, rather, where the will of the people is not just sought after but has become a pre-requisite of national objectives and interest.

#### **1.10.2 Democratic Consolidation**

Omotola (2002) conceptualised democratic consolidation to mean a position whereby the state has attained a level of maturity to the extent that it cannot be overthrown by any force irrespective of its nature, magnitude and or power within and without the political system. This implies that democratic consolidation is when a state has overcome all centrifugal forces and has developed values that place national interest before personal pursuits. Kaur (2007) argues that credible opposition is needed to replace an existing government by presenting alternative policies and programmes that are more appealing to the majority of the electorate. By way of clarification, democratic consolidation suggests a deliberate political process in a political

society in which democracy is widely and profoundly legitimised amongst the citizenry such that it is very difficult to break down (Osinakachukwu and Jawan, 2011). It is the legitimisation of democracy that makes it the people's government based upon the will and choice of the people. To consolidate a democracy, therefore, there is need for behavioural and institutional reforms that normalise democratic politics and significantly narrow its uncertainties (Majekodunmi and Adejuwon, 2012). Democratic consolidation is a by-product of good governance which encompasses accountability, the security of life and liberties, decentralisation of powers and respect for local autonomy, and when this is missing, it all constitute a challenge to democratic regimes (Eyinla, 2000:22). In essence, democratic consolidation is a status which developed democracies have achieved such that, the policies, programmes and decisions of government are people-centric and seek to promote national unity. It is far above the interests of a specific group(s) or individuals.

#### 1.10.3 Election

An election can be defined as an officially acceptable process of selecting a person(s) for public office or registering a political proposition through voting (Gwinn and Norton, 1992). The processes of electing representatives are well prescribed and are contained in the constitutions or the electoral Acts of such a state as a legal document. Elections are not just cardinal characteristics of democratic governance, but a confirmation that sovereignty truly belongs to the people. Majekodunmi and Adejuwon (2012) assert that elections give meaning to people only in a democratic context as it leads to the selection of decision makers through the choice of the majority of the citizens. Thus, elections and democracy are inextricably linked (Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011). For any elections to be considered acceptable and used as a yardstick for democratic sustainability, it must be free and fair; the electoral laws must be applied to all political parties and individuals as well as the institutions of government. Although, the notion of free and fair elections presupposes several conditions, which include the absence of manipulation, violence and fraud; it equally emphasises the impartiality of the electoral body (electoral commission) and encourages mass participation by the electorate at all stages of the electoral process (Alemika and Omotosho, 2008). An election is viewed as a mutual security pact and operates with coherent consent of the elite under conditions of bound uncertainty (Przeworski, 1991:12).

#### 1.10.4 Election Violence

Electoral violence is a form of political violence differentiated by its timing, perpetrators and victims, objectives, and methods (Bekoe 2012:2). Some election violence emanates from policy formulation and implementation of electoral laws leading up to the conduct of the polls itself. When such policies are made to favour a particular interest such as a political party, ruling elites and or an ethnic group - particularly in developing countries of Africa, violence is likely to erupt as the sanctity of the process, and the poll has already been tainted. Thus, any random or organised action taken to determine, delay or in any way influence an electoral process through the application of threat, verbal attack, hate speech, blackmail, destruction of property, physical assault and assassination is viewed as electoral violence (Fischer, 2002:8). One common feature that differentiates electoral violence from political violence is that electoral violence is often utilised with the aim of achieving specific political objectives that will usually affect the entire electoral process and outcome. Secondly, it may take place at all levels/stages either before the election, during the election or after the election; and thirdly, different actors are involved (state and non-state actors) which is why the process of electoral dispute resolution is often complex as many parties are involved and often end up in deadlocks (Seifu, 2012).

#### 1.10.5 Pre-election Violence

Pre-election violence, as the name suggests, is a form of electoral violence that takes place before the conduct of the polls. As already established, election violence can be in the form of, or classified into; pre-election violence, violence on the day of the election and post-election violence. Whichever category the violence falls, electoral violence is a threat to democracy and the quest for democratic consolidation efforts, particularly in developing countries. Besides being a threat, it depicts a serious political immaturity among the ruling elite and the different class structures in the polity. Moreso, it goes to show the level of internal contradictions and dynamics prevailing in the political society. Contributing to the discourse on pre-election violence Chaturvedi (2005:189) described it as "a form of electoral manipulation which can be substituted with the ideological exhortation". He argues that in an electoral contest involving two parties, the chances for pre-election violence will significantly reduce as the fraction of undecided voters goes up. Expatiating further Wilkinson (2006) perceives pre-election violence as a form of strategic manipulation that politicians often adopt to increase their share of the vote in a very close electoral contest. The reaction to the manipulation of the elites regarding the election outcomes constitutes pre-election violence.

Crucial to this discourse is that most pre-election violence is organised even before the conduct of the polls, either by the ruling party with the view of winning the elections or destabilising the entire process if they perceive that the outcome of the polls may not go in their favour (Hyde and Jablonski, 2013). Sometimes, the opposition could equally have planned it, intending to effect a change of government to their favour, or by forcing the entire exercise to be discredited and thereby bringing about power sharing between the contending forces through mediation and negotiations from the international community. However, one effect of pre-election violence is that the scale of violence and the intimidation could reduce the electoral outcome as electorates are afraid to go out and exercise the franchise. Secondly, it changes the voting pattern into either ethnic religious or any primordial affiliation, thereby further deepening the divisions within the polity. The ruling party would at the end of the day be declared the winner of the polls, and the circle of violence will continue if there is no genuine change (Kuhn, 2013:3). Pre-election violence could snowball into post-election violence if not handled with deep political maturity.

#### 1.10.6 Post-election Violence

Post-election violence is that form of violence that takes place after the announcement of the outcome of an election. When political candidates contest in competitive elections, it is expected that a winner will certainly emerge. So, the loser(s), under normal situations are supposed to congratulate the winner after the declaration of the final results and then wait patiently for the next polls to strategise on how to reclaim power. In reality, most election losers in developing democracies rarely accept defeat, and because of that, they often instigate violence by proxy (through their supporters) where real carnage is unleashed on innocent people in the form of post-election violence (Kuhn, 2013).

Post-election violence, according to Okpotor (2015:8), is "spontaneous or well organised acts of intimidation, coercion or physical harm that occur in respect of competition for the electoral position, which is aimed at changing electoral outcomes, which often occur shortly after the announcement of election result". The spontaneous actions are mostly perpetrated by supporters of the losing candidates and often instigated, by the losers themselves. The phase of the post-election cycle begins, argued Genyi (2015), from the time of collation to the announcement of the result, and subsequently, legal suit may be taken, and likely mediation of election dispute if violence does take place. At this stage, violence includes attacks on election officials, opposition candidates, party officials and their supporters, election infrastructures

such as offices and election materials belonging to the electoral body. Thus, if post-election violence is not handled with strong political will and wisdom, it could degenerate into full political violence, which is almost always dangerous.

#### 1.10.7 Political Violence

Electoral violence is synonymous with political violence; the only difference is the objectives, pattern, and the character of the violence. In the view of Dumouchel (n.d), political violence is "any violence that has become legitimised through the very simple fact that it happened". It is also a pattern of violence perpetrated in a political context or conflict, or that is related in its cause, motive, and its political issues. Balcell (2015:2) defines political violence as "a repertoire of a combination of actions that may involve strong use of physical force resulting in damage to [an] opponent in order to impose political aims". It could manifest through mass protests, a coup and terrorism, riots, pogroms, ethnic cleansing and even genocide (Kalyvas, 2013). Political violence is the use of brutal force by a group of people with a specific political purpose and interest which they seek to achieve at all cost. It could be motivated by a particular ideology with either some religious, ethnic, social, economic and or political motivation. Most political violence is a manifestation of political failure. Bad governance is synonymous with the politics of developing countries as they are bedevilled with a plethora of socio-economic and political problems, and irresponsible leadership at various levels of government.

#### 1.10.8 Political Leadership

Leadership plays a crucial role in the stability and development of every political society. In a democratic setting for instance, leaders are elected by the electorate (people) and are supposed to be bound by a contract. Thus, once elected, leaders are expected to take decisions only after due consultation with the people, especially in a democracy. Morrell and Harley (2006:484) define a political leader to mean "a democratically elected representative who is vulnerable to deselection and operates within, as well as influences a constitutional and legal framework". The authority of the political leader is sourced from a mandate. That is, he is only granted permission to govern based on declared policies, considered as formally granted by the electorate, upon the decisive outcome of an election. Morrell and Harley explain that since the political leader claims power through the electorate, the wishes, as well as the interests of the people, are supposed to be his top priority. Meanwhile, political leaders are elected rather than appointed and act as representatives of the people. Therefore, they are duty bound to serve all their constituents and ensure that their future interests and that of their generations are

protected. Political leaders should be more concerned about bringing political order, fostering unity and ensuring that they are indeed perfect examples to the youth (Horton, 2007).

### **1.11 Scope of the Study**

The scope of this study covers the period between 1994 and 2017 for both Nigeria and South Africa. For instance, the year 1994 marks the period when South Africa entered into the league of countries where democracy was accepted and practised after the dismantling of the apartheid regime. Nigeria too returned to democratic rule in 1999 after the military reluctantly organised and handed back power to the civilians. The choice of this period is significant in that it is the time when the full democratic credentials of these two so-called big African economies was tested. Moreover, while Nigeria is located in the western part of Africa exerting much influence within the sub-region, South Africa is located on the southern tip of Southern Africa.

### **1.12 Limitations of the Study**

This study was faced with a number of constraints, among which is the lack of cooperation from some of the respondents with regards to the topic, as some were reluctant to participate despite assurances from the researcher of absolute anonymity and protection. Some participants were unwilling to contribute fearing they might be persecuted for speaking the truth. Others, like politicians, were too busy to grant an audience or participate. However, those who willingly participated gave 100 per cent of their time. Despite these few limitations, the data for this study was fully collected and analysed to produce this thesis. Similarly, the study was constrained by funds as the money needed by the researcher to travel to Nigeria and other parts of KwaZulu-Natal for data collection at the sampled locations was a huge challenge to the researcher. Though the research assistants recruited in the conduct of the interview did their very best despite the lack of funds to motivate them, nonetheless, their best was not a hundred per cent. While it may be difficult to find evidence of the intervention impact of research grants, Langfeldt, Bloch, and Sivertsen (2015:256) aver that competitive grant schemes are set up with the intention of improving research performance. For this particular study the researcher did not access any research grants, thus limiting the research process. The research could have covered more if funding was available to go beyond the present scope and perhaps achieve much more than what has been achieved. Despite these challenges, data was collected and analysed to bring about the final draft of this thesis.

### **1.13 Study Layout**

This study consists of ten chapters and each chapter is designed to address a specific problem raised in the course of the research. Chapter two discusses the literature review and the theoretical framework. That is to say, the theoretical understanding of election violence and democratic consolidation. This is basically in the form of a review of literature relating to the study on election violence and democratic consolidation. Here the chapter examines, in detail, democratic consolidation as a concept, the constraints to democratic consolidation and then democracy and election violence. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the causations of election violence by looking at the nature of politics, the nature of elections and electoral institutions. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the theories employed for this study. Among the theories are the elite theory, frustration-aggression theory, post-colonial constructivist theory and then the games theory. Each of these theories was discussed and linked to the data collected and analysed to make generalisations as contained in the findings of this research thesis.

Chapter three describes and discusses the theoretical understanding of election violence and democratic consolidation in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The chapter examines some historical context of KZN in the wider South Africa, the political system and organisation of the province and the country at large. The composition of the South African electoral system is discussed, along with parliament, the pattern of elections and how seats are allocated to political parties after the elections. The electoral institutions are explained, the nature of election violence in South Africa, and political killings/assassinations as a form of election violence.

The historical perspectives of election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria, form part of chapter four. Here the historical overview of the state is carried out, the political configurations, the economy of the state and an understanding of Nigeria's general electoral system. The electoral institutions of the Nigerian state are discussed, the historical perspective of electoral violence in Nigeria, electoral laws and the role of political parties in the electoral processes, as well as election violence. Lastly, the chapter concludes with an examination of the challenges associated with political killings and assassinations.

The methodologies through which this study is organised and conducted constitute chapter five of this research thesis. The chapter describes the methods and the tools used in the conduct of the research. Here the research paradigm is described using interpretivism as a philosophical paradigm to give meaning to election violence in Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter goes



further to discuss the research design and the research techniques adopted for the study. Qualitative research techniques were used with a case study as a method, while the research sample and population, as well as the recruitment strategy, explained. The method of data collection and the description of the instrument of research is properly discussed. The chapter concludes with the ethical considerations that embodied the informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality required in the research.

In chapter six, the focus is on the discussion of the findings of the data collected from the field. The chapter also, in the course of the analysis, attempts to answer the questions raised for this study from chapter one. In effect, chapter six is based on the first research question which seeks to understand the factors slow pacing democratic consolidation In Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Also, the chapter examines the manipulation of religion and ethnicity by the elite, political parties and their failed promises to the people, illiteracy and the lack of educational and political education, and bad leadership and governance as some of the factors slow pacing democratic consolidation. The chapter lastly discusses the monetisation of electoral politics, greed and the increasing levels of violence as all factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa.

Chapter seven discusses two of the research questions asked in this study. Specifically, the chapter analyses the two research questions about what the role of violence in the electoral process is as well as the trends of violence during election time in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter discusses how election violence lowers the pace and space of democracy, creates enmity, and its motivation by business and resource interests. In discussing the trends of violence, the chapter examines impunity and imposition of candidates, vote buying, use of material incentives to influence voting patterns and funding of thugs to facilitate winning elections by instilling fear in the hearts of the people. And finally, the chapter discusses intimidation, killings and intra- and inter-party killings.

Chapter eight provides the answers to the research question that seeks to know the ways in which election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. The lack of free and fair elections, destruction of life and property, increasing levels of instability and lawlessness are discussed. Also discussed are the sharp divisions and unhealthy rivalry among the political elite, the loss of electoral credibility and bad leadership and governance as a consequence of election violence.

In chapter nine, the discussion is about the research questions that seek to understand the implications and mitigating strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter discusses the lack of electoral credibility and lawlessness, political stagnation and the absence of fresh ideas in governance, and then the worsening economic situation that exacerbates political apathy.

Chapter ten provides the summary, conclusions and recommendations of all previous chapters, as well as an evaluation of the research goals and objectives. The aim of this chapter is to present the conclusions drawn from the results of the analysis of the interviews and focus group discussions and to then make recommendations for further research.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Election violence has remained one of the greatest challenges confronting democracy in the continent of Africa. In the preceding chapter, it was discovered that since the introduction of electoral democracy in most parts of the continent, violence has characterised most of the elections conducted. As election violence continues, it represents a significant threat not only to political stability but to democratic consolidation. This chapter, therefore, undertakes a review of literature that relates to election violence and democratic consolidation. Importantly, the chapter has been structured into the following parts. The first section undertakes a definition of concepts relevant to the study, such as elections, electoral process, violence, democracy, and democratic consolidation. The next section discusses the causes of election violence according to existing literature, drawing influence from Kristine Hoglund's analysis. Under it (Hoglund's analysis), the nature of politics, the nature of elections, and electoral institutions are discussed. The last section of the chapter will then examine the theoretical framework upon which the study is anchored, and finally, conclusions will be drawn.

### **2.2 Democratic Consolidation**

The researcher has already defined and described the concept of democracy right from its historical roots to the present times. From this point, the focus is on conceptualising democratic consolidation. In addition, this chapter looks at the characteristics of a consolidated democracy and some of the constraints to the consolidation of democracy.

#### **2.2.1 Defining Democratic Consolidation**

Consolidation put simply, is a fundamental way of evaluating and rating the quality of democracy in any political society. The beauty of democracy generally is to ensure that democratic values and practices are upheld constantly by its practitioners. From the role played by political parties, the major institutions of the state and elites must be geared toward sustaining democracy and upholding its tenets and values.

For the purpose of clarity, Gasiorowski and Power (1998:741-743) define democratic consolidation as a process through which a newly formed democratic regime or government becomes effectively sturdy to the extent that the chances of democratic collapse (that is to say, a retrogression to authoritarianism or non-democratic rule) are highly doubtful. Although, it is very difficult to understand the elements that constitute this durability and at what stage that breakdown becomes very unlikely. The confusion though among scholars is that some have

equated consolidation with strengthening and the legitimisation of democratic institutions rather than differentiating them (O'Donnell, 1992; Whitehead, 1989:79; Schmitter, 1988:12; Collier, 2009; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Kearsy, 2007; Przeworski, 2000; Schedler, 2001). Without a doubt, the two concepts are familiar and similar; little wonder they have been implied to mean the same.

For instance, (Schedler, 2001:70, 2017) argues that democratic consolidation goes beyond mere institutionalisation and the internalisation of democratic tenets and values. Schedler further emphasises that a consolidated democracy has eliminated all anti-democratic elements that serve as obstacles to its sustainability. He listed such factor or elements to include election violence, a refusal to participate in an election and the electoral process by any party owing to unfriendly atmospheres and conditions. Others include any attempt to control, manipulate, and influence electoral outcomes as well as an infringement on the principles entrenched commonly in most liberal democracies. While this study agrees with Schedler, he failed to explain the role of the political elites as principal culprits in undermining democratic consolidation in developing democracies. Similarly, the author did not mention the impact of poverty, inequality, weak institutions of the state, corruption as some of the factors that serve as a constraint the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria respectively.

In pursuit of a better understanding of democracy, Przeworski (1999) describes emerging democracies as proto/pseudo-democracies that have succeeded only in meeting the criteria of being accepted as a democracy but lack the basic ingredients. His submission draws from the works of Schumpeter who wrote prophetically and predicted the future sequence of the journey into democracy. Schumpeter (1942:269), in his book titled “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, coined the word ‘minimalist’ to mean a form of democracy where the election of leaders comes about without any serious competition. Espousing this view, Bidner *et al.* (2015:5-7) sum up democracies in developing countries as instances where the election of individuals into a government is done by a mere toss of a coin and may not necessarily be fair. The citizens appear helpless with no electoral approval and the incumbent lack any form of electoral decorum to behave reasonably. The concept of a minimalist democracy, as argued by Igbokwe-Ibeto *et al.* (2016), is an aftermath-oriented perception of democracy or, at best, a maximalist view of democratic consolidation. Without a doubt, both political and socio-economic conditions are needed by a country for democracy to be fully consolidated. On the contrary, this may not be very correct as these conditions may exist; however, new factors like ethnicity, religion, and greed among politicians could jeopardise any attempt at consolidating

democracy. Im (1996) believes a proposition that involves not only procedural democracy but substantive elements of democracy such as respect for basic civil rights of the people and the control of the military by the civilians as well.

There are a number of structural factors identified in the literature that could serve as a constraint to the growth and development of democracy (Gasiorowski and Power, 1998). The study by Gasiorowski and Power argues that there are a number of political processes which affect democratic consolidation directly and possibly lead to its breakdown. In most cases, as in the article observed, these processes are embedded in a multidimensional social context shaped by some structural factors. Gasiorowski and Power further explain that many of these exert so much influence on the very character of the state. After that, there is no doubt that chances for democratic consolidation to take place are impeded. Von Holtd (2013) links some, of these structural factors as significant triggers of electoral violence that serve as a danger to democratic consolidation. Some of the structural factors that could potentially impede democratic consolidation in most developing countries including South Africa and Nigeria may include issues that relate to development-related socioeconomic factors, the contamination consequences of democratic neighbours and lastly, high inflation each significantly affect the likelihood of consolidation. Others include corruption, poverty, electoral violence, state capture, ethnic chauvinism, weak institutions, and lack of independent electoral umpire.

In seeking better ways of strengthening democracies and consolidating its gains, Przeworski (1991) sees some multiple political forces competing within an institutional framework. Przeworski argues that democracy will be deemed consolidated, “when under a given political and economic conditions, a specific system of institutions ultimately becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institution” (Przeworski (1991:10). The democratic corridor, in this case, is the one where the rules and the norms of the game and are respected and followed to the letter by the game players. Expatiating on Przeworski’s conception of democratic consolidation, Omilusi (2015:42) maintains that democracy is deemed consolidated when compliance (i.e. acting within the democratic institutional framework) is the equilibrium of decentralised approaches of all the relevant political forces.

In actual fact, the strengthening and deepening of the democracy from societies coming out of dictatorial regimes and very close political systems to a much more open and perhaps liberal society is associated with the consolidation of democracy (Kearsey, 2013:13). The author’s

description of the journey into democratic consolidation fits accurately into the historical realities of Nigeria and South Africa perfectly, owing to the latter's long battle with apartheid before a peaceful transfer of power was negotiated in the 1990s. We can also relate the same experience to Nigeria, a country that was notorious for military interregnum before the reintroduction of democracy in the late 1990s. So, democratic consolidation is mostly associated with democratic regimes rather than authoritarian and one-party regimes. The term 'consolidation', in the view of Schedler (1997:6), simply connotes movement and arrival, progress, and achievement. Schedler, in this article, expounds further that consolidation presupposes firmness, robustness, stability, and soundness. The author further describes democratic consolidation as something that is much more qualitative, very sound, and well-done, a more valuable thing due to its essential quality. In this sense, democratic consolidation is all about democratic maturity involving all facets of the political system. It is a kind of maturation that is far above individual and group influences capable of undermining the institution of the state and, above all, the sovereignty of the state.

Speaking further on maturity, Omotola (2002) conceptualises democratic consolidation to mean a situation where a state has attained a level of maturity such that any force cannot overthrow it, irrespective of its nature, magnitude, and power within or foreign to the state. This implies democratic consolidation is when a state has overcome all centrifugal forces and has developed values and a culture that places national interest far above personal pursuits. To sustain democracy, therefore, Kaur (2007) argues that credible opposition is needed to replace an existing government by presenting alternative policies and programmes that are more appealing to the majority of the electorate. By way of clarity, the author sees democratic consolidation as a deliberate political process in a political society where democracy is widely and completely legitimised amongst the citizenry; and that it is very difficult to break down the bond that holds the citizens (Ojo, 2008; Osinakachukwu and Jawan, 2011).

To consolidate a democracy, therefore, there is a need for change in behaviours and institutional reforms that normalize democratic politics, and largely narrow its uncertainties (Majekodunmi and Adejuwon, 2012). This may include the conduct of the citizens concerning the rule of law, due regards to fundamental human rights, attitudes toward political activities, honesty, justice, love, and tolerance. The evidence of a consolidated democracy will bring about good governance that encompasses responsible leadership, accountability, adequate provision of security of life and property, a guarantee of liberties, decentralisation of powers, and respect for local autonomy (Eyinla, 2000: 22). Eyinla believes that the by-products of

consolidation strengthen democratic regimes and make them more attractive to its apostles and citizens alike.

Apart from the fact that consolidated democracies allow for competitive and periodic elections, they also allow political parties to compete for a power change. The alternation of political power among political parties gives the citizens a sense of the type of party suitable to meet the needs of the state at a particular time. Elaborating further on power alternation, O'Donnell (1996:34) states that:

*“A democracy is considered consolidated only if there is power alternation between and among oppositions and rivals, continues support to the government even during seemingly difficult economic adversity; rebellion is defeated and punished (like the case of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria) while the government remains stable and focus in the midst of restructuring of a major institution like the party system, without the existence of any major opposition to the political system.”*

Although the beauty of democracy is that it allows for opposition to challenge the ruling party, ideological differences of political parties, and even individuals and groups, still exist and must not be allowed to constitute a threat to the stability of the state. This is because the interest of the state supersedes the interest of all. The ultimate goal of the state is the development of the state's capacity to defend her territorial integrity; the people and their interests should be the major preoccupation of the political leaders in the state.

Schmitter (1992) argues that a democracy is considered consolidated when social relations become social values. When this is achieved, Schmitter believes that the pattern of interaction becomes regular and meaningful, motivating behaviour that resists any form of external influence or change to values imbibed already. Espousing Schmitter's views, Linz and Stepan (1996) agree that democracies can be described as consolidated if they become behaviourally, attitudinally, and constitutionally internalised. Thus, once a democratic culture has been entrenched and internalised by both the elite and the citizens in the politics of a state, it is very likely, violent electoral conflicts could be effectively managed or possibly eradicated.

According to Diamond (2013), democratic consolidation reveals the quality, the depth, and the originality of democracy in different dimensions and the tremendous improvement it has witnessed. The author further states that it examines if the political competition has become fairer, vigorous, and executive, while participation and representation become much broader, autonomous, and all inclusive. The article sought to know if civil liberties are comprehensive

and rigorously protected and if accountability becomes systematic and transparent without ambiguity. At a regional level, Africa *et al.* (1995:227-228) blatantly argue that “the consolidation of democracy in Africa requires a form of noticeable practical relationship between political accountability and the value of government”. Clapham and Wiseman insist that just like with economic development, there is a conceivable clash between the principles of accountability which should, in the long term, create more effective systems of government geared toward public welfare, and in the short-term expedients, specifically political patronage, to which elected governments may be drawn. So, in every political regime, there is a dominant form of characteristics that it is identified with.

### 2.2.2 Forms of Political Regimes

Contemporary studies of democratisation have identified forms of political regimes that are common with certain characteristics being evident in most of them. Schedler (1997:7-11) highlights four forms of political regimes that determine and describe democratic consolidation; namely, authoritarian regime, semi-democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy.

#### **a. Authoritarian Regimes**

An authoritarian regime is the one where the population is deprived of their rights to select their political leaders (Stoddard, 2017). It is broadly categorised under totalitarianism. Under authoritarian regimes, authority is generally centralized, and there is an absence of political freedom. Authoritarian democracies do not seek to uphold the rule of law and do not have due regards to human rights. This is in contrast with democracy as a system of government where the people are empowered to choose their leaders (Poplak, 2018). In fact, it is evidently non-democratic as all the key elements that characterise a democracy are nonexistent.

#### **b. Semi-democracy:**

This is a form of democracy that seems to have both the features of authoritarianism and democracy. The term is mainly associated with democracies that are relatively stable but combine the elements of authoritarianism and democracy (Diamond, 2012; Case, 1993; Sedelius and Linde, 2018). Mostly semi-democracies are characterized by a dominant political party where the opposition is allowed to conduct what looks like free elections. In most cases, the dominant party holds the sway of power through fraudulent means while in other instances, elections may be fair, but the electioneering campaigns are not (Everdell, 2000). Any democracy that appears to be struggling towards improvement and consolidation is qualified



as semi-democracy. Good examples of semi-democracies are found in Latin America and Africa.

***c. Liberal Democracy:***

In a liberal democracy, the structures are built upon the idea of civil and political rights. In addition to free, competitive, and all-inclusive elections, it allows for choices to be made by the citizens without molestation. Liberal democracy is a concern with minimum procedures and political systems through which political parties enjoy the privilege of competing to capture power and control the government through free and fair elections (Anton, 2017). Liberal democracy is built upon respect for human rights, competitive elections, a free market economy, liberalism, and they promote capitalism (Pan, 2017). In a liberal democracy, the constitution is supreme and political decisions are guided by the latter and the spirit of the law.

***d. Advanced Democracy:***

Advanced democracy is simply described as those countries or democracies that are associated with institutionalism and have attained a very high level of economic development, their Human Development Index (HDI) is rated among the top 10; Prosperity exists where the GDP at PPP is over \$8000 (O'Neil, n.d:1). Advanced democracies were initially known as the first world (Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain, 2004:128). Advanced democracies are not just related to western countries but include recent democracies or democratisers and post-communist countries that share or bare the element of economic development and democracy (Dalton *et al.*, 2004:128-129; Schedler, 1997:7-11).

From the forms of regimes discussed above, the depth democracy being practiced and by extension the nature of that political society is explained. It further explains the role the citizens play in their governance, and the economic opportunities available to all, in addition, this shows the way justice is dispensed and whose interest the state protects. According to Schedler (1997), the four forms or typologies of political regimes, as discussed above, lead to five key concepts of democratic consolidation. These concepts are; avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy, and deepening democracy.

### 2.2.3 Schedler's Five Key Concepts of Democratic Consolidation

Schedler lists five main key concepts that are visibly associated with democratic consolidation. They are discussed below:

### **a. Avoiding a Democratic Breakdown**

To avoid a democratic breakdown as described by Schedler (1997) is a stage where key political actors have been bound after the transition from a former undemocratic regime, such that their political coherence prevents any attempt at the democratic breakdown. The major preoccupation of these political actors, as revealed in the article, is to ensure the survival of the democratic regime. The focus of this part of consolidation is to see that the goals of democracy are sustained continuously, carefully maintained and that this should be done persistently. In furtherance of the goals of democracy, the author argues that the survival, permanence, endurance, virtue of resilience, viability, and irreversibility of democracy must be entrenched into the political life of that polity. In effect, the central emphasis of all these arguments is essentially focused on ensuring that democracy is kept alive, by preventing it from rapid death (O'Donnell, 1992).

### **b. Avoiding the Erosion of Democracy**

Among some of the challenges faced by developing democracies is the threat that some anti-democratic forces continue to present to it. These anti-democratic forces employ all kinds of strategies aimed at the erosion of democratic values by relapsing into being less transparent and gradually descending into authoritarianism. In other words, it is the frequent and systematic attempt of the weakening democracy and its values through flagrant disregard to the rule of law by elected leaders (Huntington, 1996; Schedler, 1997:14-15). However, when democracy has developed and matured, it tends to work toward avoiding all forms of democratic erosion.

The erosion of democratic values begins with the introduction of state violence, the management of democratic decay instead of addressing or removing it, the subversion of the rule of law as a result of the absence of the state's presence. O'Donnell and Schedler further note that the emergence of dominant political parties may stifle competitive elections, this leads to the deterioration of electoral institutions and, ultimately, interferes with the virtue of honesty in counting votes. The authors in the articles also raise the concern that incumbents often abuse power invested into them and the privileges they have toward state resources to muzzle the media in a way they deem fit. They often contravene acceptable international standards of conducting elections and running state affairs. On the contrary, however, if these negative trends are carefully addressed, all subtle means of democratic erosion will be avoided, thereby consolidating democracy. That is, democratic consolidation becomes a possibility and less a risk only if the negative trends are turned to positives in order to guarantee consolidation.

### **c. Institutionalizing Democracy**

Modern democracies are built around strong institutions. Burchard (2015) agrees when he states that democratic consolidation is synonymous with strong institutional building, the construction of tangible, lower-level institutions regarding types of government, bureaucracies of the state, and systems of interest involving at the internal level in particular. As observed by Schedler (1997:17-18), there is a character shift in consolidated democracies among actors as they see democratic institutions as a central part of the formal and acceptable order of doing things. No doubt, institutions strengthen democracy and make it more attractive, responsible, and receptive to the people. Schmitter (1988:12) agrees when he states, “democratic consolidation transforms the disorganised way of doing things, imbibe sensible norms and provide remedial panaceas which may have been formed or grouped into structures”. That is to say, Schmitter means that democratic consolidation builds a relationship that is well known, practised frequently, and has a wider acceptability, generally.

Normatively, therefore, the goal of institutionalisation is to either prevent the regression of democracy or effecting democratic advances. Institutions works through contributing to democratic stability and quality as the activities of government are done based on the constitutional description of the task by every organ and institution of the state. Thus, institutionalisation is the mark of an established and matured democracy where state institutions are independent, strong, and devoid of the manipulation of the political class and the major political elite. Where institutions have been strengthened, a sign of democratic completeness is shown, and there is a reduction in the tendencies for economic related conflict (Oyefusi, 2007:19-20).

### **d. Completing Democracy**

Completing democracy is about the progression of democracy from its very rudimentary stages to a much more developed, advanced, and established state (Schedler, 1997). It symbolises all that a complete liberal democracy entails, contextualizing it within the framework of its very environment. A consolidated democracy is a term complete where the constitution is considered supreme and is the final authority in state affairs (Linz and Stepan, 1996). All elements of minimalist and undemocratic attributes are eliminated giving room to full maturity. Minimalist tendencies, such as semi-democracy, tutelary powers, reserved domains, discriminations, hegemonic party systems, and state patronage are equally done away with (O’Donnell, 1992; Valenzuela, 1992; Diamond, 1996; Nodia, 1996; Omilusi, 2016). In a complete

democracy, as argued by Schedler (1997), the elements listed above have been swallowed up by radical state reform and judicial reforms as governmental decisions and actions are no longer conducted based on personal will and do so instead on the prescribed standard enshrined in the constitution. In this case, democratic consolidation then becomes democratic constitutionalism as democracy is deepened.

#### **e. A Deepened Democracy**

A deepened democracy entails a journey from democratic transition to elections and to liberal democracy, which represents a progression from the crude or elementary to an advanced level. Democratic consolidation is a forward-thinking movement in the progression or continuance of democracy by strengthening and liberalising, making it develop into the most advanced type (Schedler, 1997). Consolidation has been viewed from different perspectives, beginning from the initial transition period, to the conduct of periodic elections, and to the strengthening of the political institutions of the state; and now, in the researcher's view, it also includes building unity, cohesion, and an unbroken bond as a result of a deepened democracy by a state or within a state. Consolidation, as argued by Gasiorowski and Power (1998), does not only focus on the survival of democracy to some certain degree, rather some significant changes and qualitative improvements have taken place in all major political institutions of the state, thereby making a democratic breakdown very improbable.

Schedler (1997) presents a perspective for understanding democratic consolidation. For him, a consolidated democracy is deepened, well institutionalised, and complete in character. He further asserts that such a democracy avoids any tendencies that could result in the erosion of democracy or any democratic breakdown. Indeed, it is imperative that democracy should be consolidated, however, Schedler did not take cognisance of the role played by the political elites in promoting stability or democratic breakdown, including fueling violence during elections times. Similarly, the study placed so much emphasis on the internal factors that promote democratic consolidation while losing sight of the influence of external forces. Notwithstanding the stated weaknesses, this study draws from the postcolonial constructivist theoretical approach. This theory has been used by Okpotor (2015) to analyse election violence in Africa. Okpotor argues that election violence holds sway because of the poor socio-economic and prevailing political conditions, which are products of a colonial legacy. Given the historical connection within Africa with regards to the past and the present, the influence of the current relationship with the global system continues to be an obstacle to democratic

sustainability. This study will further link the relationship between African political elites with the global system using Okpotor's work to extrapolate the incidents of election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Africa.

## **2.3 Causes of Electoral Violence in Democracies**

The causes of election violence in the extant literature are numerous. This includes the nature of politics; secondly, the nature of elections; and thirdly, the electoral institutions. Each of these causes will be further discussed in detail for clarity so as to be able to build a theoretical conclusion.

### **2.3.1 The Nature of Politics**

The nature of politics in a democracy presupposes the way and manner the politics of a particular political society is organised and conducted. The nature of politics also has to do with who holds power and by what means. In other words, this explains and describes the pattern of power acquisition, preservation, and transfer. It further elaborates on the level of transparency in the conduct of elections as well as the legal procedures laid down. Under the nature of politics, the study examines patrimonial and neo-patrimonial politics, clientelism, and patronage as a cause of electoral violence as well as conflict cleavages and the culture of violence and impunity among other things.

#### **2.3.1.1 Patrimonial and Neo-Patrimonial Politics**

Patrimonialism is basically conceived as a form of political domination and control where authority resides in the person ruling, and bureaucratic power is exercised by traditional authority (Hoglund, 2009). Neo-patrimonialism is an upward pattern of resource distribution that gives rights to patron-client relationships solely on the basis of some powerful individuals or parties (Francisco, 2010). Neo-patrimonialism has taken over the role of former colonial masters where only a few benefited from the government. Neo-patrimonialism has been perceived as a significant impediment that hinders African societies from developing away from primarily being producers of raw materials. Hoglund (2009) attributes this phenomenon to the political lifestyle prevalent in the developing democracies of African societies. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994:458) and Erdmann and Engel (2007:113) lament that neo-patrimonialism has been institutionalised in African politics, to such a degree that it generates social conflicts as well as election violence.

Bratton and Van de Walle (1994:458) and Erdmann and Engel (2007:113) describe neo-patrimonial persons as those who have ascriptive power to rule without holding public offices,

and that there are no distinctions between public and private office. Different types of power relations under neo-patrimonialism between political and administrative interaction exist, the rule and the rulers appear to be one (Erdmann and Ebge, 2007). In neo-patrimonialism, there exist formal rules and structures guiding the way government should be conducted theoretically, but never put to use because personal interest supersedes national needs. Part of the reason why it becomes extremely hard for these rules to be observed is because of the nexus between royalty and dependence pervades official proceedings (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:458).

### **2. 3.1.2 Clientelism and Patronage as a Cause of Electoral Violence**

Other aspects of neo-patrimonialism that are viewed as very central to election violence are clientelism and patronage. The two concepts by way of definition suggest a way by which the electorates exchange political support for the provision of certain public goods and services with the politicians (Seifu, 2012:24-25). What is of importance here though, is the object involved in the exchange and at what level the exchange should take place. The client –patron relationship is a two-way pattern. Whereas the client is expected to render political support to the patron (politician) to enable him to win elections; the patron, on the other hand, is under obligation to provide personal benefits to the client such as land, employment, good roads, water, or money (Seifu:25). With regards to patronage, the relationship goes beyond personal demands. In other words, politics is highly involved as the client is required to stick to his bargain if the contract must be relevant. This type of relationship is best explained in the exchange theory of politics where politicians are viewed as marketers in a business environment (Waldman, 1972; Cann and Sidman, 2011). Apart from the exchange and buying of votes by politicians by a clientist government, they equally introduce centrifugal forces such as ethnicity, regionalism, and other primordial tendencies meant to win political support (Van de Walle, 2007:63, 66). In these type of regimes, the medium of exchange is ‘votes’ which the electorates use as a bargaining tool to obtain any material favour in patronage democracies (Chandra, 2007:90). With the introduction of primordial politics, voters from ethnicities related to the politicians would stop at nothing to ensure that their kinsman or women emerge victorious in the polls in order to reap the rewards. (Seifu, 2012:25).

Writing on, “Violence in Nigeria: patterns and trends”, Taft and Haken (2015) note that one of the reasons Kogi state has become a violence prone state is partly because of the politics of patrimonial and neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, and patronage. The authors lament that patrimonial and neo-patrimonial politics has crippled decency and political morality since the

state has been divided along ethnic and religious lines. Loyalty is based on ethnic nationality in power. Clients and patronage sit above hard work and competence. Contracts and tenders are awarded to those who support and finance the government in power (Aloyemi, 2013). This is also reflective in the manner of political appointments, and the citing of projects as those from arguably, the so called dominant ethnic group (Igala) have had the largest share, at the expense of others (Omotola, 2006, 2007, 2008; Aloyemi, 2013). For those who are left out of the scheme of things in government, their only weapon is to revolt against this sentiment or resort to agitations that sometimes turn violent. Alternatively, they form an opposition that would ensure that the winner of next elections is their preferred candidate; hence, the incidences of violence at most elections in the state.

The same scenario applies to KZN where both patrimonial and neo-patrimonial politics, clientelism, and, patronage have been identified to have played key roles in election violence in the province (De Haas, 2008, 2016, 2017). Some political killings and assassinations have been linked to patrimony and patronage in KZN (De Haas, 2016; Bruce, 2014). Politicians who want to return elected would have to strike a deal with the client for an easy passage and, in return, favours are given to those who facilitate their success at the polls (De Haas, 2017, 2016). From the foregoing, obviously, neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, and patronage politics have been a major source of social unrest (both in KZN and KGS), a source of violence, and a danger to democratic consolidation (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:460; Mehler, 2007:217; Erdmann and Engel, 2007:97).

### **2.3.1.3 Conflict Cleavages**

Cleavages are those social divisions that exist in a political society. Put differently, they are seen as those valuable conflict configurations that have been politically institutionalised in a social system or structure (Eith and Melke, 2001, cited in Mehler, 2007:195). More often than not, they exist for certain reasons that may not be for the advancement of that society. Due, in part, to their pervasive influence on the polity, they are a reflection of the character of the political actors whose position and influence potentially determine the chances of whether elections will be peaceful or not.

Where previous wars were fought along primordial tendencies, there are chances that ethnic based parties could be formed, political activities also follow a similar fashion (Seifu, 2012:25). The danger associated with this scenario is that this could give rise to stiff competition among ethnic groups or ethnic based parties and a potential violent escalation. This scenario played

out in the first and second republics in the policies of Nigeria (Uwaifo, 2006; Ayatse and Akuva, 2013; Azeez, 2009). During this time, ethnic based parties emerged, and each controlled the region where their respective ethnic group was dominant. This has been perceived as the time when the foundation for ethnic politics was laid in Nigeria (Azeez, 2009; Adedeji and Emeka, 2015). The same problems of ethnic politics continue, where certain ethnic groups vow not to vote for any candidate other than those from their ethnic extraction. On the whole, the scenario prevents a cooperative relationship among the diverse ethnic groups. It also serves as a threat to national unity as well as the political environment (Seifu, 2012). In the end, there is always fragmentation of political parties in these types of societies, which constitutes a barrier to political stability and national cohesion and unity (Jarstad, 2008:32; Sisk, 2009:201; Mehler, 2007:200; Hoglund, 2009:420).

The basis for political mobilisation along ethnic divide shows the danger of a dominant party system. The consequence, therefore, is the fast fading off of smaller and weaker parties during elections (Van de Walle, 2007). In actual fact, the consequences do not stop at the disappearance of small and weaker parties but the complete absence of opposition and the subsequent entronement of authoritarianism with its attendant problems, as witnessed in Africa. Therefore, some opposition parties could resort to violence as a mark for expressing their displeasure, bringing in new political struggles (Mehler, 2007:203-204; Laasko, 2007:227-228). Sometimes in an effort to unseat the dominant party, they team up with civil society organisations. Examples of these are those of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) which has dominated the politics of Nigeria for 16 years until a coalition of political parties dismantled it in 2015. Another example is the dominance of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KZN between 1994 until it was dethroned in 2009 by the African National Congress (ANC) (News24, 30 April 2014). Importantly, the election that replaced the former parties listed above witnessed some violence in the process.

#### **2.3.1.4 Cultures of Violence and Impunity**

In most developing countries, there is a growing culture of violence and impunity that has become a common feature of their democracies (Seifu, 2012:27). Conflict cleavage is simply defined as those norms, values, and attitudes that promote violence as a possible means of resolving conflict (Steenkemp, 2005). Impunity is also defined as a special treatment of not being prosecuted by certain political figures despite the offences committed (Opatow, 2003: 148). This mostly applies to some high-ranking government officials and security personnel who have, in several instances, been exempt from prosecution based on the prescribed laws. In



this instance, the act of impunity opens up the platform for citizens and other public officials to flagrantly and blatantly break the law without any fear of punishment. There is a consensual understanding that allows for silence among citizens about the behaviours of others in as much as a favour is returned (Crocker, 1998:506 in Opatow, 2003:150).

The culture of violence and impunity raises the perception, which suggests violence is the consequence of previous unresolved violent conflicts (Steenkemp, 2005:253; Hoglund, 2009:421). The KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa appears to share similar features of this illustration remarked (De Haas, 2006, 2016; Hoglund, 2011). Often times, these acts of violence, though not allowed by law, are accepted by some actors and individuals within the state (Hoglund, 2009; Seifu, 2012). Besides this, due in part to a traumatic past, a culture of fear and uncertainty has already been created in the people, despite the end of hostilities (Sisk, 2009:201; Jarstad, 2008:31). Consequently, to conduct an election under this atmosphere of unpredictability would possibly not provide the kind of alternative needed to promote or sustain democracy (Lyons, 2004). Similarly, political mobilisation could be ostensibly done along ethnic divide (Sisk, 2009:201); any democracy where an election is conducted along ethnic lines, rarely survive violence. Two factors have been identified to have contributed to the culture that promotes violence and impunity in societies that have suffered conflicts. These factors are the weakness of state institutions and the state's use of violence (Steenkemp, 2005:259; Hoglund, 2009:421). The first factor is the weakness of the institutions of the state. The institution of government is unaccountable, not transparent, and politically biased, and are bedevilled by financial instability (Jarstad, 2008:28).

### 2.3.2 Nature of Elections

The nature of elections says Hoglund (2009:432) using post conflict societies and by extension emerging democracies as a case in point, is another vital area from where the factors that necessitate violence during elections have been identified. Among the key themes that cause election violence under the nature of elections to include political mobilisation, close competition, and the stakes involved in such elections are discussed carefully here.

#### 2.3.2.1 Political Mobilisation

One major challenge is how to conduct elections, most especially competitive elections that provide opportunities for fomenting conflicts and violence through continues a process of polarisation (Jarstad, 2008:29; Høglund, 2008:85). In competitive elections, what the contesting political parties mostly do is lay more emphasis on the distinguishing characteristics

from other political parties and thus, seek to mobilise or recruit membership along these lines of difference (Jarstad, 2008:29). The political parties like the African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were pre-occupied with selling their ideologies and philosophies rather than focusing on addressing the actual needs people are confronted with (Twala, 2014: 1a; Rohanlall, 2014:1-9; Africa:5-7). The ruling class and politicians employ all tactics to lure in the electorates for their votes (De Haas and Zulu, 1994; Chege, 2008:133; Burchard, 2015). The ruling class is the social class of a given society that decides upon and sets that society's political agenda. Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1916–1962) argued that the ruling class differs from the power elite. The latter simply refers to the small group of people with the most political power. This explains why conducting multi-party elections are violence-prone in Africa through the manipulation of ethnicity (Sisk and Reynolds, 1998:2; Sisk, 1998:150). The mobilisation of support along ethnic and religious lines is akin to politics in most African states (Glickman, 1998:37; Collier, 2009 26). This is often done to prevent them from losing an election (Mehler, 2007:200; Bekoe, 2008:30).

### **2.3.2.2 Close Competition**

Recent studies have shown that closely competed elections are potentially susceptible to violence (Høglund, 2008:85; Høglund, 2015). Though this is not particular to conflict-ridden societies only, but a common phenomenon of developing democracies and societies. The atmosphere for the conduct of elections in these societies is usually explosive (Jarstad, 2008:29; Høglund, 2008:85). This was demonstrated during the 2009 elections in KZN where the struggle to capture the province between the ANC, and the IFP became very intense with serious violence across the province (Sithole, 2011; Mottiar, 2014). Due to uncertainties about the outcome, each party could claim victory, and in the event their hopes are dashed, could eventually lead to an outbreak of violence (Sisk, 2008:9; Høglund, 2009:421). When dominant groups whose political power appears to be threatened by strong political competitors it is likely that they resort to violence in an attempt to protect their previous status (Jarstad, 2008:2930; Høglund, 2008:85-86).

In Africa, political power is viewed as a major commodity that must be possessed, as its possession determines the control and influence that a person would exert in society (Fortmann, 2000). In this sense, violence becomes inevitable when elections pose a significant possibility of seeking to alter the existing power structure (Fortman, 2000:3; EISA 2010:3). Political parties in developing democracies use the instrument of violence during elections to ensure

they ward off competition from the opposition (Mehler 2007:204). Whereas members of the opposition use violence to articulate their grievances over the ruling party and the electoral process/outcomes, the ruling class use strong measures to crack down and suppress the opposition by using security agencies (Mehler, 2007:204; Laasko, 2007:230). This anomaly has become a common trend during competitive multi-party elections and has undermined efforts at promoting human rights and engineering democratic consolidation attempts in these societies (Adivilah, 2009:3-4).

### **2.3.2.3 When the Stakes are high**

Higher stakes are not the same with close competition. In higher stake scenarios, the concern is on the consequences and the risks involved in losing elections. When the stakes are high, competitors know quite well that it is either a loss or a win while, in close competition, the margin of winning an election is smaller from both candidates. Stakes, in this case, means the chances of winning or losing an election, this increasingly becomes high in the context of the politics of patronage and identity (Sisk, 2009:9; IDEA, 2009:10). Competitive or close elections increase the political consciousness of the electorates as they are determined to choose the best out of the best. This leaves the outcome of probability owing to the closeness of the race. Therefore, it is doubtful that elections could become explosive when the stakes are very high as competitive elections are often prone to more violence in emerging democracies and, by extension, post conflicts societies (Hoglund, 2009:422).

Poor economic performances in most African countries makes the stakes in politics often very high as the politicians struggle to capture power (Fortman, 2000:76). Widespread poverty and economic crunch have exposed a section of society, causing them to turn their backs against dominant parties making the stakes very high, and thus, a potential violence escalator. (Laakso, 2007:229; Fortman, 2000:92). To be elected to hold a public office is seen by politicians as a sign of a change of status. Similarly, it is an opportunity to become a lawbreaker or to live above the law and be immune to prosecution (Collier, 2009:27).

### **2.3.2.4 Election Administration**

The electoral institution (EI) is expected to exhibit a high level of professionalism, efficiency, transparency, and impartiality. However, when these pre-conditions are not met, the chances of election violence become very high (Pastor, 1999:5; Sisk, 2008:16). In all honesty, most elections in developing countries are conducted and concluded under the atmosphere of mistrust, tension, and suspicion and this accounts for some of the escalations of election

violence (Lyons, 2004:282; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007:171). The widespread bias, a lack of accountability, and inadequate funding of these public institutions predispose them to compromise, impartiality in judgment, and incompetence in the discharge of their duties. On the part of the election administrations, institutions play a vital role in creating such circumstances (Jarstad, 2008:28; Pastor, 1999:12).

The choices of Electoral Management Boards (EMB) determine if violence will erupt or not, and this has a lot to do with the structure of the EMB, in other words, whether it is partisan or non-partisan (Hoglund, 2009:422; Lope-Pintor, 2005:22). A partisan model of election is a traditional election which is presided by an election administration office of the government, in conjunction with a government ministry. However, the traditional model of elections must be overseen by a judicial body (Pastor, 1999:1). One key weakness common with the partial, partisan electoral model is the high level of mistrust and division among representatives of different political and interest groups (Reilly, 2008:176). There is little wonder that the problem of the credibility of elections has remained a stubborn and a major cause of election violence (Mehler, 2007:210; EISA, 2010:4). The recently concluded 2017 national elections in Kenya have again proved that this remains a critical problem of elections in Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Often times, election monitoring teams are invited to participate in elections for the purpose of boosting the confidence of voters and to raise the hope of the people for free and fair elections (Hoglund, 2009:423; Sisk, 1998:170; Lopez-Pintor, 2005:25). Sometimes, these election monitoring groups could end up creating more problems than they solve as they have been found in some cases siding with a particular party or giving contradicting statements capable of inciting violence (Abutudu, n.d; Kelly, 2010; Chigudu, 2015). Nonetheless, their role cannot be overlooked completely.

#### **2.3.2.5 Electoral Rules and Regulations**

Electoral rules and regulations are those laws that describe, direct and guide the conduct of elections from the buying of the nomination form to the announcement of results (DFG, 2017). Theoretically, these rules can be classified into two parts; the rules of election competition and the rules of electoral governance (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002:7-8). For the purpose of clarity, Mozaffar and Schedler state that the rules of election competition contain issues like election formulas, the size of the district and boundaries, the size of the assembly, and are often referred to in many writing as electoral systems (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002:7). On the other hand, the rules of governance involve areas such as political party(s), candidates, and the eligibility of voters, registration of voters, and vote counting, as well as the techniques of reporting,

election monitoring and the mechanism for conflict resolution, and campaign financing (Seifu, 2012:35). The imperatives of these rules are that they give structural incentives for conflict resolution characters, on the part of those participating in/playing the political game (Reynolds and Sisk, 1998:4).

Similar rules are adopted by semi-democratic regimes too, as they are seen to have been generating conflict. So, to attract public acceptance, the rules are given different name tags, such as the “Nested game”, “Norm violation”, and “Winning Strategy” (Schedler, 2006:12; Wigell, 2008:242; Collier, 2009:45). The exclusion of opponents from participating in the political process and the suppression of their organisation increases the chances of violence, which is why the ruling party will devise strategies like disenfranchisement, vote buying, and the use of incentives for the electorates in exchange for votes, such as the giving of money for the mobilisation for votes (Ottaway, 2003:141; Ghandi, 2009:408-409; Collier, 2009:31). Sometimes, instances like threats of political assassination, coercion of the opposition and the electorates by agents of the ruling party as part of the objective for politically motivated violence (Lindbergh, 2006:157). Similarly, electoral fraud is meant to alter the final outcome of the election and to ensure its scope goes beyond a technical breach of the electoral laws by completely unleashing violence on voters (Lehoucq, 2003:233).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the scholars above discussed election violence without looking at the role played by the international systems, the incorporation of African countries into an international capitalist system, as well as the current relationship between African and the capitalist system. Furthermore, the game played by the politicians' couples with the manipulation of the elite exacerbates aggressive behaviours that manifest into violence from the people. Admittedly, the relationship between the imperialist west and most developing societies is not meant to bring development to them but to continue to undermine their development so that they will remain subservient to the imperialists.

## **2.4 Principal Theories Upon Which the Research is Constructed**

This section discusses the theoretical framework upon which the study is anchored on. Therefore, this section examines the Frustration Aggression Theory, Post-Colonial Constructivist Theory, Elite Theory, and Game theory. These theories underpin this study, their major proponents and justify the basis for adopting them for this study briefly.

#### 2.4.1 Frustration Aggression Theory

Developed by Dollard *et al.* in 1939 (Dollard *et al.*, 1939:1). The frustration-aggression theory has been used to explain violence and its tendencies across various disciplines in the social sciences and the applied sciences (Breuer and Elson, 2017:1). Breuer and Elson note that the theory initially holds that aggressive behaviours always presupposes the existence of aggressive behaviour, and contrariwise, that the existence of frustration often leads to some forms of aggression. Thus, the reaction that comes from the frustration from gaining access to an individual's expectations (Dennen, 2005:1). However, this theory has been criticised first, for claiming aggression is a function of frustration; the assumption that frustration always leads to aggression is not true. Despite this critique, this theory has been instrumental in explaining the nexus between election violence and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. Masango (2004:995) uses the theory to extrapolate the aggression that arises from the social disorganisation inherent in the South African society. Masango reasons that this form of social disorganisation has negative effects on the people as it predisposes them to aggressive tendencies. On the other hand, Iheanacho (2015:260), using the frustration aggression theory, discovered that electoral violence discourages the election of credible leadership thereby affecting the level of people's participation in the electoral process, as well as constituting a setback to democratic sustainability. So, this study relies on this theory to justify election violence on the attitudes of the political elites who have taken the people for granted with slow efforts at consolidation, a gradual regression to authoritarianism, and a blatant disregard for the rule of law.

#### 2.4.2 Post-Colonial Constructivist Theory

The postcolonial constructivist theory is drawn from constructivism and post-colonialism. Whereas constructivism is an approach which studies global politics and shares the view that states exist within a world of our making and, therefore, cannot exist outside human actions and the globalised world (Behraves, 2011:1; Fierke, 2010:178). The identities and the interests of political actors in addition to institutions and political structures are socially constructed and, as such, are mutually constructive (Wendt, 1992). Post-Colonialism, on the other hand, is an attempt to shift away from the study of global politics from the so-called Eurocentric perspective to the colonized states. A postcolonial approach requires a non-Western or Post-Western approach and centre stages the interrogation of certain normalised assumptions, such

as Western standards of rationality and normative hierarchical categorisations that privilege western perspectives (Shani, 2008; Grovogui, 2001).

By combining post-colonialism and constructivism, you will have a post-colonial constructivist approach. Okpotor (2015) uses post-colonial constructivism to explain election violence and its dynamics in Africa. The theory is an appropriate theoretical framework for studying election violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa. First, the issue of violence and electoral violence, particularly in Africa, cannot be divorced from the continent's colonial history and current relations with international society, particularly the West. The gulf between Western democratic, theoretical expectations and on-the-ground cultural practices can in itself be a source of conflict (Darby 2004:18). Second, it avoids problematic historical periodisation and spatial assumptions that focus on the West and ignores the rest of the world, leading to much-needed insight in international security studies (Barkawi and Laffey 2006:334). Third, a post-colonial constructivist theoretical framework will help avoid simplistic ahistorical, or what Grovogui (2001:29) calls "historical omissions" resource-only or ethnicity-only accounts, of violence on the African continent.

Okpotor (2015) uses this theory to analyse post-election violence in Africa. In her paper titled, "electing violence: explaining post-election violence in Africa", Okpotor agonisingly lamented the way election violence has continued to undermine democracies in the continent. The author recognised the enormous socio-economic and political challenges, such as; resource disputes, economic inequality, poor economic opportunities, and electoral illegitimacy, coupled with postcolonial realities created in Africa, this enables the platform for a possibility of violence. Okpotor states that post-election violence in Africa is a combination of product and productive post-coloniality, which is, in turn, product and productive of these factors. While this may be true, the author failed to recognise the role of the post-colonial African elites who work in collaboration with the international global system to engineer violence and undermine democratic consolidation.

#### 2.4.3 Elite Theory

The elite is known to be a tiny group of individuals who exert a large amount of influence in a political society. This theory helps give an understanding of how societies are structured socially, economically, and politically. The origin of Elite theory can be traced to the philosophical works of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Robert Michels (1876-1936). Mosca explained how tiny minorities out-organise, outsmart, and outwit

large majorities, arguing that “political classes”, Mosca’s coinage for political elites, usually have, “a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority”, over the people they rule over (Higley, 2010; Lopez, 2013).

Pareto argued that elite thrives well in societies with relatively unhindered social mobility. In such societies, Pareto claims, constitute the group of the most talented and deserving few individuals. But in actual societies, the elite are those who are adept with at applying the two modes of political rules- “force and persuasion”. They often enjoy great privileges and advantages, like inherited wealth and family connections (Higley, 2010). Pareto outlines another type of governing elite whom he described as ‘lions and foxes’. Roberto Michel agrees that the elite is an oligarchy like in large organisations that work hard for expert leadership to function effectively. Michel further said that once these individuals gain control of money, there is a flow of information, promotions, and the concentration of the powers belonging to the organisation are then control by them (Lopex, 2013). Michel, Pareto, and Mosca all agree that the autonomy of the elite is inescapable in any society, whether in democratic or egalitarian societies as word progresses (Yusuf, 2014).

Burchard (2015) attributes the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya as the brainwork of the political elite whose desperation for political power culminated to the massive killings and destruction that took place. Kagwanja and Southall (2009:261-263) agrees with Burchard that the explosion of violence was as a result of elite manipulation of armed militias that have for long eroded the state’s monopoly of violence since 1992. The elite in Kenya, for the first time in the history of the country, introduced religion in a bit to mobilise political suppose. As a result of the intensity of the contest, the election was termed forty-one against one, which means 41 ethnic groups against one ethnic one group (which is the Kikuyu) that have dominated all facets of the country’s economy (Chege, 2008:133). The aftermath of the 2007/2008 post-election violence has continued to define the politics of Kenya.

Espousing a similar view, Onuoha and Ufomba (2017:214-216) agree with Burchard and Kagwanja and Southall that the elite manipulates the people into violence, particularly election violence in Africa. Drawing their experiences from Nigeria, the authors argue that, because the elite derives their support from their ethnic-religious enclaves, they have developed ethnic-based structures. Since the politics of every society is shaped by its values and the preferences of the elite; their interest then becomes dominant in Africa. The authors submit that ethnic competition and election violence in Africa are as a result of the competing interests among



this ethnic-based elite and their inability to harmonise their interest. Indeed, the elite cannot be exonerated from election violence in Africa; however, Burchard *et al.* fail to address the issue of poverty and the ‘poveritisation’ of these ethnic nationalities as the factor for the manipulation of violence. Thus, the elite theory would be used to understand how the ‘poveritisation’ of the people help aid the whipping of ethnic sentiments in election violence.

#### 2.4.4 Game Theory

Game theory could be described as such a systematic study that involves a strategic interaction among individuals believed to be rational beings (Kockesen and Efe, 2007:8). The authors further reveal that Game Theory revolves around the idea of strategic interactions, especially within groups of people, governments, and firms where the actions and the behaviours of individuals have the capacity to either affect or influence the outcome of the general public. Kockesen and Efe clarify that what is crucial and central here is not the situation that describes this act as a game, but the strategic acts of individuals that leads to the outcome.

The pioneer leaders of the discipline of game theory were originally mathematicians in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such as Ernst Zermelo in 1913 and John Von Neumann 1928 (Bonanno, 2018:11). Subsequently, a breakthrough was achieved when John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, in their Book, “*Theory of Game and Economic Behaviour*”, which was published in 1944, as revealed by Bonanno. As time goes by, another important development on the game theory was achieved through the work of John Nash (1950-51) and Llyod Shapley (1953). The author further revealed that game theory has a profound influence on the development of many branches of economics, such as industrial organisation, international trade, labour economics, and macroeconomic. With the passage of time, the influence of game theory transcends beyond economics further to other branches in the social sciences, such as political science, international relation, philosophy, anthropology, and sociology.

Interestingly, game theory makes a provision of the official language that allows for the representation and analysis of interactive situations. That is to say, a state where different individuals or entities regarded as players take actions which have repercussions on other people (Bonanno, 2018). Game theory can be sub divided into two main branches: the first one is the “cooperative game theory”, while the second is the, “non- co-operative game theory”. The cooperative game theory assumes that the players can communicate, come into some form of alliance, and then enter into binding agreements among themselves. Bonanno noted that this cooperative theory had been adopted, for instance, in the analysis of voting behaviours and

other issues that relate to political science and other related fields. This theory best describes and explains the activities and behaviours of politicians during elections who are out to campaign for votes from the electorates. The main focus of the entities (the players) in the game is the end result (that is, who wins the elections), disregarding how the game was played. Which is why the game theory has been criticised for focusing more on interactive behaviour while losing sight of the players and their actions that constitute a threat to the stability of society in the situation of election violence. Despite these limitations, this theory was very relevant in helping this study extrapolate the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and the KwaZulu-Natal province of the Republic of South Africa.

It is within this context that the elite theory will be used in explaining the interface between electoral violence and democratic consolidation efforts in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa. The elite theory has been adopted for this study so as to give a better understanding of the role of the ruling class and the ruling class (politicians) in relation to their desperation, behaviour, and manoeuvres to capture political power and control power through the whipping of ethnic sentiments and ‘poveritisation’ of the people. It is also to aid our understanding of their inability to restructure the political, economic, and social structures created by the colonial past and how this failure has continued to undermine the consolidation of democracy in Africa. It will further aid our understanding of how the elite always connives with the international capitalist world to undermine the majority in democracies. To remain politically relevant, they ensure that they adhere to some international policies that may not be favourable to the general population against the collective good of the country. As Schedler argued, they violate liberal-democratic minimum standards of freedom, fairness, and integrity in so systematic and profound ways as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule, rather than instruments of democracy. Hence the adoption of the post-colonial constructivist approach is to give insight into the relationship between the international capitalist system and the colonized countries.

Similarly, the elite theory was useful in understanding how structural factionalism and the quest for supremacy among the political elite heightens election violence and is undermining democratic maturity in Africa in general. The Post-colonial constructivist theory hopes to examine the effects of the colonial history and current relations with the international society, particularly the West, regarding election violence and democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN. Likewise, the frustration-aggression theory will be useful in explaining the reaction, through aggression, of the people in democracies in Africa. With poor governance structure,

unemployment, religious/ethnic sentiments, low levels of education, and unequal access and distribution of economic resources, there is a predisposition of the people to the manipulation of the political elite and consequently, aggressive behaviours.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the extant literature on election violence and democratic consolidation. After a brief introduction, the chapter set out to explain key concepts central to the study by defining such concepts like elections, electoral process, electoral violence, democracy, and democratic consolidation. In addition to this, the chapter discussed the causes of election violence in a democracy, drawing influence from the works of Kristine Hoglund. The causes of election violence are categorised into the nature of politics, the nature of elections, and lastly, the electoral institutions and systems. The argument is that election violence in Africa is situated within these three elements identified, and any possible solutions should be built around them. The chapter also examined the theories of frustration aggression, post-colonial constructivist theory, and elite theory to help build an empirical argument on election violence in Africa.

The review has contributed immensely to the objectives of this study by seeking to understand the relationship between election violence and the consolidation of democracy. It has been discovered that election violence is, without doubt, one of the problems confronting the continent of Africa now. Election violence does not only promote political instability and undermine democratic consolidation, but has created a state of hopelessness, frustration, and acts of aggression among Africans. More people, particularly the youth, continue to lose faith in the system owing to violence and a lack of economic opportunities and political direction. Though most Africans still believe in a true democracy, however, they are yet to really see the clear benefits of democracy in their daily lives.

## **CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES OF ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

The KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN) of South Africa has been embroiled in a series of violence, particularly political and electoral violence. In the last chapter, this study discovered some of the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Africa generally, and the role of election violence in the democratic process regarding the sustainability of democracy. This chapter discusses the history of KwaZulu-Natal, the political system, and the political structure of the province. In doing that, the economy of the province will be analysed vis-a-vis its performance and the natural resource endowment in the province. The chapter will examine the electoral system from a national perspective and then narrow it slightly down to the province. Consequently, the chapter will equally examine how elections into national and provincial legislature are conducted with reference to how seats are calculated and allocated. The role and performance of political parties over the years will, at the same time, be discussed. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the historical and contextual perspectives of election violence and political assassinations in KZN, and then conclusions will be drawn.

### **3.2. KwaZulu-Natal: Organisational and Political Perspective**

The end of the apartheid regime and the eventual introduction of democracy marked a new phase in the politics of South Africa and, by extension, KwaZulu-Natal. Like the central government, the province is modelled after a parliamentary form of government. It consists of premier as the executive and administrative head, who appoints his provincial executives (Members of Executive Committee-MEC) for the smooth administration of the province (Adlam, 2016). Further to this is a provincial parliament whose primary role is the formulation of laws as well as serving as a check on the powers of the premier, who is also a member of the parliament. The provincial parliament is headed by a speaker who presides over parliamentary businesses when in session. The province is divided into a number of local governments and municipalities for administrative convenience (See KZN Treasury, Feb 2017). There are 11 district municipalities in the province, which place KZN ahead of any province in South Africa. Among the municipal areas are Amajuba, Ethekwini, iLembe, Ugu, UMgungundlovu, Uthukela, Umkhanyakude, Uthungulu, Umngeni, Umzinyathi, Sisonke, and the Zululand district Municipality (Staff, 2014:5; Adlam, 2016).

Since the province came into existence, it has produced seven (7) premiers, among which is Mr Frank Mdlalosa, who was the first premier of KZN under the IFP platform in 1994. In 1997, Mr Mdlalosa was succeeded by Mr Ben Ngubane of the same IFP. Following the national elections of 1999, which the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won, they appointed Mr Lionel Mtshali as the premier of the province. Mr Mtshali's tenure was the last time the IFP tasted power in KZN as they were dethroned by an opposition party, the African National Congress in 2004. Mr S'bu Ndebele then became the first premier of the province under the ANC in 2004. He was succeeded by Mr Zweli Mkhize of the same ANC in 2009. Mkhize was replaced by Mr Senzo Mchunu in 2013 after serving for four years. By 2014, Mr Senzo Mchunu was given another term to serve as the premier. However, he was in 2016 replaced by Willie Mchunu (not related) as the new and current premier (Berry, 2013; SAHO, 2017; Durham, n.d; de Haas, 2016).

Importantly, the emergence of each provincial leader has always brought different dimensions in the politics of the province. At the same time, it has determined the political relationships and harmony that would exist among the power brokers and apolitical alignment within the ruling party. This, in some cases, could potentially serve as triggers of violence or conflict during elections times.

Among the mineral resources that are commonly found in the KwaZulu-Natal province are coal, titanium, dioxide, and zircon. Mining in KZN has dropped significantly, to the extent that its contribution to the GDP was only 2 per cent in 2016 (KZN Provincial Review, 2016). There is an increase benefaction of minerals, especially in aluminium, iron ore, and steel phosphate. On the whole, the agricultural sector is doing very well, contributing significantly to the GDP. Despite this robust economic performance in the province, poverty and unemployment remain high (De Haas, 2016). In 2011, the poverty headcount stood at 10.9 per cent. However, it dropped in 2016 to 7.7 per cent. Whereas 24.0 per cent of people were absorbed into the labour force in 2015, however, unemployment remained at 23.9 per cent as of the last quota in 2016 (See KZN Provincial Review, 2016). Given the crime rate in the province, it is imperative that poverty and unemployment be quickly addressed in order to effectively fight crime and criminality. The poverty level necessitated by unemployment and inequality predisposes people to violence, especially during elections in the province.

### **3.3 Understanding the South African Electoral System**

The electoral system of South Africa came into being following a long time of negotiations between the former apartheid regime's officials, and various parties led by the African National Congress (ANC) (Louw, 2014a). The leaders at the convention were faced with the challenge of choosing or deciding the most appropriate and suitable electoral system for a deeply divisive country like South Africa at the time. To configure an electoral system is directly linked to the nature and dynamics of the politics of that country. Also, the comparative choices between the citizens, the preferences of elected officials, as well as the direction of government policies, are incredibly important (SAHO, 2011). At the end of the convention, the Proportional Representation (PR) was chosen as the most suitable electoral system for South Africa (Shongwe, 2017:2). The selection of this system was based on its perceived inclusiveness, simplicity, and most importantly, its amenability and flexibility to absorb or allow for a coalition government (Lodge, 2003; Louw, 2014a; Shongwe, 2017).

The electoral system of South Africa can be categorised into three broad dimensions:

1. Its ballot structure: This explains how the citizens can cast their votes and what they are voting for. This prepares them, in good time, to make their choices even before going to the polling stations to cast their vote.
2. Its districts structure: The country was divided into elective districts and each province has a specific number of districts. Thus, this explains in detail the exact number of districts there are as well as the exact number of seats per district.
3. The electoral formula: Here the electoral system has developed a formula for calculating the seats and how they are allocated to each district and party. In a nutshell, the formula describes how votes are converted into seats after the polls (Teorell, and Lindstedt, 2010).

During the first national elections in South Africa, the citizens voted for the parties of their choice as required by the Electoral Act. For political expediencies, the country is divided into large multi-member district regions. There are nine provinces that make up of the country (totalling a magnitude of 200 seats, ranging from 5 to 48 seats in each region) (Louw, 2014a). The Proportional Representation (PR) system was used in allocating seats to the number of votes that each political party got (Shongwe, 2017). The number of seats received by each political party forms the parliament that formulates the laws of the country. This explains the workings of the electoral system in South Africa.

### 3.3.1 Composition of the South African Electoral System

The electoral system of South Africa is made up of the parliament, which includes the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), who are considered the senate. Each of these plays a vital role in the legislative process in South Africa. We shall examine the composition of this with reference to the parliament, election procedures, the national assembly, and allocation of seats.

### 3.3.2 The Structure of the Parliament

The parliament of South Africa is made up of 490 seats (the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 4, Part 42(1)). Parliament is bicameral in nature, meaning it has two houses. The lower house is the National Assembly while the upper house, considered as the Senate, is the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Each of these houses is established by virtue of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996 Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 4 Part 42(1)). The lower house, The National Assembly, represents 400 seats (chapter 4, part 46(1)). The upper house is the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which has 90 seats (10 representing each province in South Africa). Members of the NCOP provincial delegates are nominated by each provincial legislature (Louw, 2014a; Chapter 4, Part 60(1)).

### 3.3.3 Elections into the National and Provincial Assembly

The selection of representatives to act on behalf of a majority through the making of laws is what elections mean. Elections in South Africa occur in two phases: the general and provincial elections. Both are conducted at the same time and on the same day too. Due to the adoption of the Proportional Representation (PR), the South African electoral system is a closed-list proportional presentation (Louw, 2014a). Provincial and general elections are conducted on the same day and are held every five years. Voters are presented with two ballot papers, one for the national vote and the other for the provincial. The process is run by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) who is responsible for the organisation and conduct of elections in a free and fair manner (Shongwe, 2017; Louw, 2014a). During elections, voters cast their votes to parties and not individual candidates (Alvarez-Roviera, 2010).

### 3.3.4 The National Assembly

The National Assembly is the most decisive house in the South African parliament because it is through the National Assembly that the executive members of the cabinet are recruited (Louw, 2014a). Seats to the National Assembly are filled into two layers: Half (about 200) of

the seats are regional seats and are occupied with reference to regional votes as well as regional lists. The other half (200) of the seats are national seats and are filled with reference to national votes and national lists or completely from regional lists in the event a party did not submit a separate national list (Álvarez-Rivera, 2010). However, there must be a conversion of votes into seats first. Members of the National Assembly carry out oversight functions by constituting committees to investigate issues of national importance vis-a-vis cases of a financial misdemeanour on government departments.

### 3.3.5 The National Council of Provinces

The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is the upper house of South Africa's parliament. The NCOP is made up of 90 members, ten representatives each per province that makes up the republic of South Africa. Six among the ten delegates are permanent delegates who are elected by the provincial legislature, proportionally; in accordance to the strength of the parties represented in the legislature (World Elections, 2014; Louw, 2014a). This provision is based on the formula contained in part b of schedule 3 of the 1996 constitution. Permanent delegates serve for a duration of the provincial legislature while the other four are classified as special delegates, the provincial premier and three other special delegates are elected by the provincial legislature; again, in proportion to the strength of each political party (World Elections, 2014). The powers of the NCOP are contained in section 42.4 of the constitution as well as their responsibilities. The NCOP represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are well protected at a national level. It achieves this through active participation in national legislative debates and creates a platform for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces (South African Parliament, 2018; World Elections, 2014).

### 3.3.6 The Way Seats Are Allocated

The allocation of seats in the South African National Assembly is very important as it shows the performance and popularity of each party and its manifestos to the electorate. To allocate seats, the number of votes a party receives is translated and calculated into a proportion of seats in the national assembly first, regionally and then nationally (Louw, 2014a; Alvarez-Rivera, 2010). First of all, the number of votes that equal a single seat must be calculated. Thereafter, each seat then represents a quota of votes. To calculate this, you simply divide the total number of votes, with the total number of seats. There is a method used by South Africa, which is a version of 'Droop Quota' which determines seats through votes cast (Lundell and Hill, n.d). To determine regional seats, the quota is used to determine, for every region, the total number



of votes in that region as well as the total number of seats in the region. The quota is equally applied to determine the total number of votes in the country and, at the same time, the total number of national seats (Lundell and Hill, n.d; Louw, 2014a).

It has already been established that the Proportional Representation system was adopted for South Africa as an electoral system. So, the same Proportional Representation system is applied to the allocation of seats. Proportionally, the number of seats allocated to a party is subject to the number of times the party meets a full quota. The simplest way to calculate this is by dividing the share of votes received by each party from the regional as well as the national election, using the quotas to determine the percentage for every party (Louw, 2014a). In the process of this, the remaining ones are set aside. However, should there be unallocated seats left after the conclusion of the process, the remaining seats are then allocated to the parties with the largest remaining votes (Álvarez-Rivera, 2010; Lundell and Hill, n.d). From then, the 400 seats for the National Assembly are filled.

### **3.4 Electoral Institutions of South Africa**

An electoral institution prescribes the rules of the game to all and sundry other things. Similarly, an electoral institution affects the ability of citizens to participate actively in politics, influence the outcome of elections, and affects the way government policies are formulated (Rogowski and Schuit, 2018). In this section, the independent electoral commission of South Africa, electoral courts, political parties, and election violence are discussed.

#### **3.4.1 The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa**

The electoral Commission in South Africa is the body charged with the responsibility of organising and conducting elections in the country. Padmanabhan (2002) states that to manage elections successfully, it would require an effective and efficient authority with confidence to oversee the process. Padmanabhan downplays the role of traditional democracies which he says have shied away from election administration models practised by developed countries and instead, allow government bodies to run elections. What makes this more successful is due to the independence of the judicial arm of government that can adjudicate any election dispute with little or no interference coming from the state.

For an electoral commission to be successful it should be independent of the influence of the executives, an alternative mechanism for checking accountability, and the finances of the commission needs to be established (Shongwe, 2017:1-2). Similarly, election administration

must be efficient, devoid of administrative or technical breakdowns, and insulated from political manipulation of falsifying figures that could discredit the entire exercise (Padmanabhan, 2002). The first post-apartheid commission was, “the Independent Electoral Commission” (IEC) which was established during the transitional period. Padmanabhan noted that the IEC was established to replace the state institution or administration that was in charge of organising and conducting elections during the apartheid era. Before this time, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) had been involved in organising elections during the apartheid era, after an electoral law was passed by parliament. In the article, “Democracy’s Baby Block: South Africa’s Electoral Commission”, Padmanabhan reveals that the formation of the IEC was derived from a consensus reached between the defunct national Party (NP) and liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC). It became obvious that the DHA was not going to be accepted within the conduct of elections as it has done previously, owing to its oppressive racial biases and prejudices.

On the day of its establishment, the IEC was structured with clearly defined roles, scopes, and limitations. The commission was afforded broad legislative, administrative, and judicial powers in the 1993 Act (Padmanabhan, 2002; Louw, 2014b). The clear functions of the IEC, as set out in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, are outlined in section 190, which states:

*“The electoral commission is empowered to manage the election of national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies in accordance with national legislation, ensure that those elections are free and fair, and declare the results of those elections within a period that must be prescribed by national legislation and that is as short as reasonably possible.”*

The Act empowered the IEC to organise and conduct transitional polls. Among its mandate was to determine the results of elections and to certify that such results are a product of free and fair exercise. It was further empowered to investigate and arbitrate where the electoral laws may have been violated (Alvarez-Rivera, 2010; Padmanabhan, 2002). To safeguard the commission from any influence (internal and external) from carrying out its duties, it was granted fiscal powers. Alvarez-Rivera and Padmanabhan clarify that the Act statelty controlled the qualification and the conduct of the commissioner of the IEC; given the powers to recommend commissioners to the interim transitional executive council and impose limitations on the employment of commissioner after leaving the IEC and limited dismissal of commissioners owing to misconduct.

The committee that was saddled with the responsibilities of drafting the Act is The Kepton Park Technical Committee. Lodge (2003) and Padmanabhan (2002) confirm that the Act gave the IEC fiscal powers as well as freedom from any attempt to manipulate them by depriving them of adequate funding from the government so as not to unduly influence the commission. Lodge and Padmanabhan explain that with these wide powers granted to the IEC, there were fears that the commission could become too powerful and undermine the government. Thus, certain clauses were included in the Act to prevent that from happening. Among the measures taken to include that special electoral courts were set up to oversee the IEC. The task of this special court was to review the commission's discussion for the sake of integrity and fairness. The IEC Act imposed separation of powers within the commission (particularly among sub-units) in order to reduce interference and not derail the vision for setting up the commission. To further strengthen the commission and guarantee effectiveness, Padmanabhan reveals that three automatic offices were created by the Act; administration, monitoring, and adjudication, but all answer to the commission.

The experiences from the 1994 elections were useful to legislators as they had to work to ensure that the commission was well equipped in all aspects, for future elections without glitches. This comes about after the commission had declared that the elections in 1994 were free and fair, a confirmation that should have come from the court in the event of legal contestations. In pursuance of this objective, the electoral commission Act 51 of 1996 was enacted to make a provision to establish and design an electoral commission to oversee the conduct of national, provincial, and municipal/local legislative bodies and referenda. The Act equally made provision for the establishment and specified the powers, duties, and functions of an electoral court and to make provision for matters in connection with it (Shongwe, 2017).

### 3.4.2 Electoral Court

In order to deal with electoral disputes that may arise in the process or aftermath of an election, there was an establishment of the electoral court (Shongwe, 2017). The Electoral Court (EC) was established by virtue of section 18 of the Electoral Commission Act. The EC is made up of judges from the Supreme Court of Appeal, two High Court Judges, and additional two members appointed by the president of the republic (Alvarez-Rivera, 2010; Shongwe, 2017). Among the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the electoral court, though extensive and comprehensively spelt out, include:

*“Review of any decision, hear and determine an appeal regarding any decision; determine its practices and procedures as well as make its own rules; hear and determine any matter vis-à-vis the interpretation of any law referred to it and investigate any allegation(s) of misconduct among many others.”*

The Electoral Court has received recognition and confirmation by different rulings at the Constitutional Court, prominent among them is the case between Kham and others Vs Electoral Commission and another where the Constitutional Court stated this in paragraph 42:

*“The jurisdiction to review any decision of the IEC relating to an electoral matter affords the Electoral Court a power of judicial oversight over the activities of the IEC. The Electoral Court can examine any decision by the IEC and substitute it with its own. The range of electoral matters may be great. Certainly, all the issues arising in the present case relate to electoral matters. They concern who may vote and whether all those who voted were entitled to do so.”*

From this affirmation, the electoral court reserves the power to entertain cases relating to election disputes and ensure that justice is served to whomever it is entitled to. The essence is to ensure that democracy is not truncated by certain undemocratic elements. Fairness and the rule of law is applied to all irrespective of their personality (Shongwe, 2017:6). This also propels political parties to play the game according to the rules.

### 3.4.3 Political Parties in South Africa’s Democracy

There are 261 registered political parties in 2014 in South Africa who are officially recognised and allowed to contest elections at all levels (IEC online, 2018). As good as this figure stands, not all these political parties are popular and influential in the democratic process; most of them are not very active in politics as their popularity is limited to specific places. Most of these political parties cut across the nine provinces that make up the country. All the same, their impact cannot be ignored. Table 3 provides details of national/provincial performances of political parties during elections.

**Table 3.1 National/Provincial Performance of Parties in South Africa 1994 – 2014**

SN	Party	Acronyms	1994/Seats	1999/Seats	2004/Seats	2009/Seats	2014/Seats
1	African National Congress	ANC	62,65% /252	66,35% /266	69,69% /279	65,90% /264	62,15% /249
2	New National Party	NP (NNP)	20,39% /82	6,87% /28	1,65% /7	-	-

3	Democratic Party	DP (DA)	1,73% /7	9,56% /38	12.37 % / 50	16,66 % /67	22,23 % /89
4	Inkatha Freedom Party	IFP	10,54% /43	8,58% /34	6,97% /28	4,55% /18	2, 40% /10
5	Congress of the People	COPE	-	-	-	7.42% /30	0.67% /3
6	Economic Freedom Fighters	EFF	-	-	-	-	6.35% /25
7	Independent Democrats	ID	-	-	1.73% /7	0.92% /4	-
8	United Democratic Front	UDM	-	3.42% /14	2.28% /9	0.83% /4	-
9	African Christian Democratic Party	ACDP	0.45% /2	1.43% /6	1.60% /6	0.81% 3	0.57% /3
10	National Freedom Party	NFP	-	-	-	-	1.57% /6

**Source: See IEC**

From the data above, it is obvious that the performance of some political parties has dropped significantly while some have disappeared from the political scene. The researcher took a sample of ten political parties and examined their performance between 1994 to 2014. The data show that most parties are performing abysmally, perhaps because of the increase in the number of new parties emerging year in and year out. Other plausible explanations could be attributed to a lack of service delivery from these parties to the people. Of significant importance is the African National Congress (ANC) which has held sway to power since the dawn of democracy in South Africa (Parliamentary Monitory Group (PMG), 2018; Netshintenzhe, 2014; Brand South Africa, 2007, 2014; De Jager, 2014). Other factors for the decline could be due to a lack of good economic and social policies and programmes that could entice the electorates to vote in their favour. The table below gives details of the performances of two dominant parties in KZN.

**Table 3.2 Provincial Legislature Results: KwaZulu-Natal 1994, 1999, 2004, 2014**

	1994			1999			2004			2014	
Party	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%
ANC	1,181,118	32.33	26	1,167,094	39.38	32	1,287,823	46.98	38	11,436,921	62.25
IFP	1,844,070	50.32	41	1,241,522	41.90	34	1,009,267	36.82	30	441,854	2.50

**Source: See IEC**

In KZN, the performance of political parties appears to be on the same path with national trajectories. At the dawn of democracy in 1994, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was the dominant party, winning the majority of seats in the provincial legislature and producing the Premier of the province. The party shortly after the 1994 elections began to witness some declines in popularity. For instance, its performance dropped from 10.54 per cent in the 1990s to 8.58 per cent in 1999. By the 2004 elections, the IFP was down by 6.97 per cent (Sithole, 2011:1172). The ANC made some gains in 2004 with 16 per cent of the votes while the IFP got more than 50 per cent. However, events take a turn for the worst for the IFP in the 2009 elections as the party lost control of the province with 22 per cent of the votes as the ANC secured 63 per cent (Bruce, 2009:6; Sithole, 2011: 72). By way of analysis, the result meant 51 seats went to the ANC while the IFP got 18 of the 80 provincial legislative seats. From this moment, the political misery of the IFP continued as it became the official opposition in the province. In 2011, there was an implosion in the party where certain members parted ways with the IFP and formed the National Freedom Party (NPF) (Sithole, 2011). Since then, this has affected the performance and the voting strength of the party.

In his study on, “voting trends 20 years since the introduction of democracy in South Africa, Netshitenzhe”, avers that a lack of good social and economic policies are potentially affecting the popularity of these parties. The author retrospectively went further to identify two historically dominant parties, namely the ANC and DP (DA). However, party manifestos have altered this trajectory, and new, strong opposition has emerged hoping to win the votes of the people. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are keeping the ruling party on its toes because of its critical nature (Netshilezher, 2014; De Jager, 2014; Brand, South Africa, 2014). Besides, the party has used the weaknesses of the ruling party (ANC) to expand its influence using the bulk of the unemployed youths. This is part of the reasons their political (EFF) has been criticised for being violent, intolerant, and showing racial bias toward non-whites. This inflames violence during elections and therefore requires some political consideration.

### 3.5.1 Election Violence in KZN, South Africa 1994 -2017

As far as the Republic of South Africa is concerned, liberal democracy in actual fact began after the post-apartheid South Africa in 1994, when the first national and all-inclusive elections were conducted. From this era, the researcher believes that democracy and all its principles equally took root in the KwaZulu-Natal province. As with the experiences at a national level

where violence has characterised most polls, the same can be said of KZN (Taylor, 2002). However, KZN's scenario appears to be unique and of immense interest; hence, this study. Looking back at the long history of armed struggles and resistance, coupled with violent infusions during the colonial era, the assumption would be that the past has been transferred into the new dispensation of democracy (Schuld, 2013). While this may be true to a certain degree, Schuld and Taylor did not consider the role of the new political class who were more concerned with their personal interests than the general interests of the public. This is a common feature of most developing democracies.

It would be recalled that events leading to the first democratic elections in 1994 recorded a large level of violence (Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011; De Haas, 2016). Political movements, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as well as the African National Congress (ANC), played a pivotal role in the struggle for independence and when apartheid was eventually dismantled, they led the way for the new democratic journey. Initially, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was unwilling to participate in the election but was persuaded to, and they eventually won the polls in the province with over 50 per cent of the votes (Mottiar, 2014). Mottiar reveals that three months prior to the 1994 elections, around 1000 people were killed in election related matters. Ultimately, from 1994 to 2002, it is believed that between 2000 to 4000, people were killed in political violence in KZN alone (Taylor, 2002; De Haas, 2016). Post-apartheid electoral violence in KZN has been primarily along the deep philosophical and ideological lines between the IFP and the African National Congress. These ideological and philosophical lines reference here suggest the belief systems, the form of government and its character that these two political parties hold opinions on at the time. They were among some of the motivations for violence. Though, there was a peace initiative instituted in 1996 that saw reconciliation between the two political parties. This initiative, to some extent, did reduce the surge of political and election related violence in the province; nonetheless, political violence and election violence is still being witnessed in the province (De Haas, 2016).

Prominent among the areas that have witnessed remarkable violence which attracted national and arguably international attention is the Richmond area. Violence and assassinations broke out in Richmond town following a serious political fallout between Sifiso Nkabinde (a former strong member of the ANC) and the leadership structure of the ANC. Nkabinde had trained and armed a rug unit called "the Self Defence Unit" (SDU) whose activities were antithetical to the ANC. On 22 July 1997, days preceding the local government by-election, two newly elected Richmond ANC councillors, including three ANC members, were assassinated (Taylor,

2002). This scenario had put fear in the people and completely diminished interest in politics and political activities in the minds of the public as the by-election had to be postponed. Taylor further recorded that eight people, including the ANC Deputy Mayor, Mr Percy Thompson, were gunned down at a tavern in the centre of Richmond in July 1998. But in an attempt to bring the violence to an end in Richmond, a recommendation was put forward to establish an independent judicial commission of inquiry by the provincial legislature to investigate the incidents of killings and violence across the province. Regrettably, no commission of inquiry was ever appointed. Nkabinde was later assassinated on the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1999 by three attackers outside a supermarket in Richmond. Despite Nkabinde's death in Richmond, violence did not end, more killings and deaths continued. Taylor submits that perhaps, top ANC and IFP political big wigs feared that any inquiry could implicate them in the violence and, as a result, stalled any attempt at constituting the commission of inquiry.

At Nongoma, the traditional home of the Zulu royal seat is another town within KZN that has witnessed political violence at the highest levels. Though a traditional IFP stronghold, the presence of other political parties was a risk in the real sense of it. As earlier pointed out, political violence from 1994 to 2009 in KZN had essentially been between the IFP and the ANC. Thus, political and electoral violence within this period generally had been either on an inter- or intra-party basis (Mottiar, 2004; Taylor, 2002; Piper, 1999). Essentially, this violence is often orchestrated with the intention of destabilising the conduct of the elections or to discredit it in totality. One other means by which this is achieved is through the systematic political assassinations of key political figures that are perceived as potential threats to the realisation of the political objectives of certain people. So, political assassinations had been prevalent in Nongoma, and it has claimed several lives. Taylor (2002) revealed that 20 people were assassinated in Nongoma and the identity of the victims were those of IFP and ANC members between 1999 to 2002. Realistically, before this time period, inter-party violence had not been common in Nongoma, majorly because the ANC had not had any firm roots in the town. Violence has been between factions within the IFP structures (Taylor, 2002).

Owing to these massive political killings, the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) has been labelled as the killing jungle, particularly because of the experiences from the early 1990s to the 1999 elections that were marred by intimidation and violence. Election violence in KZN can be clearly understood from the apartheid era to the transitional period where violence became the instrument of power between and among political parties and political gladiators (Schuld, 2013b; De Haas, 2016; Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011). There are a number of places and



issues that can trigger violence before, during, and even after elections in KwaZulu-Natal. Among these includes; nomination of candidates for elective positions by parties, intra-party violence, as well as inter-party rivalries that have gained prominence both at the provincial and local government levels (Sithole, 2011; Piper, 1999; Mottiar, 2004, 2014; Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011; Taylor, 2002; Schuld, 2013b). Recently, the issue of tenders, corruption, and ‘factionalisation’ (divisions along with different interests) has continued to play a central role in the escalation of election related violence across the province. As this continues, the institutions of the state are undermined and weakened by the ruling elites and thereby stifle the consolidation of democracy, which is why political killings and election related violence has persisted in the province. Sometimes, this violence is pre-determined and manifests in the form of the political assassinations of potential rivals or those who are conceived and seen as retrogressive to certain political ideologies.

The exact number of election based violence events that have occurred between 1993 to 2017 in KwaZulu-Natal have not been empirically documented, and the total figures of deaths, as well as casualties, are non-existent. However, De Haas (2016) notes that electoral violence has left an estimated 4000 people died between 1994 and December 1998 in KZN. She further argues that most of the violence had been along party lines, particularly the two major political parties, The African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party, (IFP) (De Haas, 2016). On the contrary, Sithole (2011) disagrees with this claim as there has been violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the breakaway members who formed the National Freedom Party (NFP). For instance, one particular example of ANC versus IFP induced violence is the Richmond area. The political and electoral violence that had erupted in Richmond had been linked to the destructive ANC warlord, Sifiso Nkabande, following his expulsion in 1997 (Taylor, 2002; Schuld, 2013a; De Haas, 2016, Mottiar, 2010). It will be recalled that the first local government election in 1995 in KZN was delayed until May 1996 owing to violence. Due to the intensity of the violence, the South African Defence Force (SANDF) had to be drafted in to guarantee security (Piper, 1999; De Haas, 2016). As mentioned above, besides election violence, there are politically motivated killings that are often associated with elections. Between 2010 and 2012, it is reported that 41 people have been murdered in the province alone in what seems like election related deaths (De Haas, 2016).

In 1994, the Independence Electoral Commission (IEC) received complaints of ‘no-go-areas’, making their work very difficult and even dangerous (Schuld, 2013b). The election recorded violence in Richmond, Shobashobane, and Nongoma indicates the power of territorial control

by the two co g political parties. For instance, an attack 5in Shobashobane by suspected IFP hitmen left 19 people dead in 1995 during the local government planned elections (Piper, 1999; Schuld, 2013b; Mottiar, 2004). Admittedly, the violence in Nongoma and Richmond are practical examples of intra- and inter-party power struggles occasioned by cross-carpeting, perceived by some as a strategy meant to undermine the territorial control of the people (Schuld, 2013b). It suffices to say that due to the quest by political parties to create ‘no-go areas’, it has led to the creation and formation of gangs and thugs to facilitate the realisation of specific political objectives. These warlords then unleash violence, often on innocent citizens during election times. A good example is KwaMashu; a township nears the city of Durban where gangs and warlords have control of the town simply for the purpose of self-defence against opposing gangs (Schuld, 2013a; Taylor, 2002).

The overall assessment of violence, either electoral or political, in KZN is mixed though. For example, between 1997 and 2010, there has been a significant reduction in the rate of election and political violence. However, recent events across the province suggest that political and electoral violence appears to have resumed again. One of the arguments put forward for the resumption of election violence is because electoral violence is a common trend or feature of elections in KZN (Hoglund and Jarstad, 2011). Describing election violence Piper (2004) and Dugard (2003) observe that it centres on the disruption of rallies and the prevention of electioneering in places considered to be sensitive. It also involves intimidation, attacks, and assassinations of supporters/opponents, including prospective candidates. All contending parties often complain of frequent confrontations between the ANC and the IFP exhibiting complete intolerance (Schuld, 2013a, 2013b, Sithole, 2011).

The recent increasing levels of electoral violence in KZN have been attributed to the levels of ‘factionalisation’ and polarisation, particularly in the ANC since the 2007 Polokwane conference. De Haas (2016) argues that the manipulation of the party list intended to exclude delegates who were openly opposed to the candidature of Jacob Zuma may have heightened violence within the ANC. However, one observation claims the violence in KZN is unconnected to the ‘ethnicitisation’ and the twisted politics by the Zulus. Furthermore, the desperate desire among some comrades to hijack and control the party structures contributes to some of the violent escalations often witnessed before and during polls. Another observation is the increasing penchant for primitive accumulation which is becoming recurrent and plays a vital role in our understanding of the election violence in the KZN. Perhaps this has balkanised the people between those who are inclined to corruption against those who are opposing it. All

this is linked directly to the problem associated with the post-colonial political mentality of African leaders.

In 2011, there were local government elections in KZN, and the polls were characterized by violence over nomination and allegations of manipulation of party lists. A commission of inquiry was constituted to ascertain the veracity of these claims, and it was indeed discovered that all councillors were fraudulently elected (De Haas, 2016). As good as these investigations and discoveries are, the incidents of manipulations and violence persist in the province as politicians have intensified their desperate attempts to capture political power at all cost. These claims of manipulation resurfaced during the 2016 local government elections in Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital of KwaZulu-Natal, leading to the death of six people (Eye Witness News, July 18 2016). Regrettably, no single prosecution has been made on the perpetrators of this fraud. This act continues to undermine the rule of law and efforts at the consolidation of democracy.

Allegiance to certain individuals within the party structures (ANC/IFP) rather than the party appears to be fuelling violence and election based violence in KZN. These people have arrogated to themselves the power of being king-makers (political machines) whom the politicians must align with to excel politically. From this point, the formation of these factions in most cases degenerates into violence. Another factor that seems to be fuelling election violence in KZN is the increasing rates of politically motivated killings, either before or after elections. These killings have often been targeted at key political opponents considered or perceived as potential threats to the political survival or ascendancy of certain ambitious leaders (politicians), either within the party structure or outside the party structure.

### 3.5.2 Election Violence During the 2016 Local Government Polls

Before these elections, violence started early in 2016 intending to disrupt the conduct of the elections. In the beginning, the violence took the form of an inter-party dimension, so much so that tensions were high in certain contested areas within the province (De Haas, 2016). The intra-party tension arose over the leadership of the ANC and the question of the nomination process. De Haas reveals that seven months before the conduct of the elections, 20 people were reportedly killed in politically motivated circumstances in KZN. A further probe into those killed shows that three of them were members of New Freedom Party (NFP), a breakaway party from IFP. Prominent among them are Nompumelelo Zondi, Phosithe Mbatha, and Anna

Madonsela; the other three were IFP supporters (Alson Mzwakhe Nkosi, Siyanda Mnguni, and Thokozane Majola). The remaining fourteen deaths were members of the ANC.

Cases of attempted assassination were recorded in which several people sustained different degrees of injuries. For instance, in the IFP stronghold of Msinga, an attempted assassination on the life of the NFP chairperson, Vikizitha Mlotshwa was carried out on April 2016. In a related development, an ANC candidate for the Muden, Mr Jeffrey Ngobese, was targeted on his way to Grey town. De Haas (2016) claims that some of the incidents of election violence during the 2016 local government polls in KZN were caused by the official manipulation of the nomination list by the ANC, a sentiment that led to violent protests and deaths in places like Pietermaritzburg (PMB) and Kokstad (Eyewitness News, 2016). The degree of violence linked with the process varied from physical confrontation (exchange of blows) at meetings in Kokstad to the burning of homes belonging to prospective candidates in Ifata (South Coast). There was also the burning down of cars at KwaDukuza (North Coast) belonging to councillors. Further to this, there was wide scale destruction of government property in places like Folweni, south of Durban, where some thugs torched and looted municipality buildings and other properties (De Haas, 2016).

As a result of the disaffection over the nomination of candidates that led to widespread violence, security personnel were attacked with stones while the roads leading to the northern parts of the Durban Township were blocked in June, disrupting traffic flow. The most destructive part of the violence to property occurred in the Isithebe industrial area near Mandeni, where, in March 2016, several factories were set on fire and subsequently were forced to close (De Haas, 2016).

### **3.6 Political Assassinations as a Form of Election Violence in KZN**

Another form of violence during elections is the manner in which political assassinations are carried out frequently in KZN. These assassinations are not only limited to the IFP and ANC alone but cut across other political parties and groups. Even the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) had complained of the murder of 13 of its members (Schuld, 2013b; Mottiar, 2006; De Haas, 2008). The culture of assassination seems to have been inherited pre-1999, where violence had been instituted as a legitimate means of resistance towards apartheid. During this period, the killing of political leaders through the use of petrol to bomb houses saw hit-squad attacks became the common form of violence (Schuld, 2013b). Importantly, political assassination is not particular to post-apartheid South Africa, rather it is a legacy of the

apartheid regime through which they employed to eliminate leaders of the resistance struggle during the 1970s and 1980s (Dugard, 2003; TRC, 1998; Schuld, 2013a). This trend was blindly copied by the two opposing political movements, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress; as antagonism, assassinations were used for the systematic elimination of their leadership structures (Gwala, 1992).

The spate of politically motivated killings in KZN has persisted unabated. These killings have been oscillating from different frequencies. Sometimes the figures would drop while at other times they will go up depending on the intensity of occurrences. Political assassination is any form of killing carried out on a person(s) without their prior knowledge, mostly on political purposes. One of the challenges confronting the studies on political killings in KZN and South Africa at large is the failure by the authorities to monitor all the incidences of these killings since apartheid ended (Bruce, 2014:3). Nonetheless, some researchers have documented a sizeable number of them. First and foremost, it is pertinent to state that more than 90 per cent of political killings in post-apartheid South Africa has taken place in KZN. Between the years of 1994 to 1996, available evidence from literature claims that 220 people were killed in South Africa with KZN accounting for 170 of the deaths alone (Bruce, 2013). In a more detailed analysis, Bruce (2014:3) and Plaut (2018:1) confirm that from 1994 to 1999 a total number of 450 political assassinations have been carried out in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

In the view of Schuld (2013a), political assassinations in KZN is very distinct in the manner it is often carried out. For instance, in situations where someone has been assassinated, a sufficient background check and the identity of the killers known will show that the attack was carried out as revenge in cycles of killings that may have once taken place (Taylor, 2002; Schuld, 2013a). Schuld claims that these assassinations are often carried out at night (often at the victim's house) or sometimes in the daytime and in public in ostensibly drive-by shootings. Most of the weapons used in these assassinations are sophisticated ones which call to question where they are obtained from. According to Minnaar (1992a) and Dugard (2003:35), some small groups of professionals were said to be behind a large share of violent attacks in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC's) findings discovered and confirmed a professional hit-squad activity in the KZN province, led by powerful local warlords like Thomas Shabalala in Squatter Camp Lindelani and Sifiso Nkabande in Richmond (Minnaar, 1992b; Schuld, 2013a; De Haas, 2016). Although these attacks were often described as political violence, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the rationale behind them. However,

it is imperative to state here that they are perhaps connected to political power which, in a democratic state, is the essence of politics.

Political assassinations are not only particular to the years immediately after the political independence of the 1990s; it transcends beyond that period to the present. From 2009 to date, news of selected assassinations of party leaders or politicians is reported regularly on local media outfits across the province. Sometimes, the target appears to have moved away from the traditional ANC/ IFP rivalry to the respective breakaway parties, such as Congress of the People (COPE) and the National Freedom Party (NFP). An organised and documented study on political assassinations since the end of apartheid to date is non-existent in the literature and, so far, only evidence based on newspaper articles and the information obtained by researchers are mostly relied upon (Schuld, 2013a; Piper, 2004; Taylor, 2002). Though De Haas (2008) attempted to document a few cases of political assassinations targeted at political leaders from the 1990s, it did not cover the present era and therefore is not sufficient enough for this study. A survey conducted by the South African government revealed several high-profile killings of politicians from the two antagonistic parties, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (De Haas, 2008, 2016; Schuld, 2013a; South African Institute for Race Relations, 2005).

Insights into the politics of political elites in Durban (the biggest and the economic hub of KwaZulu-Natal Province) in its recent past has been identified (Bond, 2011:15-16). The article titled, “Welcome to Durban” for instance, reveals how Sbu Sibiyi, a leading member/official of the ruling party in Durban, ANC councillor-Wiseman Mshibe, and the leader of Chatsworth township-Gundu Makhanya, as well as several members of the Inkatha breakaway party, the NFP, were killed in 2011. Meanwhile, in the years before these incidents, more assassinations were carried out that took the lives of so many people, including a traditional leader Inkosi Mbongeleni Zondi, the local leader of the South African National Civic Organisation, Jimmy Mloto, the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance’s leaders, and Ahmed Osman as well as many others were assassinated (Schuld, 2013a). The events that led to their deaths look similar to the old spectrum of being gunned down at home or on the street, reminiscent of the 1990s. Assassinations are also on the local agenda of civil society again; the high increase in politically motivated violence over the past two years even moved the Durban-based NGO ‘Democracy Development Programme’ to launch an open forum on the state of political killings in KZN in November 2012. The invitation further speaks of 40 deaths that have been attributed to fighting within and between political parties (Schuld, 2013a).

In a downward trajectory, Bruce (2013, 2014) notes that as of 2000 onward, there has been a decline in the rate of killings in the province. Though, no concrete explanation was given for the decline; perhaps there was some self-realization among the people not to kill. However, despite the decline, pockets of killings still took place across the province year in and year out. From 2009 to date, there has been an increase in the rate of political killings again, with the peak period being 2011 and 2012 (De Haas, 2016; Bruce, 2014). Bruce revealed that 54 political assassinations took place in KZN between January 2009 and May 2014. In the article titled, “Political killings in South Africa: The ultimate intimidation”, Bruce retrospectively shows how seven (7) people had been assassinated from 2006 to 2008 in the province, bringing the total number of assassinations to 61 and total fatalities to 70.

There is no specific location or region that can be said to be more prone to political assassination than the other. However, certain towns and localities have made headlines for these killings in KZN. Prominent among them are Wembezi, Ulundi, Inanda, KwaMashu, and Umlazi. More than 50% per cent of these killings occurred around 2011 to 2012. ANA (2018:1), Bruce (2013:16), and De Haas (2016) attribute the increase in political assassinations within these years to the emergence of the new political party, the National Freedom Party (NFP). The NFP broke away from the conservative IFP in 2011, and the animosity among the leaders of the parties took a new twist with lots of killings. At the same time, the increasing rivalries among ANC member fuel many of these killings (ANA, 2018). The 2014 general elections could be another plausible explanation for the killings as politicians who felt their political chances of climbing up the ladder were under threat. Therefore, all necessary means had to be employed to eliminate all the obstacles that include assassinations.

In a study titled, “The Killing Fields of KZN Local Government Elections: Violence and Democracy in 2016”, De Haas (2016) confirmed that 60 people were killed in, what is termed, politically motivated murders (assassination) in KwaZulu-Natal between 2014 to 2016 alone. Specifically, a total of 35 people have been killed in KZN since the run up to the 2016 municipal elections, with a large percentage of the victims being members and leaders of the ANC (Mkhize, 2017). Further detail shows that 12 councillors or ward candidates were killed in the two-month period ahead of the August 3, 2016, local government elections (Harper, 2017). Among those killed is Khaya Thobela. Harper states, that until the assassination, Mr Thobela was the speaker of the Umzimkhulu Municipality and deputy secretary of the ANC in the Harry Gwala region. In the month of March, Thandazile Phoswa, deputy mayor in the Richmond local municipality, was shot in her home. A couple of weeks earlier, the

municipality's manager, Sbusiso Sithole, was killed in an ambush by unknown gunmen and shot dead while on duty (Mkhize, 2017). Giving a detailed picture of the incidents of assassination, the minister of police disclosed that a total of 45 councillors had been killed since 2009 to 2017 (Herman, 2017). This revelation was made following the assassination of Sindiso Maqaqa, a top ANC member at a national level who lost his life following a bullet injury he sustained in an assassination attack (ANA, 2018). Still, within the Harry Gwala Region, five ANC officials had been assassinated in 2017. This number was added up following the assassination of Nkosinathi Ngcobo, who was shot in the night (Lindeque, 2017).

Going by the report of the study conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR), which identified over 450 political assassinations in KwaZulu-Natal alone since the ANC came to power in 1994, calls for serious action from the authorities have been made (Kane-Berman, 2017). Obviously, no sufficient reasons have been advanced to explain the surge in these political killings. Nevertheless, some of the reasons cannot be divorced from the desperation to capture political power amongst competing individuals and groups. Similarly, the politics of primitive accumulation, which has become a policy among the ANC big wigs could be another plausible explanation to the spate of assassination in the recent century.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the contextual perspective of electoral violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The chapter equally reviewed incidences of election violence from 1994 to 2017. The history of KZN, its economic strength, and the resources the province is endowed with were explored. The chapter, in addition, took a look at the political structure of the province as well as its political journey since the demise of apartheid and the introduction of democracy in South Africa. Politically, KZN has produced leaders within the province and outside. The chapter describes how leaders are selected through the electoral system adopted during the transitional period to democracy. The Proportional Representation (PR) as an electoral model was adopted and it explains how leaders and the legislates are elected using the close-list and the quota system. It also calculates the way seats are allocated in parliament and the criteria used to allocate them to parties after elections. Through this, the researcher was able to study the performance of the two dominant parties in the province, the ANC and the IFP. From this point, the chapter identified the principal culprits in election violence in the province to be the ANC and the IFP. The overall implication of this menace to the politics of KZN and, by



extension, South Africa is that politics would probably be left in the hands of gang leaders, thugs, and criminals which is inimical to the general development of the province.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KOGI STATE, NIGERIA**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Kogi State (KGS), Nigeria has been embroiled in a series of violence, particularly political and electoral violence. Like the rest of Nigeria, Kogi State is heterogeneous in nature with three strong ethnic groups always at loggerheads with each other. Politically, there has been contestation among the ethnic groups on the appropriate political formula for running the state, without success. This has led to fiercely contested elections over the years with a serious loss of lives. Therefore, this chapter discusses electoral violence in Kogi State, Nigeria. In so doing, an overview of the brief historical perspective of Kogi will be given. The chapter further examines the political configurations of Kogi State and election violence, and how its weak economy predisposes it to more violence. On a wider scale, the chapter looks at the Nigerian electoral system, the electoral institutions, the historical perspective of election violence in Nigeria and how all this influences election violence in other states of the federation. Additionally, the chapter discusses political assassinations/killings and their impact on election related violence in Nigeria, and finally, a conclusion is drawn.

### **4.2 Kogi State in a Historical Perspective and the Dynamics**

Located between the confluence of the rivers Niger and Benue, Kogi is central and strategic both to Nigeria as a country, and the history of Nigeria. Created on August 27, 1991, during the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, with Lokoja being its capital city, without doubt, Kogi State is quintessentially Nigerian (Omotola, 2006; Cleen Foundation, 2011). The state is obviously heterogeneous, with the Igalas being very dominant in almost all aspects of public life. Essentially, there are three dominant ethnic groups, namely Igala, Egbira and Okun. Besides these ethnic groups, other small ethnic groups are found in all the local governments that make up the state. These include Ebira Koto, Kakanda, Oworo, Ogori, Magongo, Bassa-Nge, Bassa-Komo and the Ibaji. Others include Gana-Gana, Kupa etc. (Omotola, 2006; Tenuche *et al.*, 2005:2-3).

Ebira, Igala and Okun, as the three most dominant ethnic nationalities in the state, have historically been together. For instance, the Ebira and the Igala groups are listed among such groups as the Idoma, the Tivs in Benue State and the Jukuns of Taraba State and were classified as the “Pagan” tribes in colonial records (Taft and Haken, 2015:130). They were said to have migrated from the Kwararafa Kingdom into their present location (present day Kogi State).

Additional historical sources also indicate that the Ebiras, at a certain period, settled among the Igalas at Idah before migrating to their present settlement in present day Okene. The two ethnic groups share cultural and linguistic values. The two exhibit common characteristics in terms of staple food consumed and masquerade festivities. Economic transactions among the people are deeply entrenched, and inter-ethnic marriage is common (Tenuche *et al.*, 2005:2).

The history of Kogi State is equally central to northern Nigeria and the entire federation. It suffices to state here that the protectorate of northern Nigeria was proclaimed in Lokoja on January 1, 1900, signalling the official entry of colonial rule in the region (Cleen Foundation, 2011). In terms of territory and composition, Kogi State is similar to the defunct Kabba Province under the northern region. Interestingly, the state creation exercise of 1976 by the military saw the defunct Kabba Province divided into two. One part was merged with present day Kwara State while the other part of the province, which consists of the Igala ethnic group and others, merged across the river as Benue State (Omotola, 2006; Tenuche *et al.*, 2005). This incident was a re-organisation of the former Kwararafa Kingdom, however; the challenges of merging these ethnic groups would soon manifest in a negative manner as competition to capture political power and control economic resources among them became intense.

Despite these rich historical connections, there is a high level of animosity, mistrust and suspicion between and among these ethnic groups within and often outside the state. Importantly, most conflicts in the state have revolved around them with devastating consequences. This animosity and suspicion have remained one of the major factors of political tension and conflict at different times since the creation of the state. And with the return of democracy in Nigeria, the political alignment and struggle to control the political structures of the state has been dominated by the Igala, a situation that has not gone down well with the Ebiras and the Okuns. The dominance by the Igala in all structures of the state has continued to heighten the political divide thereby making the competition to capture state power and exert more influence over the state very charged, and a clear setback to democratic consolidation.

#### 4.2.1 The Political Configurations of Kogi State and Electoral Violence

Politically, the Igala have held sway to power since the creation of the state using the so-called 1963 census figures to claim numerical superiority over other ethnic groups (Tenuche *et al.*, 2005). And as is characteristic of most heterogeneous and developing societies, the politics of identity would find grounds to manifest. Therefore, the domestication of political power by the Igalas has heightened tension, bitterness and animosity amongst the three dominant ethnic

groups as well as some minority groups, such that violent conflicts have been recorded in the state (Bagaji, Etila and Maji, 2012:131; Omotola, 2006, 2007; Tenuche *et al.*, 2005). Essentially, the heterogeneity of Kogi State is not the only source of political instability, but rather the failure to manage the differences among the diverse ethnic nationalities. In addition, violence in Kogi is not only along with the inter-ethnic line but much more along intra-ethnic groups, as it is common along political parties (Segun and Samuel, 2010).

Kogi State is divided into three Senatorial Districts, namely: East, Central and West. Each of these Senatorial District represents one of the three dominant ethnic groups (with a few minority groups), giving them strong political influence (Aleyomi, 2013). For instance, Kogi East Senatorial District has a minority group like Bassa- Nge, Bassa- Komo and the Ibaji. Similarly, the Kogi Central Senatorial District has minorities such as Ogori, Magongo. And lastly, the Western Senatorial District consists of minorities *viz*: Kakanda, Oworo, Gana-Gana, Ebira-Koto etc. All these diverse groups are found in the twenty-one (21) local governments across the state (Tenuche *et al.*, 2005). Kogi State shares a boundary with nine (9) states, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). For instance, Kogi shares a boundary with Niger, Nasarawa states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to the north; to the eastern part is Benue and Enugu states; while in the western part is Edo, Ondo, Ekiti and Kwara States (AOAV and NWGAV, 2013).

On its creation in 1991, the population of Kogi State stood at 1,230,145 based on the 1963 national Census figures (Omotola, 2008). However, upon the conduct of the 1991 national census exercise, the population figures increased to 2, 204,646. This upward increase had continued when in 2006 another census exercise was carried out with Kogi State recording a total of 3,314,043. In 2015, an estimate of the national census by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015) put the population of Kogi State at 4,473,500. As good as these increases may appear, they have remained one (if not the major) source of contestation and a basis for violence in the state. The Ebiras, Okuns and other minor ethnic groups have accused the Igalas of fraudulently inflating figures to gain political leverage against others (Tenuche *et al.*, 2005).

Since its creation in 1991 to 2017, Kogi State has produced four (4) different democratically elected governors. Abubakar Audu was the first to be elected governor in 1993 and 1999 under the ANPP. Mr Audu was defeated by Ibrahim Idris in the 2003 general elections under the platform of the PDP. Mr Idris served for eight years, and by 2012 Mr Idris Wada won the elections under the PDP again and served for four years until his defeat by the APC in the 2015

general elections. Currently, Yahaya Bello is the governor who took over in 2015. He is recontesting in the November 2019 elections, seeking a second term.

During the 2003 general elections in Kogi State, many lives were lost while several others sustained various degrees of injuries across the state. Human Rights Watch (July 2003) recorded that in Idah local government area, a leading politician and a chieftain of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), Mr Salifu, was shot dead while attempting to snatch a ballot box. In a related development, fighting broke out in Okene local government council involving supporters of PDP and ANPP that started early in the morning of April 12, 2003 (Human Rights Watch, May 2003). The intensity of the violence was quite high, such that the supporters of both parties were armed to hijack election materials. This happened the day preceding the election and continued through the election as well (Human Rights Watch, May 2003).

In continuation of the scale of election violence in Kogi State, fighting was also reported between PDP and ANPP supporters leading to the shooting and subsequent death of two people on April 12, 2003, in Ogori-Magongo (Kogi central Senatorial District) local government. It suffices to say that the 2003 general elections were very bloody across the country and Kogi state in particular. As noted by AOAV and NWGAV (2013), violence in Kogi State has become prevalent owing to the circulation of a large cache of small and light weapons in the state. It is not surprising; therefore; the state was ranked seventh in terms of election violence in Nigeria out of the 37 states of the federation (Bello, 2014:6). To corroborate the claims of AOAV and NWGAV (2013) about the number of illegal arms in Kogi, the state Police Commissioner reported that "there are over 1,000 AK 47 rifles in circulation in Okene Local Government alone" (This Day August 25, 2012). This is a very dangerous situation considering the fragile state of Kogi. Going by this disclosure, a comprehensive survey of all illegal arms was supposed to have been undertaken by the authority concerned across the state to control the scale of the problem. The chances are that these numbers could be much higher than imagined.

Due to violence and the intimidation of voters and other electoral officials, elections had to be put on hold in several polling stations in Kogi State during the 2003 exercise. An independent observer reported that sounds of gunshots were heard in one location, which scattered voters who ran for their lives and who eventually had to regroup for voting. However, after an hour, voting was suspended following the smashing and destruction of ballot boxes by people believed to be thugs. As observed by Human Rights Watch (2003), supporters of ANPP allegedly attacked agents of other parties while gunshots were fired into the air to scare the

people away from the polling stations. Both the ANPP and PDP members were seen chanting war songs. Sadly, the presiding officer was intimidated to the extent that the electoral procedures were not followed as required. Consequently, some ANPP loyalists stole the ballot box under gunfire (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Available reports also indicate that some presiding officers were beaten up in various locations by dangerous thugs.

In 2009, tensions rose with members of the PDP in Okene Local Government over financial issues, resulting in riots that claimed the lives of two people. Okene is not new to violence as any little provocation can spark serious violence with severe consequences. And following the 2011 general elections in Nigeria that subsequently led to the post-election violence, saw the violence spread to Okene culminating in the death of people (Taft and Haken, 2015:131). The same spate of violence was witnessed in Ofu local government. Specifically, two persons were killed in a politically related form of violence in 2009 involving PDP and ANPP supporters following the ruling by the Supreme Court that upheld the election of the State Governor Mr Ibrahim Idris, whose election was challenged by the opposition citing allegations of fraud. With this development, political tension continued into 2010, when political thugs killed ten people in the months of February, May and August (Taft and Haken, 2015:131).

Electoral violence of all kinds is something that calls for the sincerity on the part of the government to be addressed. It is possible to conduct elections without violence; however; political maturity and commitment are required from all stakeholders as too much blood have been shed. As always, once the elections approach, the political atmosphere is filled with tension and fear of possible violence. This perception informed the decision by some stakeholders to organise workshops and sensitisation programmes regarding the consequences of election violence. Penultimate to the 2011 elections, Kogi was one of the states designated by both local and international election observers as a possible flashpoint. This is evident giving the level of violence that had characterised previous polls in the state (Daily Trust, December 10, 2015). The conduct of the politicians and political parties during the primary elections in the state consolidated the serious fears that political desperation and opportunism rank high. This was evident as the primary elections of all major and minor political parties, including the likes of the PDP, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) was subsumed in the dust of alleged manipulation. This generated a lot of acrimony, resentment and veiled threats of violence by several aggrieved politicians who felt cheated at the primaries (Jimoh, 2015:1).

Owing to the attention that was given by stakeholders to the 2011 elections reminiscent of the previous bad experiences, extensive voter-education, training and sensitisation was organised and conducted. The initiative was strongly supported by some local and international observers parties such as the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Joint Donor Basket Fund which comprises the European Union (EU), the Department For International Development (DFID), and Korea International Development Agency (CIDA) (Jimoh, 2011:2). Participants were drawn across the three Senatorial Districts of the state. Among them were traditional rulers, religious leaders, tribal leaders and the youths. This initiative yielded a positive result as the rate of violence was significantly reduced with very few incidences of violence (Daily Trust, December 10, 2011).

Whereas the 2011 initiative recorded significant success in mitigating election violence, the 2013 local government elections were the opposite. The election was conducted on the 4<sup>th</sup> May 2013 but was marred by serious violence with many deaths, while election offices were razed down in some local governments. One of the casualties was an aspiring councilorship candidate in Awo Ward 1 in Ojoku District of Ankpa local government, Mr Adonis Omeh, who was shot at close range by an unknown assailant (Human Rights Watch, 2014, Daily Trust, December 10, 2013). It was reported that Mr Omeh, who was contesting the election under the PDP, was returning from a meeting with other party faithful when he was killed (BNF May 5, 2013; Vanguard Newspaper May 5, 2013).

Another incident took place in Odu Ward 1 in Dekina local government resulting in the death of two people in clashes involving supporters of the PDP and ANPP regarding the distribution of sensitive materials for the election. At Alloma, the hometown of former Governor, Abubakar Audu, some people who dressed in police uniform shot and killed one Mr John Okpanachi, a prominent youth leader in the locality for daring to confront them for non-receipt of election materials. The same assailants abducted the councillorship candidate of the ACN, Mallam Danjuma Yunusa, in the area together with some youths who were forcefully thrown into the van (truck) and driven away (Vanguard Newspaper May 5, 2013; BNF, May 5, 2013). Because of the infusion of violence into the Nigerian electoral process, it is often very difficult to differentiate the act of criminality from electoral violence in Nigeria. This sometimes makes it difficult to believe all the claims mentioned above as both the opposition as well as the ruling party(s) could orchestrate this and blame it on the other. Notwithstanding, this is vital in helping us understand the enormity of the violence in Nigeria's elections.

As the circle of violence continued to increase, violence was recorded in Mopa-Muro local government where the polls were disrupted till noon. Angry youths also threatened to beat and injure people who were determined to vote. Among the victims was Mr Juwon Elekula, who was the secretary-general of the National Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE). In addition, Mr Elekula also doubled as the presiding officer during the polls but was attacked with a machete on his head for daring to proceed with the conduct of the election against the wishes of some thugs at the local government. Further violence saw the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Bassa local government burned down together with election materials (BNF, May 5, 2013; George, 2013). The illustrations above show that the spate of violence was high, given the number of deaths recorded and other casualties. The lesson to draw from this is that the efforts of the local and international partners/stakeholders were useful in 2011 but could not be sustained in 2013 by the state government in order to cope with the tides of election violence in Kogi.

In 2015, the conduct of the general elections across the state was relatively peaceful with few incidents of violence. However, when the election into the State's Houses of Assembly and the Governorship were eventually conducted, the situation was violent. Elections violence was recorded in Ofu, Ankpa, Dekina, Lokoja, and Kogi local government councils. There was gunshots, disruptions of voting, killings and attacks on election materials and officials in several polling stations across the state (The Cable, April 16, 2016). The police made 15 arrests for electoral violence (George, 2016:1). Due to the intensity of the violence, a rescheduling of polls was conducted in order to complete the electoral process as stipulated by law. It is important to note that election violence in Kogi State, and by extension Nigeria, has been institutionalised; hence, the political elites need violence to win the election at all levels. Violence opens the avenue to strategise how elections can be won. However, a non-violent election would certainly not guarantee victory for dubious politicians; hence, the use of violence during the election.

#### 4.2.2 Economy and Mineral Resources as a Source of Political Tension

Economically, Kogi State is richly endowed with both human and material resources, but the challenge is that economic activities are not active compared to the mega cities like Lagos, Kaduna and Port Harcourt. In terms of natural resource endowment, the state is blessed. Notable among them includes expansive fertile land for agricultural activities, a large deposit of iron-ore located at Ajaokuta and Itakpe (under the Central Senatorial District), and limestone



at Obajana (this is under the Kogi West Senatorial District) where the largest cement factory in Africa is situated (Omotola, 2008). There is a large forest in Kogi West where timber is produced in commercial quantity. Though not all mineral resources have been explored, nonetheless, there are speculations that oil and gold could also be discovered in large quantity.

Given this resource base, there are only three identifiable and productive companies known in the state: the Ajaokuta steel company, the iron-ore mining at Itakpe and the Dangote cement company (privately owned). The two government-owned companies are not operating at a maximum capacity currently owing to a lack of investment from the government (Cleen Foundation, 2011). Besides being mineral-based, Kogi State is also endowed with other resources like palm oil, marble, dolomite, coal, and ironstone (Onah, 2001). Despite this resource endowment, the unemployment level is very high among university graduates and other school leavers (the young people in particular) across all the local governments. Most of the youths have resorted to riding motorcycles popularly called “Ahaba” for survival. This has exposed them to a different form of crimes, among which is thuggery (Cleen Foundation, 2011). And due to this high level of unemployment, the youth have been become instruments of violence during elections.

Despite the low investment in the state, the few companies operating in Kogi are generating a substantial amount of income for the state in the form of revenue. The quest to control this substantial amount plus the penchant to control state structures has often turned politics in the state into a state of warfare (Bagaji *et al.*, 2012:131-132). Given the advantage of numbers that the Igala ethnic group has over other groups, and considering that democracy is a game of numbers, they have exploited this to their favour by winning all the elections conducted since the creation of the state. As a reaction to the dominance of the Igala ethnic group over others, as well as the way state resources and projects, are allocated by the Igala-led leadership, tension has always preceded every election. This is in an attempt to rip power away from the Igala and restructure the power equation (Omotola, 2006:5-6; 2008). This has always made elections in the state a hotly contested affair with all the intrigues. Below is the map of Kogi State.

**Figure 4 1: Map of Kogi State**



Adapted from AOAV and NWGAV, 2013

### **4.3 Understanding the Nigerian Electoral System**

An electoral system, in a nutshell, is a combination of different rules guiding the chances of the people (citizens) to actively vote. It also includes the number of voters and how votes are used, the number of votes as well as the size of electoral districts in a country; there is also the introduction of approaches or gateways, bonuses, and the allotment of mechanisms often applied to transform votes into tangible seats (Babalola, 2018). Interestingly, the Nigerian electoral system has not been static since the country gained independence from the British colonial masters in 1960. This can be further understood from the historical narrative of the failed attempts to find a suitable form of government that could address the myriads of the diversities inherent in the Nigerian state by the colonial government (Odusote, 2014:25). Odusote blames the flawed system on what was bequeathed to the country as characterised by poor organisation, lack of transparency, and widespread political irregularities. Others include the unfair manner in which candidates are disqualified, pilfering of electronic data, and biases displayed by law enforcement agencies. While this may be true, Odusote has failed to

acknowledge the inability of the post-colonial political leaders to design a national development plan aimed at promoting national unity and cohesion. More than fifty years down the line, the same problems still confront African countries including Nigeria, this should not be the case.

By 1960, at independence, the British bequeathed to Nigeria a British model of a parliamentary system of government. Under this system, the election of parliament and members of the executive arm of the government was chaotic, and this led to the collapse of the first republic and the subsequent military coup that took place in 1966 and the counter-coup that followed (Nyam, 2015; Odusote, 2014). To find solutions to the political instability, the system of government would have to change to one that would accommodate all the diverse ethnic views without much brouhaha (Gberevbi, 2009:175-176). In this instance, a new system of government (presidential) was introduced for the 1979 general elections in Nigeria. The presidential model was adapted from the American system and made to suit the values and culture of the Nigerian people from 1970 to date (Babalola, 2018).

Nigeria is a Federal Republic where power is shared between the federal government and the component units such as States, and Local governments (1999 Constitution of Nigeria, Chapter 1, Part 1). As a republic, the Nigerian presidential system allows the voters to elect the president directly rather than through an electoral college. In addition, the President-elect is empowered to serve for four uninterrupted years which is subject to an extension assuming he/she decides to seek re-election, with a two-term limit only (De Villier, 2015; Anyasi, 2016:1). Nigeria operates a bicameral legislature called the National Assembly. The National Assembly is made up of the Senate (the upper chamber) and the House of Representatives (the Lower Chamber), both of whom occupies the red and green chambers respectively. Elections into the National Assembly are conducted simultaneously and they are to serve for a period of four years after which another election is conducted. The same applies to the Presidential, Governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections also (1999 Constitution of Nigeria, Chapter I, Part II; De Villier, 2015). Nigeria has 36 states and 774 local government councils. These component units are vital to understanding the Nigerian electoral system and are instruments of election violence.

The composition of the Nigerian state is a factor of violence itself, as some people (section) of the state perceives themselves as been marginalised from the governance system. While some are in favour of regionalism, others subscribe to the presidential system but prefer autonomy

over the resources rather than being controlled and starved by the federal government. Therefore, the struggle for power is meant to either maintain the status quo or change it. And in the process, this has often led to violence across the country during elections.

#### 4.4.1 The Structure of the Nigerian Legislature

The Nigerian legislature (parliament), as mentioned earlier, is called the National Assembly. Located in Abuja, the nation's capital, the National Assembly is divided into two chambers—the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is considered as the upper chamber of the National Assembly. The Senate mostly occupies the red chamber of the National Assembly while the House of Representatives is a lower chamber of the National Assembly often referred to as the green chamber (Anyansi, 2016; 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, Chapter V, Part I). The National Assembly has a total of 469 members. A breakdown shows that the Senate has 109 senators while the House of Representatives has a total of 360 members elected across the country. The National Assembly consists of a political and administrative structure which has been put in place to ensure that it realises its legislative mandate and objectives. Section 47 to 51 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria describes the political composition of the National Assembly. The administrative structure, also known as the bureaucratic structure, is often headed by the clerk to the National Assembly, who can further be described as the administrative and the accounting officer of the National Assembly (A guide to the Nigerian National Assembly, 2015:3-4). The National Assembly, by virtue of their position and power as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is supposed to serve as a tool for promoting the peace, unity and security of the country. However, during the period under review, Nigeria's National Assembly has been embroiled in a series of scandals revolved around corruption, physical confrontations and partisan politics that are detrimental to the interests of the state (Banjo, 2013; Olufemi, Akinwumi and Ugonna, 2015).

#### 4.4.2 National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly Elections

Election into the National Assembly and the states' Houses of Assembly in Nigeria is conducted through the plurality systems as contained in the constitution. The plurality system has been adopted by the Nigerian state as the most preferred form of electoral system.

**Plurality System:** The plurality system is often referred to as the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system. It is considered as perhaps the simplest form of electoral systems and commonly practised in some developed democracies and even emerging democracies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, New Zealand, Nigeria and India (Warioba,

2011:22; Sisk, 2017:7). The plurality system gives each voter the right to vote for only one candidate at a time for a specific position. The candidate that obtains the highest votes among many others is declared the winner. In Nigeria, for instance, the 36 states and the FCT are divided into three senatorial districts each, while the FCT has only one district. Each senatorial district casts its votes for the candidate of their choice (Anyansi, 2016). Anyasi further clarifies that seats are allocated to the House of Representatives proportional to the population of that state.

The same plurality system applies to elections into the states' Houses of Assembly across the 36 states of the federation. While the constitution places limitations (duration) on the terms a member of the executive can run for in a political office, the reverse is the case with the parliament, both at the national and state levels. A member of the national assembly can be voted for several times so long as his constituency likes him. In order to qualify to contest the elections for the state house of assembly, a citizen must have reached the age of 30 and above. The 1999 Constitution, Chapter V, Part II reads: "Reference to the provision of 107 of the constitution, one (a citizen) shall be deemed qualified to stand/contest for an election into the House of Assembly provided (a) he/she is a bonafide citizen of Nigeria; (b) he/she must have attained the age of 30 years; (c) he/she must have acquired at least the school certificate level of education or its equivalent, and (d) he/she is a registered member of a political party and being supported by the same party".

#### 4.4.3 Nigeria's National Assembly

As the legislative arm of government, the National Assembly in Nigeria is by law empowered to make laws, amend some sections of the constitution and ensure that the executive arm of government implements the laws made. As noted earlier, the National Assembly is bicameral in nature. Anyansi (2016:1) clarifies that the Nigerian National Assembly shares some similarities with the American model in that it has the upper and the lower chambers. Though both houses have equal powers, the upper chamber (the Senate) are empowered to screen and approve top appointments of key individuals sent to them by the President. The lower house (House of Representatives) either work to support or oppose any government policy, programme or action contrary to the national interest, outside their oversight functions. A combination of the upper and the lower houses make up the National Assembly. The National Assembly is organised through a political structure headed by executives. The 1999 Nigeria's constitution Chapter V. Part I captured it this way:

Sub-section 47-49 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) affirms that the National Assembly shall be established for the federation which shall comprise of the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was further revealed that the Senate should consist of three seat each from every state and one from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The constitution further clarifies that subject to its provision, the lower house (House of Representatives) shall consist of 360 members representing each federal constituency across the 36 states of the federation. Allocation of federal constituencies is carried out based on the population of that state, and the constituencies shall be of equal population; so long as no constituency shall fall within more than one state.

It would be safe to admit that the election of the principal staff (members) of the National Assembly (both chambers), could determine the stability and effectiveness of the National Assembly. It is not surprising how the National Assembly, particularly since the beginning of the fourth republic(1999-2018), has witnessed unprecedented levels of physical confrontations and crises of different proportions owing to leadership tussles and issues of financial malfeasance (Banjo, 2013:83-85, Odisu, 2016:454). At the same time, a strong and law-abiding National Assembly would work to ensure the consolidation of democracy while the reverse will wallow in crises as evident in Nigeria.

#### 4.4.4 State Houses of Assembly in Nigeria

There are 36 states across the Nigerian federation and in each of these states, there are 36 Houses of Assembly with members elected to make laws and carry out oversight functions of checking the excesses of the executives. The powers of the state's Houses of Assembly are enshrined in the 1999 Constitution in Part II, chapter V. Sub-section 90-93 which provides that Houses of Assemblies shall be established for each state of the federation. Subject to the provisions of this constitution, a House of Assembly shall consist of at least three or four times the number of seats, which such a state has in the House of Representatives divided in such a way to reflect, as far as possible, almost equal population; it further spelled out the maximum number of legislatures the state house should have. The leadership of the House of Assembly shall be headed by a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker respectively. The Constitution is further furnished with the conditions for the impeachment of a Speaker and his Deputy. The constitution further provides that a state House of Assembly shall consist of not less than twenty-four (24) and not more than forty members. As good as these constitutional provisions are, the legislatures are empowered by law to appoint a trained lawyer to help them in

coordinating their legislative businesses. In sub-section 94 it is stated that “a Clerk to the State House of Assembly shall be appointed and other staff as prescribed by a law enacted by the House of assembly, and the way and manner of appointing the Clerk and other staff of the State House of Assembly shall be prescribed by that law”.

From the above, it is clear that both the National Assembly and the states’ Houses of Assembly are constitutionally empowered. Furthermore, their duties are similar, and the structure of the leadership is the same too. However, the act of law-making holds the key to peace and good governance by virtue of their powers in Nigeria. Unfortunately, they have often been at the mercy of the executive arm of government, perhaps because of ignorance and greed. An effective and powerful legislature would make legislation that would permanently address the menace of election violence. At best, they could enforce their powers on the executive to implement all the relevant laws that relate to acts of violence during elections. However, because most of these legislatures are products of a corrupt system, it is becoming practically impossible for them to fight the system that gave birth to them, making the fight against election violence very difficult. This explains the struggle for the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria since its re-introduction in 1999.

#### **4.5 Electoral Institutions in Nigeria**

This section discusses the electoral commission in Nigeria from a historical perspective, electoral tribunals, and political parties.

##### **4.5.1 Electoral Commissions in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective**

There are a number of Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) that have existed in the history of democracy in Nigeria (Momah, n.d:37). From pre-independence to present day (2018), these EMB’s, also known as Electoral Commissions (EC) have played a key part in the democratic journey of Nigeria. Although, what is interesting about this is the rate at which their identities and structures have had to change and the controversies they have equally generated in the conduct of the elections in Nigeria (Momah, n.d:38). This goes to show the extent to which Nigeria has either developed or failed to develop a political culture. Retrospectively, the experiences of past military interregnum often open doors for new EMB’s as the junta would certainly ban all political activities. Notwithstanding, the EMB’s in Nigeria are have never been shy of controversies and partisanship throughout the history of election organisation and administration in Nigeria.

The first EMB to be established was the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) created to conduct the independence election in 1959 (Vanguard 21 August 2010; Momah, n.d:37-38). Right from independence, the EMB's have had different names at different times. For instance, after the attainment of independence in 1960, another body was established called the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) to conduct the general and regional elections in 1964 (Vanguard 21 August 2010; Imam, 2010). This body did not last long owing to the Nigerian Civil war (1966-1069), and by 1976-1979 the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was set up. FEDECO would soon be replaced in 1987-1989 with a new name called the National Electoral Commission (NECO). The reorganisation and restructuring continued when NECO was renamed to National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) to conduct the 1994-1998 elections (Momah, n.d:38; Vanguard, August 21, 2010). By 1998 this commission was replaced with a new electoral commission (i.e., The Independent National Electoral Commission-INEC). INEC was designated to organise and conduct the 1999 elections and was the first following the withdrawal of the military from the Nigerian political scene. The newly established electoral commission was able to conduct the 1999 general elections and since then has conducted five general elections to date.

#### 4.5.2 Heads of Electoral Commissions in Nigeria

Going by the descriptions above, it is evident that Nigeria has had several individuals as chairmen and heads of the electoral commissions. Each of these officers had their success and, what this study terms, failure in the course of discharging their responsibilities. For instance, it is on record that Nigeria has produced 12 chairmen of the electoral commission within the period of 58 years (Vanguard, 21 August 2010; Imam, 2010:1-2). Chief Eyo E. Esua is known as the first indigenous Nigerian to head and conduct elections from 1959 to 1966 (Momah, n.d:37-38). During his tenure, Chief Esua oversaw the most violent elections during the First Republic and arguably, in the history of elections in Nigeria. It was this election violence that led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the former Western Region of Nigeria in 1964/65 (Ojo, 2012:7-9; See [global security.org](http://globalsecurity.org)). It is important to stress here that electoral commissions and electoral violence in Nigeria cannot be separated as they are part and parcel of election violence.

After Esua, Chief Michael Ani took over from Esua and conducted the 1979 general elections that brought Shehu Shagari to power in 1979. Chief Ani was soon replaced by Justice Ovie Whiskey in 1983 following the controversies that characterised the outcome of the elections



and the subsequent military coup in 1983 (Ojo, 2012:10). Prof Eme. A. Ewa became the chairman of the commission (NECO) and served between 1987 to 1989. His tenure was very brief and characterised as a complete disaster as he could not manage to conduct a credible local government election in 1987, and as a result, he was replaced (Vanguard 21 August 2010; Imam, 2010). Another Prof was appointed to take over from Prof Ewa. Prof Nwosu, a political scientist, was tasked with the challenge to organise credible elections for the 1993 general elections. History will remember him as one who conducted one of the freest elections in Nigeria's history, but which was controversially annulled by the military. As a result of the drama that ensued during and after the polls, Prof Nwosu was removed following the exit of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1993 as the Head of State. In his place, Ambassador Okon Edet Uya succeeded him as chairman of the electoral commission (NECON) in 1993. It is important to state here that Amb. Uya was hurriedly appointed by the outgoing regime and therefore, was hurriedly sacked by the incoming regime of General Sani Abacha (Vanguard 21 August 2010). Chief Sumner Dagogo Jack then assumed the position of chairman and conducted the local government and state assembly elections; however, none of them was inaugurated. This was due to the untimely demise of General Abacha on June 8, 1998.

The death of General Sani Abacha marked the start of another phase in the political history of Nigeria. His transition programme was brought to an end and replaced by another one led by his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. General Abubakar appointed Justice Ephraim Akpata to head a new electoral commission called the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1998. This commission organised the elections that re-introduced Nigeria back to democratic rule from 1999 to date. It would be safe to say that he spearheaded the longest-serving electoral commission to date. After the conduct of the 1999 general elections by Justice Akpata, he was subsequently dropped and replaced with Dr Abel Gbuobadia who served between 2000 to 2005. Dr Gbuobadia conducted the second democratic civilian organised election in 2003 that saw the re-election of Chief Obasanjo for the second term into office. With the expiration of his term as chairman of the commission, Dr Gbuobadia retired and was replaced by Prof Maurice Iwu. At this point, it is safe to say that Prof Iwu will never be forgotten as he remains the most controversial figure that has ever graced that seat in the history of Nigerian democratic experimentation (Iwejuo, 2011:44). It would be an understatement to call him the grand master of manipulation as his tenure was marred by manipulations, malpractice, widespread irregularities and many crises of election confidence and integrity (Vanguard 21 August 2010; Imam, 2010). His claim that the United States of

America should learn from Nigeria how to conduct elections was a huge joke and will forever remain indelible in the minds of politically conscious Nigerians.

To correct the electoral administration's crises created by Prof Iwu, it became imperative to look for someone with impeccable qualities to oversee future elections in Nigeria. Prof. Attahiru Jega, a respected political scientist, was chosen to head the electoral commission. Prof. Jega introduced some reforms during which two national elections were conducted with significant improvement. After serving his term, Jega was replaced with another political scientist, Prof. Mamood Yakubu, in 2015. Importantly, each of the personalities mentioned above played a part in facilitating or witnessing election violence. Even Jega, who brought about remarkable changes in the electoral process, witnessed the deadliest post-election violence in Nigeria in 2011. Therefore, it is practically impossible, for now, to separate electoral commission in Nigeria from election violence as they have on countless occasions served the interests of the ruling party rather than the people. The reason being that the power to appoint heads of the electoral commission lies with the President instead of the National Assembly or the judiciary as the case may be. As a result, it becomes very difficult to work against the people by whom one has been empowered. Therefore, due to the conflict of interests, they have been found to have at some point favoured the ruling party(s) thereby creating a negative perception about their neutrality.

#### 4.5.3 Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Elections in Nigeria

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is saddled with the responsibility of conducting elections in Nigeria. The commission has its head office at the nation's capital, Abuja, but there are offices across all the states and local government councils of the country. The Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) is empowered by law to conduct both Federal and State elections while the name of the state commission is known as the State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) whose duty it is to conduct local government elections (Nyam, 2015:95). The INEC was established in 1998 and since then the commission has conducted all the elections since 1999 to date at all levels of the federation as part of its constitutional mandate. Among the responsibilities of INEC as contained in section 153, schedule 21 and in part one of the third schedule of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, sub-section 15.

Most of Nigeria's electoral management bodies have not been fair in terms of conducting credible elections and by being non-partisan. Nigerians generally share the view that the electoral commissions have been part and parcel of the problems associated with election

credibility, election fraud and election violence (Momah, 2016:38). More often than not, they have been used by the ruling parties to facilitate the return of incumbent leaders both at the Federal, States and Local Government levels (Nwolise, 2007:165; Mgba, 2017:90; Momah, 2016:38-39). And since the people do not see the electoral body as being a neutral umpire, it becomes practically impossible to build confidence in it. Given this perception of partisanship by the INEC, it is no wonder that reactions from the people culminate in violence. Some resort to taking legal means to seek redress beginning with the electoral tribunals and escalating to the higher courts.

#### 4.5.4 Elections and Electoral Tribunals

An electoral tribunal can be better described as an ad hoc court established by law with the intention of affording candidates the opportunity to challenge the outcome of an election through judicial arbitration (Nyam, 2015:101). Meaning, the desire to correct any problem that may have surfaced during the course of an election gave rise to the electoral tribunal (in Nigeria) as provided for adequately in the 1999 Nigerian constitution as well as the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); with the sole aim of resolving disputes that may have arisen (Tarfa, 2014:3). Clearly, the responsibility of this court by virtue of its constitutional authority is to address any problem associated with the conduct of an election (Iwejuo, 2011:11). In section 133(1) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) it makes provision for the following:

*No election and return at an election under this Act shall be questioned in any manner other than by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (in this Bill referred to as an 'Election Petition'); presented to the competent tribunal or court in accordance with the provisions of the constitution or of this Act, and in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party.*

Evidently, anyone who intends to file a petition regarding any undue action or undue return in the conduct of elections, such a person is allowed to do that through a competent electoral tribunal. The tribunal is empowered to hear any complaint brought before it and rule on it. However, any petitioner who feels unsatisfied can approach a higher court of competent jurisdiction for redress.

In Nigeria, the electoral tribunal was created by section 285 of the 1999 constitution. The section provides that the establishment of tribunals for the National Assembly, gubernatorial and the election of members of the legislature (Tarfa, 2015:3; Nyam, 2015:101; Bawa,

2014:14-15). As indicated in section 141 of the constitution, within 14 days before an election, an electoral tribunal is expected to have been constituted, and a petition must also be filed at least 21 days after the results of an election has been declared by the appropriate authority (Bawa, 2014:15; Nyam, 2015:101). The main jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal is to hear and determine whether petitions regarding the fair election into the office of such individuals as the Governor, Senator, member of the House of Representatives and member of the House of Assembly (Tarfa, 2015:3-4; Bawa, 2014: 15).

Tribunals are set up at a state level called the State Electoral Petition Tribunal (SEPT) to address election complaints from the state. Presidential, gubernatorial and local government candidates are allowed to file a complaint to the tribunals in order to seek redress. With regards to electoral tribunals involving the President and presidential elections, the Court of Appeal is the first and the right court to file a petition as contained in section 139 of the constitution. Here the electoral tribunal is constituted and headed by a Chairman and assisted by four members of the courts from the Appeals Court; the judges of the customary court of appeal of the state are all appointed by their Presidents (Presidents of these Courts), and the Khadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal (Bawa, 2014; Tarfa, 2015; Nyam, 2015:102).

The establishment of the electoral tribunal has remained one of the greatest constitutional flaws of the Nigerian democratic credentials. Though a federal state by creation, the judicial architecture of the country to a larger degree reflects a unitary system in practice. This is due to a concentration of power in the central government, rather the decentralising it to the component units as it should be (Nyam, 2015:101-102). This is a legacy of the many years of military regimes which reflect its centrist proclivity in its promulgations (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006:29; Nyam, 2015:101). These courts have been highly politicised particularly by the ruling party(s), thereby denying justice to those who may have been unjustly declared losers (Kari, 2015:1; Iwejuo, 2011:45-46).

Decrying the bad situation of tribunals in Nigeria, Omenma, Ibeanu and Onyishi (2017:1) lamented that the judiciary, particularly the courts, has remained one of the obstacles to democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The authors argue that the involvement of the courts in the democratic process has not influenced it positively. After reviewing reliable data from gubernatorial election results in Nigeria, they noted that only 6.3 per cent success was recorded in the courts. This sentiment was further underpinned that the judiciary has been compromised and justice is now being sold to the highest bidder (Kari, 2017:1). Little wonder

Nigerians have no confidence in the judicial system as an accused can be declared guiltless while the petitioner ends up in jail, consequent upon a faulty and corrupt judiciary. This has, without doubt, influenced election violence in Nigeria's democracy as political parties employ all means possible to win the election either through rigging or the instrument of violence. Therefore, the politics of Nigeria in the past 19 years have been impacted significantly by the quality of its political parties.

#### **4.6 Election Violence in Nigeria 1999-2017**

Electoral violence in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era, particularly, when the elective principles were introduced under the Sir Hugh Clifford Constitution of 1922 (Egobueze, and Ojirika, 2017:3; Ojo, 2014:6; Nwolise, 2007:162). The nature of election violence between 1922 and the present day has changed significantly. The universally accepted standards of electoral processes have all lost their values of fairness and peaceful competition and are thereby predisposed to a high level of intolerance and a sharp division along ethnoreligious lines among the politicians (Obakhedo, 2011:54-55). Obakhedo further decried the behaviour of the politicians who use intimidation, blackmail and even threats through their thugs to force voters to vote for them. This observation has put to the test, the power/relevance of the Electoral Act, which laid down the rules and the procedures that must be followed by all politicians. This has, therefore, demonstrated how the political elite had undermined constituted rules, weakened institutions and hence, the manifestation of election violence. The political elite, especially in Nigeria, has been the significant perpetrators of election violence using different means. Their role is the destruction of standardised norms of procedures and laws. Ideally, they are supposed to shape government policies and programmes towards development. Sadly, they have become instruments of destruction through corruption, greed, and violence.

Historically, each Republic has had its own kind and share of election violence occasioned by the political elite. From the first republic (1960-1966) electoral violence revolved around complaints of widespread fraud, intimidation and violence following the general elections of 1964 and the regional elections of 1965 (Obakhedo, 2011:104). Obakhedo described the intensity of the violence that culminated in an inter-communal riot that claimed the lives of more than 200 people. With the collapse of the first republic came the second republic which ushered in Shehu Shagari as President in 1979 and 1983 respectively. Like the first republic, the election was marred by massive irregularities and corruption that subsequently triggered outbursts of post-election violence (Egobueze, and Ojirika, 2017:4). Given the weakness of the

centre, the military intervened again, like in the first republic, bringing to an end the second republic.

The third republic witnessed the conduct of the Presidential elections that were won by late M.K.O. Abiola but was later annulled by the military signalling the end of the third republic (Ojo, 2014:7; Jawan, and Osinakachukwu, 2011:133). The military in 1999 finally handed over power to the civilians following the general elections of that year marking the beginning of the fourth republic. During this period, there was general apathy among Nigerians towards politics, consequent to the events of 1993. The election (1999) was contested and won by the candidate of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the person of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. The election was relatively peaceful; however, there were flickers of violence (Nwolise, 2007; Ojo, 2014:8). Chief Obasanjo's government conducted the 2003 general elections. However, besides the spate of election violence, political assassinations were common with key political figures being eliminated.

Election rigging was done in connivance with the INEC, while individuals who were favoured were made governors; tickets were presented to those who had never been active into politics to contest for national assembly positions (Nwolise, 2007:165). There was general disappointment among Nigerians given the flagrant violation of constitutional provisions for the conduct of elections. The expectations for a credible election were dealt a huge blow in 2007 when another election was conducted by the same Obasanjo's government. Omotola (2009) describes it as "garrison democracy"; while Cashmir Igbokwe, a columnist with the Sunday Punch Newspaper described it as "war by another means" (Nwolise, 2007:170). Egobueze and Ojirika (2017:5) argue that the 2007 election was the worst ever conducted in the history of elections in Nigeria. Nwolise (2007:165) agreed when he said, the for the first time, rigging went digital sparking violence in almost all the states of the federation prompting fears of war. The uneducated or semi-educated politicians used the educated youths and members of the academic community to facilitate the rigging of the election through the use of electronic voting. This is a complete opposite of what education is meant to achieve in the life of individuals and a nation at large. It is on this account that more than 300 people were killed across the country (Ojo, 2014:8). Generally, the 2011 election was perceived to be more transparent compared with 2007 as the INEC was more determined to get it right. Unfortunately, the post-election violence that followed the declaration of the PDP candidate as the winner of the polls was devastating. The violence left more than 800 dead, more than 700 cars burned down with several other destructions of property worth billions (Ojo, 2014:8-9).

The violence drew international attention given its scale. This was a further revelation that much needs to be done to eliminate violence in elections in Nigeria.

Then came the 2015 general election, which was by far more transparent than previous elections in history. This was made possible through the introduction of technology such as the electronic card readers to help check the incidents of rigging, fraud and manipulation. Although there was violence, it was restricted to a few locations and states (Egobueze and Ojirika, 2017:7). In general, the journey to the 2015 general elections was very rough with some instances of political assassinations, ravaging activities of Boko Haram terrorists, and large-scale kidnapping. Campaign offices in states like Bauchi, Katsina were burnt down while convoys of campaign cars belonging to the ruling party (PDP) were also burned. There was serious violence in states like Kogi, Rivers, and other states in the southern part of the country. Apart from general elections, other local elections have not been peaceful between 2015 to 2018. Among them are: Kogi, Rivers, Osun, Ekiti, Benue and Taraba states. As the 2019 general elections draw closer, there are fears that violence will mar the polls, except if better preparations are put in place to curb the spate of election violence already ongoing across the country. In effect, the history of elections in Nigeria is a history of violence; pre-election violence, violence during elections and post-election violence. It is left to be seen whether the current crop leaders would summon the courage to weed out the violence of the democratic space or that it will continue for a future messiah to turn the situation around.

#### **4.7 Electoral Laws and the Challenge of Election Violence in Nigeria**

The foundation of election violence could arguably be situated within the legal framework that established and guides the conduct of elections in Nigeria. The introduction of elective principles under Sir Hugh Clifford's Constitution of 1922, during the colonial era, marked the beginning of violence on election-related matters (Ojo, 2014:6; Ladan-Baki, 2016:23). Thus, at the heart of election violence lies the problem of electoral laws. For instance, the legal frameworks that regulate the conduct of the elections in Nigeria are derived from the 1999 constitution (as amended), the Electoral Act 2010(as amended), as well as the guidelines rolled out by the electoral commission-INEC (Hassan and Yusuf, 2015:7). Hassan and Yusuf further identified other legal instruments guiding the conduct of elections to include: the Code of Conduct for Civilians, The Nigeria Code of Advertising Practice and Sales Promotion (APCON), Guidelines and Regulations for Political Parties, the Nigerian Broadcasting Code and the Police Act, as well as the guidelines regarding the conduct and behaviours of police officers posted on election duty anywhere within the country etc.

These legal frameworks have undergone various amendments majorly because of the difficulties encountered in the course of conducting elections in the past. As a result of the shortcomings of the frameworks, it has been detrimental to conducting credible and fair elections in Nigeria. This necessitated the amendment of some sections of the 1999 constitution and the Electoral Act 2006 to address these concerns (Hassan and Yusuf, 2015:7). In section 87 of the Electoral Act which focuses on intra-party democracy, has lost its meaning when compared with sections 31-38, 78-102 of the same electoral Act. In particular, section 87 (4) (c) (ii) specifically states that any aspirant who scored the highest votes shall be declared the winner of the party's primaries at the end of voting. Thus, in compliance with the Electoral Act, the name of the winner shall be transmitted/submitted to the INEC as the candidate for the party.

In the same manner, section 31(1) clearly declares that no name shall be rejected or disqualified upon submission to the INEC by the party; even when the party intentionally chooses to submit the names of those who may have lost out in the primaries or did not even contest the primary elections in the first instance (Hassan and Yusuf, 2015:9). This void in the Electoral Act has been a subject of controversies between aspirants and godfathers within the party structures. The power brokers would always want their cronies to be nominated so that they can continue to milk the state resources to their satisfaction. The opponents of this have often clashed with these power brokers, consequently leading to election violence between and among their supporters.

The INEC was established by virtue of the provision of section 153(1f) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) and is empowered as the electoral umpire in elections as contained in the 2010 Electoral Act. The Electoral Act mandates the INEC to monitor the activities of political parties to see that their conduct promotes intra-party democracy. In section 85(2) the Act empowers the commission to attend and observe any convention, conferences, campaigns and congresses of political parties even without prior notice. As good as this provision may seem, there are certain contradictions within the Act itself. Section 31(1) says that:

*Political parties shall within 60 days submit to the commission the list of candidates to represent their political platforms at the general elections as prescribed by law; and provided that no candidate's name shall be rejected or disqualified by the commission for whatever reason(s).*



First, the inclusion of the phrase “any reason” is obviously dangerous and has taken the power of the INEC away to sanction any political party. This has predisposed the INEC to the mercy of some powerful politicians who would use their political and economic might to influence the selection process in order to achieve their objectives at all cost.

On the issue of financing, the 1999 constitution and the Electoral Act 2010, as well as the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) make clear provision on how campaign finances should be sought. However, political parties embark on fundraising exercises beyond the provision of the law. The Electoral Act places some limitations on the amount of the money candidates, and their political parties can receive in the form of a contribution either from individuals or groups. Section 88-93 of the Electoral Act makes provision for the regulation of campaign finance. Similarly, Section 91(2)(3) of the same Act places a barrier on campaign spending for presidential and governorship candidates to the sum of N1000,000,000 and N00,000,000, respectively. Furthermore, section 91(9) of the Electoral Act stipulates that “no individual or the other entity can donate more than one million Naira (N1million) to any candidate” (Hassan and Yusuf, 2015:10). Section 338(2) of CAMA clearly forbids companies from directly or indirectly making donations or presenting gifts or funding any political party.

However, it is evident that during the 2015 general elections, like many other elections in history, these provisions were violated with impunity without any sanctions from the INEC. The 2015 general election was a good case in point where money was fully displayed as usual by both the ruling and opposition party. For instance, the re-election campaign bid of former President Goodluck Jonathan raised over N21 billion where specific individuals like Tunde Ayeni of Skype Bank allegedly donated N2 billion on his behalf and some unnamed associates from other companies (Vanguard 21 December 2014). This is in violation of section 38(2) of CAMA as well as other relevant legal provisions guiding elections, election financing and campaigning in the country. This flagrant violation has opened more avenues for others to do the same, and the consequences have always been clashes among the political gladiators, which in most cases has led to violence by their supporters.

Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) released a report on campaign financing in Nigeria which shows that the two major political parties (the PDP and the APC) have violated and are still violating electoral laws and regulations by using public funds for their campaigns (CSJ, 2015:2,7). The report by CSJ further revealed that N4, 973 billion was reported to be the amount of money spent in February 2015 by the two parties, with the PDP believed to have spent a whopping

N3, 549 billion. Additional information also shows that the campaign team of former President Goodluck Jonathan, led by the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN), were involved in a bribery scandal. It was alleged that the team handed over N7 billion and N5 billion to the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Ohaneze Ndi Igbo respectively to give maximum support to the re-election bid of Goodluck Jonathan. All these cases point to the fact that the Electoral Act, as well as other existent laws, have been violated with impunity in Nigeria. As the public watch this open desecration of the laws of the land by political leaders, it becomes practically impossible for the followers to want to respect the same laws that are being violated by the elite. This in effect, is responsible for the incessant electoral violence and total lawlessness in Nigeria.

#### **4.9 Political Killings in Nigeria 1999 -2017**

Political killings or assassinations have had a visible presence in Nigeria's democracy. Even before the re-introduction of democracy in 1999 in Nigeria, the country had been confronted by cases of high-profile assassinations, many of which are yet to be truly resolved. Hakeem (2016:1) argues that "there is hardly any election year since 1999 that a politician is either killed or brutally assassinated". As a result, these political killings have been part of the major outcomes of election violence in Nigeria (Igbafe and Offiong, 2007:1). Igbafe and Offiong lamented that 45 per cent of political killings took place between years 2000- 2007 alone. The authors further observe with sadness the inconclusive nature of all cases of political assassinations in the country. The police who are paid to protect all citizens' lives and property seem to be clueless and helpless on the way to deal with the security challenges in the country. In a dramatic development, the then Nigerian Police Chief, Sunday Ehindero, while addressing the National Assembly said:

*...Now regarding the security situation in the country and with reference to the 2007 elections, I have to brief you that we have large arms and ammunition in circulation in our society; the threat of arms proliferation in this country is serious. Some politicians carry arms to rallies while are students caught with arms and ammunition on their way to conventions..." (Durotoye, 2014:235).*

From the quotation above, the Police Chief was merely itemising the challenges confronting the force but never proffered solutions nor mentioned names of those arrested. This explains the reasons for the increasing rates of political assassinations in the country. In democracies where there are strong institutions of government with complete independence, the work of

policing, effective security and justice is easily carried out without the influence of the government. Retrospectively from the first republic, there have been a high profile political assassinations and killings ostensibly during the general elections of 1964. And when the first military coup took place on 15th January 1966, it took the lives of famous nationalists among whom are: Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Chief Samuel Akintola, (Igbafe and Offiong, 2007:14). Between the first republic and the fourth republic, there were incidences of political killings, but most of them were carried out by the military regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha. However, with the reintroduction of democracy in 1999, the spate of the political assassination reached a height such that Prof. Wole Soyinka described the then ruling party, the PDP, as a “nest of killers” and claimed that until the nest is dismantled, the political killings in the country would never stop (Iheanacho, 2004). From this position, one can understand that political killings or assassinations are the handiwork of politicians who are desperate to exert their influence in power.

According to Igbafe and Offiong (2007), Durotoye (2014) and Hakeem (2016), the number of assassinations in Nigeria is evidence that these killings remain a threat to democracy and any attempt at consolidating democracy given the failure of the government to resolve all the pending cases of political assassinations across the country. This disposition appears to have emboldened the perpetrators to carry on with their nefarious activities without restraint. For instance, despite the reports of suspects being arrested for the murder of Chief Bola Ige, nothing concrete has been done by the federal government. The suspect is still very much active in politics today. The same can be said of other high-profile killings such as Harry Marshal, Funsho Williams among others.

#### **4.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the historical context of election violence in Kogi State by looking at it from the larger Nigerian perspective. The chapter began by contextualising Kogi State with particular reference to the political configuration of the state in the larger Nigerian sense. The chapter sought to understand election violence in Nigeria by looking at the electoral system, the electoral institutions governing the conduct of elections, how elections are conducted into the National Assembly, the electoral management body, election tribunals and the political parties involved. Interestingly, the chapter further examined the nature and the historical context of electoral violence with a special focus on electoral laws guiding the conduct of elections in Nigeria, and an overview of election violence in Kogi State. The chapter

subsequently concluded with a discourse on political assassinations/killings in Nigeria between 1999 to 2017, and their implications on election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria at large. From the review above, it is evident that election violence still remains a big challenge in Nigeria as well as an obstacle to the sustainability of democracy. Besides the political and ethnic diversities that characterise the Nigerian state, these primordial tendencies significantly influence the politics of the state.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This section focuses on the description of the methods and the tools that will be used in the conduct of this research. The chapter begins with a description of the research paradigm supported by the philosophical context for which the research was established. Interpretivism was chosen for the study of election violence and consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria. The chapter will further examine the research design upon which this study is built and the research approach to be adopted. The study employs the qualitative approach, which oftentimes is less structured and collects subjective data. The sampling techniques and the population for the study also constitute part of this chapter. Equally in this chapter is data collection, the techniques that are used for the collection of data, as well as the tools and instruments for the data collection, explained. That is, the manner data will be collected, analysed and interpreted for intellectual consumption forms part of this chapter. Furthermore, this section discusses the research instruments used and the recruitment strategies for the study, the presentation of data and data analysis. In addition, the basic information on research as it relates to ethical considerations is also discussed, and finally, a conclusion will be drawn.

### **5.2 Paradigmatic Perspective of the Study**

In any empirical research, there is a philosophical dimension to which the researcher wishes to be directed and or vice versa. Paradigm is the philosophical way of thinking, particularly in a research context (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017:26). The paradigm is considered as the worldview of the researcher. Kivunja and Kuyini further noted that this worldview is perceived as a perspective or a way of reasoning, a school of thought, sets of shared beliefs, which gives proper meaning and interpretation to a research data. As a worldview, paradigm gives us a philosophical assumption about the nature of reality (referred to as ontology- meaning, what we believe about the nature of reality); the way of knowing (referred to as epistemology- which is, how do we know what we know?), and ethics and a value system (referred to as axiology- meaning, what do we believe to be true?) (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012:1). Paradigm helps us to examine a social phenomenon, and from the understanding gathered from the social phenomena, the explanation can be made.

There are four major philosophical paradigms in research. They are positivism, critical realism, interpretivism and pragmatism (Saunders, 2009:124). Positivism gives emphasis on the use of a quantitative approach due to its focus on the need to reflect objective reality in a highly

structured environment (Blaikie and Priest, 2017). For interpretivism, the emphasis is more on the application of qualitative research designs due to their ease in processing cases from one case to another. It allows for the collection of subjective views that relate to the diversities of participants (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009:115-116). For the critical realist, the emphasis is on the things one experiences which they claim are sensations; the images of the real world, not the things directly. Critical realism explains how often people are being deceived by their senses. And then pragmatism, which explains that the most important thing that determines the epistemology, ontology, and axiology that a researcher adopts has to do with the research questions (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:109). They must be appropriate and not be ambiguous in order to be able to answer the research questions. Each of these research paradigms or philosophies gives a perspective and thinking to the research. In any case, this study adopts interpretivism as a philosophical approach to extrapolate election violence and consolidation of democracy in KZN and KGS.

#### 5.2.1 Interpretivism

As a philosophical approach, interpretivism holds that the most appropriate way in which to investigate or study social order is via an instinctive interpretation of the participants involved (Bhattacharjee, 2012:19; Creswell, 2012). This paradigm engages in research with the aim to interpret elements of the study and as such, incorporate human interest into a study (Dudovskiy, 2016). The main focus of the interpretivist paradigm is to seek to comprehend the subjective world of human experience (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017: 33). To get to the heart of the subject being investigated, Kivunja and Kuyini clarify that interpretivism seeks to understand and interpret the thoughts of the subject or their meaning. The essence is to try and understand the viewpoint of the subject under investigation rather than the perception of the observer.

In interpretivism, the emphasis is more on understanding the individual and the way he/she interprets the world around him/her. That being the case, the main principle of the interpretivist paradigm is the idea that reality is socially constructed (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017:33). It is no surprise, therefore that this paradigm has often been referred to as the constructivist paradigm. This is because theory in this paradigm does not precede research; instead, it accompanies it so that it is fixed or grounded on the data generated by the researcher. Like other paradigms, interpretivism has its assumptions on ontology, epistemology and axiology.

### 5.2.2 Ontology of Interpretivism

As a branch of philosophy, ontology deals with the nature of reality, meaning, what reality is and what it is not (Blaikie and Priest, 2017). On the question of what reality is, the interpretivists share in the belief that reality is socially constructed; and that there are a good number of intangible realities as many people are constructing them (Creswell, 2003; Mertens, 2009). The reality, in this sense, is a perception of the mind and is more of a personal or social construct. A question could be asked for instance, do you believe in life after death or do you share the view that witches exist in real life? Perhaps you do, that would be your own personal reality, a way through which one tries to critically make sense out of the world around.

Therefore, the interpretivism reality is restricted to context, space, time, and people in a particular condition and must not be generalised into a single common reality (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012:10). There are realities based on individual and group realities. Interpretivism seeks to rationalise the reality that exists in election violence and how it relates to the consolidation or otherwise of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria. For the ontological interpretivists, election violence is a reality in Africa, and without a doubt, it has created lots of social, economic and political problems. Thus, the ontology of interpretivism is that election violence is a reality and has caused some significant setbacks for democratic gains in Africa. Therefore, it should be subjected to both philosophical and scientific interrogation to unpack its impact on the entrenchment of democracy and democratic values and principles in Africa. Ontologically, the interpretivists seek to understand the nexus in the real sense of it, between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria. These perceived linkages will then be interpreted to ascertain the reality behind the assumptions of linkages.

#### 5.2.1.2 Epistemology of Interpretivism

This is based on the fact that truth can only be found within human experience (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012:10). Epistemology of interpretivism focuses on those details of a situation, the reality that lies in those details, as well as the subjective meaning motivating actions (Saunders, *et al.*, 2009:119). For instance, statements like what is true or false are historically culture-bound and context-dependent, notwithstanding the fact that some may be universal. Within this context, belief systems, stories of communities and other spiritual linkages find space as legitimate knowledge. This best explains some of the myths about election violence in Africa as certain subjective beliefs or knowledge are subjective in explaining the relationship between

election violence and the consolidation of democracy. The epistemology of interpretivism seeks to understand the reality that lies in the motivating factors for the continuous escalation of election violence in Africa, despite numerous efforts to nip it to the bud by stakeholders.

### **5.2.1.3 Axiology of Interpretivism**

Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies judgement about values (Saunders *et al.*, 2009:116). The axiology of constructivists share the belief that since reality is mind constructed and dependent, knowledge is then subjective; social inquiry is, in turn, value loaded and biased. The type of paradigm a researcher chooses in research inevitably influence his/her values, even the choice of a topic, the methodology of collecting and analysing data, the way data is interpreted, and the conclusion of the findings and report writing (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012:10). Balanced axiology holds that the conclusions of the research findings will definitely resonate with the views and values of the researcher, by at least making an effort to give a fair report of the findings. The axiology of a constructivist researcher is expected to show where his study is value loaded and ensure that the report is written on it. In the course of this study, all biases related to election violence are reported to ensure that the validity and reliability of the study are not put to question.

## **5.3 Research Design**


In every scientific investigation, be it quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods, there are certain approaches that give direction to the research (Creswell, 2014:12). A research design refers to the overall strategy that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way. Essentially, it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data (De Vaus, 2001:2-3; Trochim, 2006:1). One of the central focusses of a research design has to do with the ability to address the logical problem and not the logistical problem of the study (Yin, 1989:29). From this point, this study relies on a qualitative approach using a case study method (Meyer, 2001:330; Yin, 1993).

A case study is simply an in-depth examination, always undertaken over time, of a single case, such as a policy, programme, intervention site, implementation process or participant. It is a scientific inquiry which interrogates a contemporary phenomenon from its real-life situation (Alnaim, 2015:29). Case studies seek to provide answers to such questions like “How”, “Why” a particular phenomenon occurs? The case or the unit of the method could be an individual, a programme, school or the case of election violence (Alnaim, 2015:29). Researchers have investigated in detail the case studies in order to describe its analytical dimension. Demetriou



(2009:204) revealed in detail that case studies are mainly qualitative, although, it could have some elements of quantitative evidence with some statistics. The choice of the case study in this research is important as the researcher seeks to explore election violence and its relationship with democratic consolidation in KZN and KGS using a single case study. One of the advantages of a case study is that it allows for a lot of detail to be collected such that would not normally be easily obtainable by other research designs. Also, within case studies, experiments can be conducted. On the other hand, the disadvantage of a case study is that it has been criticised for lacking rigour. It is also characterised as being too long, hard to conduct and generates a large quantity of documents (Yin, 1984:21). The single case study examines a single phenomenon of great importance like election violence and then seeks to explore the factors responsible for its recurrent manifestation in African democracies, and to what extent does this undermine the consolidation of democracy.

**Figure 5.1 Research Philosophy**



#### **5.4 Research Methodology**

This study has drawn significantly from the qualitative approach using a case study method. Qualitative research is scientific research or investigation that seeks to answer questions by collecting evidence and producing findings that are applicable far beyond the immediate boundaries of the study (Bhattacharjee, 2012:113; Curry *et al.*, 2009). Put differently, only qualitative research allows the study of the phenomenon in its natural pattern, trying to make sense of or interpret the phenomenon in terms of the meanings people give to it (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:3). Thus, the findings of qualitative research are more descriptive than prescriptive in real sense. Qualitative methods can be used to understand complex social processes, to capture essential aspects of a phenomenon from the perspective of study participants, and to uncover beliefs, values, and motivations that underlie individual electoral choices and behaviours (Curry *et al.*, 2009).

This study is qualitative because of its exploratory nature. Through it the researchers are able to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons, views and motivations for election violence. Besides, it further provides insights into the problem of election violence and its relationship with democratic consolidation and also helps in developing ideas or hypotheses for possible quantitative research. The advantage of qualitative research is that it allows for a broader study involving a greater number of individuals. Similarly, it allows for greater objectivity and accuracy. In spite of these strengths, the qualitative method has some disadvantages. One of which is that it makes use of a very rigid and static approach as well as employs an inflexible process of delivery. Sometimes researchers do collect data that is much narrower and superficial (Barbbee, 2010:4-5).

#### **5.5 Study Site**

This study was conducted in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa and the Kogi State of Nigeria. The choice of KwaZulu-Natal Province arises from the fact that it has witnessed a series of conflicts and perhaps, more election-related violence since the introduction of democracy in South Africa (see Lancaster, 2016:11-12; Schuld, 2013; EISA, 2014:95-96). Lancaster (2016) revealed that from 2013 to 2015 alone, 146 election related protests were recorded in South Africa. Out of these figures, 29 per cent were peaceful, while 71 per cent of the protests turned violent. KwaZulu-Natal Province tops the list of the most frequent cases of election-related violence (Lancaster, 2016:11). It is on this basis that KwaZulu-Natal province has been selected for this study in South Africa.

Kogi State has had its own share of election violence and has been described as one of the most difficult states to conduct elections in Nigeria (Independent National Electoral Commission-INEC online, 2017). Political and electoral violence has been a recurrent phenomenon in the state since the dawn of democracy to date (See NWGAV/AOAV, 2013; Cleen Foundation, 2011; Cohen, 2015; Bello, 2014:6; Human Rights Watch, 2004:35-36; The Cable, April 16, 2015). Kogi State has been the hotbed of political and electoral violence in Nigeria (Cleen Foundation, 2011:1). Conducting elections in the state has been a very tough challenge for election authorities as all forms of violence are introduced to mar the polls. It is a complex state where gangs and organised violence like muggings, carjacking and armed robberies are very prevalent (NWGAV/AOAV, 2013).

## **5.6 Population and Sampling**

In every research, there is a population which the study is targeted at. And if the population is too large to reach, a strategy is often devised to select a small population called a sample to help conduct the study. Therefore, this section discusses the research population and the sampling below:

### **5.6.1 Research Population**

Every research has a specific population it wishes to engage with. In essence, a research population basically underscores the number, size, nature/category and the quality of the relevant individuals it hopes to engage. That is, either they are directly connected in several ways to the reoccurrence of electoral violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and Kogi State, Nigeria or are more knowledgeable about the subject. The research population for this study is politicians and the electorates. The electorates include youths, women, employed and the unemployed etc. The total number of registered voters in KZN as at 2018 is 5,524,678. Of this number, there are 3,115,137 registered females and 2,409,541 males (IEC Online, 2019). In Kogi State, the total number of registered voters stands at 1,646,350. These categories are crucial to the understanding of how election violence occurs during and after elections in Africa.

### **5.6.2 Sampling**

Sampling is a specific principle used to select members of the population to be included in the study (Dudovskiy, 2016). On the other hand, Bhattacharjee (2012:22) sees sampling as the statistical means of selecting a subset known as a “sample” of a population of interest for the purpose of making observations and statistical inferences regarding that population. It has been

noted that because many populations of interest are too large to work with directly, techniques of statistical sampling have been devised to obtain samples from larger populations (Bhattacharjee, 2012). There are two broad types of sampling: Probability and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling is sometimes referred to as random sampling or representative sampling. In this sampling, every member of the population has a known – non-zero, chance of being included in the sample. Therefore, it involves some forms of random selection. Non-probability sampling, on the other hand, is also called judgmental or non-random sampling. In the non-probability sampling, not all units of the population have an equal chance of participating in the investigation. That means, no random selection is made. In this study, the purposive sampling technique has been chosen. A purposive sampling technique is a sampling method whereby a researcher obtains his sample that may appear to him/her to be a representative of the larger population, by using his judgement (Elmusharaf, 2012:7). The selected participants in purposive sampling are pre-determined based on specific criteria set by the researcher often meant to answer the research questions (Marshall, 1996:5523). The criteria for selection include participation in politics through voting, campaigning, being a party member, observer and an advocate for democracy. The decision for these criteria was purposively taken by the researcher because of his expert knowledge and the importance of these people to the study.

Additionally, the choice of purposive sampling for this study is because of the flexibility to selection. Therefore, the choice of purposive sampling is justified based on the fact that the selected participants were those who had a wider and broad understanding of democracy, elections and election violence in their communities. Purposively, therefore, the twenty participants for the interview were selected through the maximum variation sampling technique. The maximum variation sampling is also known as heterogeneous sampling. It is that purposive sampling technique designed and used to provide as much insight as possible into the phenomenon under consideration (Crossman, 2018:2). The variability informs the choice of politicians and electorates as participants for the interviews and the focus group discussion. Among the electorate include women, youths, employed and self-employed constituted the number of participants.

The population sampled for this study is 20 people for the interview while 24 people combine for the three focus group discussions, totalling, 44 people. From this twenty, ten people were

interviewed in KZN while another ten were interviewed in KGS respectively. The sampled areas where respondents were selected for the interview in the KwaZulu-Natal Province are Ulundi, Nongoma, Nkandla, Umlazi, and KwaMashu. The mode of recruiting these participants was purposive. This was done in collaboration with the research assistant who, by virtue of being a local and well familiar with the ward, assisted in identifying the participants for the FGD. The criteria used for the selection of the participants was based on a sound knowledge of the politics of Ward 86, U Section, Umlazi, KZN, South Africa. Through this, the researchers were able to identify and select eight persons for the FGD.

In the same breath, interviews were conducted in Okene and Lokoja Local Government Areas representing Kogi Central and West Senatorial Zones of the state, respectively. Respondents were drawn from Okene town, Adavi and Checkpoint from Okene LGA, while Adankolo and New layout were represented from Lokoja LGA. The selection of these sample areas was purposefully carried out by the researcher as a result of their relevance to the study. Similarly, the selection of the sample areas reflects the different classes that characterize the case study and in tandem with the theoretical framework of this study.

**Table 5.1: Population and Sample**

<b>Divisions of Kogi State/KwaZulu-Natal Province</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Sample</b>	<b>Sampling method</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>FGD (members per group)</b>
<b>Kogi State</b>	Politicians	6	Purposive	6	FGD3(6)
	Electorates	4		4	
<b>KwaZulu-Natal Province</b>	Politicians	5		5	FGD3(10)
					FGD2(8)
	Electorates	5		5	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>20</b>		<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>

### 5.6.3 Recruitment Strategy

The participants for the interview and the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were recruited in connection with all the research assistants, who by virtue of their experience, had in-depth knowledge of all the participants. During the recruitment exercise, all the politicians that were selected had been deeply involved in politics for more than ten years, while the electorates are those who are very much familiar with the politics of election violence in their areas. Before the interview and FGD were conducted, the researcher, together with his team of nine research assistants across KZN and KGS, identified the participants face to face (Archibald and Munce, 2015:34). Each of the participants was duly informed of the purpose of the interview and the proposed date for the interview, requesting their consent and availability. After receiving assurances of their willingness and availability, plans were put in motion to move to the sites for the interviews and the FGD. Five interviews were conducted in the homes of the participants while the remaining fifteen were carried out in the offices and places of work of the participants.

## 5.8 Data Collection and Description of Instrument

This section discusses the data collection methods and instruments. The primary source of data collection for this study was in the form of a semi-structured interview and focus group discussion (FGD).

### 5.8.1 Interview

Interview methodology was employed for data collection in this study. Interviews are a personalised data collection method and are often conducted by persons trained for the purpose, using research protocols such as questionnaires (Bhattacharjee, 2012:78). One advantage of the interview method is that it gives the interviewer the ability to observe facial reactions and personal demeanour of the interviewee. The most common type of interview is the face to face interview where the interviewer engages the respondent directly with questions, often written down, and records the responses of the interviewee in the process (Bhattacharjee, 2012:78).

Though the face to face interview may seem simple, it is a complex process. For instance, face to face interviews are time-consuming and may be influenced by personal bias complexities that could influence the outcome of the report negatively (Blair, Czaja and Blair, 2014; Fowler, 2009:127). Despite these weaknesses, the interview is still the most effective instrument for data collection, particularly in social science research (Alshenqeeti, 2014:39; Lancaster,

2005:133). The choice of the interview method for this study was predicated on the objective that the researcher hoped to accomplish.

The study equally made use of recording devices for recording all the interviews and the responses from the FGDs. The purpose of the recording was to aid the preservation of the information collected, as well as to prevent sluggishness in the collection of data from the researcher. Recording devices such as a radio recorder were employed mainly for the research only.

#### **5.8.1.2 Interviews in Kwazulu-Natal**

The researcher conducted interviews in five locations across the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Among the locations were KwaMashu, Nkandla, Nongoma, Umlazi and Ulundi. One person was interviewed in KwaMashu, one in Nkandla, three in Nongoma, one in Ulundi and four in Umlazi. In total, ten people were interviewed across the KZN Province, five politicians and five electorates. In terms of political affiliations, there were three members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and two from the African National Congress (ANC) among the politicians interviewed. Of the five electorates interviewed, there was one police officer (youth), one student activist (female), one religious leader (male), one employed graduate (male) and one unemployed graduate (male). The interview questions were designed in a manner that promoted uniformity and coherence as well as ensuring that deviation did not occur in the process (Neergaard, and Leitch, 2015:2-3). Between 30-45 minutes was spent in interviewing a single participant.

In the course of conducting this interview, the researcher was assisted by six research assistants across the five selected areas in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The reason for the high number of research assistants in KZN was because of the language barrier, lack of familiarity with the terrain across the selected areas and fear of being attacked as a foreigner. In addition, most of the research assistants were instrumental in the identification of the participants for the interview and with other logistics matters.

#### **5.8.1.3 Interviews in Kogi State**

Of the ten people interviewed in KGS, six were politicians and four were electorates. The six politicians were interviewed at New Layout, Adankolo, Kabawa, Checkpoint and two in Okene. Among the electorates interviewed, one was from New Layout, two were from Checkpoint and one was from Okene. Of the electorates, there was one self-employed youth, one employed male, one community/tribal leader, one retired civil servant (an electorate) and

an employed graduate (serving civil servant). In terms of political affiliations, there were members of both the ruling party (APC) as well as members of the opposition (PDP). Two APC politicians were interviewed while four were from the PDP. The questions for the interview were designed in a semi-structured manner, which gives room for the person being interviewed to give further clarification. The majority of participants for the interview were interviewed in their offices and two others in their homes. A total of 30-45 minutes was used in the conducting of each interview. The pattern of the interview was the face to face type as with the FGD. During the interviews, the researcher made use of devices such as a radio recorder, pen and writing materials in the form of a notebook for the purpose of note taking and recording of daily events, as well as a wrist watch for timing purposes. During the interviews, the researcher was assisted by three research assistants across the selected study areas of Kogi State, Nigeria.

#### 5.8.2 Focus Group Discussion

The study made use of the focus group discussion (FGD) as one of the instruments for data collection. A focus group discussion allows for a wider interaction and in-depth discussion arising from responses (Freitas *et al.*, 1998:1-2; Smithson, 2007:357-358). The FGD is often used to collect the ideas and experiences of participants regarding the topic being investigated (Mishra, 2016:2). Mishra further noted that FGD is an excellent tool for explaining the attitudes of people by clarifying and providing a better understanding of the subject matter. Usually, an FGD comprises of a small group of people, ranging from six to nine in number (Gilshad, 2013:192). The FGD for this study adopts the 'Funnel Structure' approach. In this approach, each group begins with a less structured approach that allows for free and frank discussions and then moves toward a more structured discussion of the specific questions (Logan, 2013:14). Logan further states that the type of instrument used by FGDs allows the participants to actively participate in the wider debate or discussion.

#### **Focus Group Discussions: KZN**

Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. The first FGD was conducted at Ward 86, Section U, Umlazi while the second one was conducted at the Zonal Secretariat of the African National Congress' (ANC) in KwaMashu. A total of eight people participated in the first FGD in Umlazi, while ten people participated in the KwaMashu discussion. Prominent among them were three seasoned politicians, in addition to two secondary school teachers (civil servants), two youths (an unemployed university



graduate and an unemployed person with matric) and a housewife. Except for the two youths, none of the other six participants was less than forty years of age. This was very important in order to have a mature and responsible conversation regarding the topic being investigated. With the help of the research assistants and in order to ensure uninterrupted discussion, the living room of one of the participants was used for the discussion.

While the FGD participants sat in the living room, the researcher began the discussion by introducing himself and the essence of the discussion, and then proceeded to request for honest and frank opinions regarding the questions that they were to be asked. It was observed that all the participants for the FGD in Umlazi were actively involved in the discussion. All the politicians in the group were active members of the African National Congress (ANC) as they were unwilling to have politicians from other parties in their midst. The FGD started at 9:32 am and concluded at 11:00 am.

In KwaMashu there were ten participants at the FGD, representing both politicians and electorates. The zonal secretary of the ANC in KwaMashu and five other politicians (in total two women and four men) and four electorates (a male and three females) were the participants. Participants were allowed to freely express their views on all the questions asked during the discussion, and all their responses were recorded for preservation. The discussion began at 10:23 am and continued until 1:15 pm.

### **Focus Group Discussion: KGS**

A single Focus Group Discussion was conducted in Kogi State, Nigeria. The discussion took place in Lokoja, the state capital, with a different combination of participants. The participants for this FGD were purposively chosen by the researcher, in collaboration with his two research assistants who had in-depth knowledge of the town and the politics of Lokoja. In addition, participants for the FGD were drawn from three wards within Lokoja, the state capital; Wards, C, D and E. The choice of these wards was made as a result of their sizes, centrality to election outcome in the state capital and most importantly to the antecedence of crimes, violence and election violence in Lokoja.

Among the eight participants for the FGD were four men active in politics (politicians) and four electorates (two civil servants; one unemployed male graduate and one businesswoman), who were the active respondents. As a consequence of the sensitive nature within the State regarding topics of ethnicity and religion, the composition of the group fairly captured this. In particular, all three dominant ethnic groups in Kogi State, namely Egbira, Igala and Okun, were

adequately represented in the discussion. Similarly, there was adequate religious representation with the two religious groups being equally represented. Another characteristic of this FGD was that members of different political parties were represented, namely the All Progressive Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

The FGD was conducted in the office of one of the politicians, located within the state capital. The discussion began with the principal investigator introducing himself and the purpose of the study to the participants. The researcher then began by asking the respondents to introduce themselves, their political affiliations and age groups. This was followed by the principal researcher asking questions *vis-à-vis* election violence and democratic consolidation. In the course of the discussion, participants were allowed to elaborate on any of their responses to questions asked, as the researcher moderated. The discussion started at 10: 00 am and lasted for one hour and thirty minutes.

#### **5.8.2.3 Documentary Review**

The documentary review is another way of collecting data by reviewing relevant documents central to the study. Ahmed (2010:2) defined this as “a written text” about a specific phenomenon. Ahmed further conceived documentary review as ‘any form of documented or written material, apart from a record that was not prepared particularly in response to some demands from an investigator. The documents may be internal to a programme, such as strategies for curbing election violence in developing countries, records of incidences of election violence over a period of time or external documentation from international partners such as the United Nation Organisations (UNO), African Union (AU) *etc.* (Anonymous, 2009:1). Anonymous further noted that the documents might be in the form of hard copy or electronic version such as reports, programme ratings, funding proposals, newsletters *etc.*

The essence of documentary review, among other things, is to: (a) collect background information *vis-à-vis* any phenomenon such as election violence in KZN and KGS, (b) determine if the implementation of a programme is in tandem with the plan of action and (c) compile documents relevant to your evaluation and many more (Anonymous, 2009:2). In the case of electoral violence in KZN and KGS, a documentary review forms part of the sources for data collection for this study. Empirical resources of information have been consulted to enrich the study with relevant data.

## 5.9 Data Analysis

Thematic Analysis (TA) was adopted for the analysis of data for this study. Thematic analysis has to do with identifying those patterns or themes in qualitative data (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017:3352). Unlike many other methods in qualitative research, thematic analysis is not tied down to a specific epistemological or theoretical perspective (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017:3352). Due to its flexibility, TA has been adopted to aid the analysis of data collected through interview and focus group discussion. As a result, thematic analysis has been used to analyse each research question from the generated data. The essence was to help interpret patterns in the qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2013:2) *vis-à-vis* election violence in KwaZulu-Natal and Kogi State.

The thematic analysis was applied to each interview conducted. It began by listening to the audio recordings and reviewing all written content with the aim of identifying themes and categorising patterns in election violence and democratic consolidation in KZN and KGS. For each individual interviewed, the audio recording was transcribed in verbatim, detailing the responses to every question asked. After the transcription, each respondent was assigned a code for the purpose of identification, and to preserve anonymity (the identity of the respondent) in the course of the analysis.

In each question, the responses were categorised (grouped) together based on the research philosophy. This was further followed by the collation of data for easy analysis. Doing this was meant to aid in the understanding and interpretation of the responses in the course of analysis. It was also to help respond to every question and address the objectives of the research as raised in the introductory part of the study. Since Focus group discussion and interviews were used for the collection of data, the inductive analysis was adopted in analysing the data. The inductive analysis involves the process of coding the data without necessarily trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or through the pre-conception analysis of the researcher (Braun and Clarke, 2006:14). From this stand point, we can, therefore, safely say that this type of thematic analysis is driven by data. To further aid the analysis of the data generated in the course of this study, the Matrix method was adopted to further aid the understanding and analysis of data. In simple terms, what a matrix does in any data analysis is to significantly contribute to the display, presentation, pragmatic evaluation and the dissemination of findings in a study (Averill, 2002). The author argues that Matrix analysis is one of the strategies used to advance knowledge and enhance the development of evidence in qualitative research.

Matrix could be very useful and valuable in the quest to establishing relationships or any interplay between and among variables and categories of data or phenomena of interest. This could be achieved by looking at how these categories or variables relate to specific theoretical concepts such as groups, kinship patterns, perceived authority or as in this case, election violence and the consolidation of democracy. Importantly, Averill explains that this helps in the search for tentative positions that link variables and categories of information. The use of Matrix has helped to graphically display known intersections between dimensions of phenomena (election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa), providing an expansive picture of the research (Averill, 2002). Therefore, the Matrix analysis was used to analyse the data by explaining how election violence constitutes a real set back to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

### **5.10 Ethical Consideration**

In social science research, the role of ethics is very important. Participants have rights that must be respected by the researcher, and to ensure that their security is guaranteed and taken seriously. To this end, the principal researcher must ensure that no single individual is exposed to any form of danger by virtue of participating in the study (Pillay, 2014:196). In view of this, this study was conducted in such a manner that the objective of the research was not compromised. Before the commencement of the interview and focus group discussions, all the participants were told that their conversations were going to be recorded. In upholding the ethical standards of the study, the following constitute some of the ethical issues that the study was preoccupied with:

#### **5.10.1 Informed Consent**

The consent of all participants in this study was sought for before embarking on it. The participants were first informed of the purpose of the research, and at the same time were told that they have the right to not participate or withdraw at their will, during the course of the study. As such, no participant was forced, threatened or unduly influenced and induced to participate in the study (Ruzek, and Zatzick, 2000:29). As is common in every form of scientific research, protocol attached to the research instruments (interview schedule) informing participants of the purpose of the study and requirements for participation was presented (Pillay, 2014:199; Fowler, 2009).

### 5.10.2 Explicit Authorisation

Explicit authorisation is simply the permission usually granted to an individual, either to enter a particular place or to do something. It is further conceived as a concept that grants access to certain resources (sensitive) and only to those to whom permission is granted (Vapen and Hall, 2008). Having obtained consent from the University to embark on the research, the researcher had to first receive authorisation from the respondents to attend the interview and the Focus Group Discussion. An authorisation is sought afterwards, if the data to be collected is sensitive and would require investigating files, archives *etc.* (Maxwell and Beattie, 2004). In this case, explicit authorisation was granted by some councillors and other participants of this study.

### 5.10.3 Respect for Persons, Cultural and Personal values

Having selected the participants for this study, each one was treated with the utmost respect and capable of making individual choices without any influence. In tandem with the ethical values of this study, all participants were treated with respect (Gilshad, 2013:8-9). During the course of this study, the researcher accorded all the highest respect that every percipient deserved. Those with titles such as Honourable, Mr Mrs, Chief, Nkosi *etc.* were all addressed in like manner. In certain cultures where one has to bow before greeting an elder, this etiquette was observed in order to fulfil the purpose of the research. With this attitude, it encouraged participation and fruitful discussions among participants.

### 5.10.4 Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality

Anonymity simply implies that the names of the persons used for a research or research site are not disclosed. Usually, it is extended to include information relating to individuals or the research site that would make it easy to be identified (Walford, 2005:84-85). Walford further described confidentiality to mean any information that is secret and private. Anything which a research participant says in confidence during an interview or focus group discussion, must not be passed onto another person. In this study, the researcher assured participants of privacy, anonymity and total confidentiality principles, enshrined in the research process. It was further affirmed to the participants that any information given would be purely for academic purposes (Pillay, 2014; Gilshad Creswell, 2013:8-9; Ruzek, and Zatzick, 2000:29). Data from the respondents was treated with a high level of anonymity, without any participant being identified by his or her name in the course of the analysis (Terrell, 2016). As contained in the consent letter and other protocol, the participants were all briefed about this (see appendices).

**Table 5 2: Table of Interviews Participants**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Location</b>
MKHKZN	Male	School teacher/politician	ANC	Umlazi
LGKZN	Male	Unemployed graduate	Electorate	Umlazi
SPAKZN	Male	Employed /Youth	Police officer	KwaMashu
SNHKZN	Female	Youth /undergraduate	Activist	Umlazi
KHUKZN	Female	Politician/former Councillor	ANC	Umlazi
NKOKZN	Male	High school teacher	Religious leader/electorate	Nongoma
SBOKZN	Male	Technical director	Employed graduate	Nongoma
KUNKZN	Male	Politician/Former Councillor	IFP	Ulundi
HADKZN	Male	Politician/Serving Councillor	IFP	Nongoma
SENKZN	Male	Politician/Serving Councillor	IFP	Nkandla
RMTKGS	Female	Politician	PDP	New Layout
GRAKGS	Male	Politician	APC	Adankolo
LKGMKGS	Male	Politician	PDP	Kabawa
OGRIKGS	Male	Community/Tribal Leader	Electorate	New Layout
APTKGS	Male	Lawyer/Politician	PDP	Checkpoint
NDIKGS	Male	Retired civil servant	Electorate	Checkpoint
KOKOKGS	Male	Politician	PDP	Okene
OBEDKGS	Male	Self-employed Graduate	Electorate	Okene
ENGRKGS	Male	Politician	APC	Okene
OBETKGS	Male	PRO	Employed graduate	Checkpoint
FGDKZN1		Focus Group Discussion		KZN
FGDKZN2		Focus Group Discussion		KZN
FGDLKJ		Focus Group Discussion		KGS

## **5.11 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the research methodology and methods used for the study. Similarly, it has discussed the research paradigm with emphasis on the research philosophy underpinning the study. It further discussed the research design, the study site, population and sample of the study. The chapter equally described the data to be collected and the instruments through which the data was generated. With all of this, the strategy for recruitment was clearly spelt out, bearing in mind the manner in which data was analysed and interpreted. The chapter concludes with an ethical consideration of the study, which is key to the research. From the research methodology and methods discussed above, it very evident that no study can give a better direction and achieve its objectives if the methodologies through which conclusions are arrived at are not clearly described and discussed. Further to this is the application of the paradigmatic philosophy of Interpretivism contextualising it under the ontology, epistemology and the axiology of this study.

## **CHAPTER SIX: UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS SLOW PACING THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA**

### **6.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapter, the research methodology employed for the study was clearly presented. Emphasis was placed on the research paradigm, research design, research approach, population as well as the sample. In addition, the method of data collection and analysis was explained. The main focus of this study, therefore, is to analyse the interplay between democratic consolidation and election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. Based on the first research question which seeks to understand the factors slow pacing democratic consolidation In Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, the main purpose of this chapter is to discuss and equally give some clarification regarding the findings of the data collected both from the conduct of interviews and the focus group discussion. The chapter begins by examining the manipulation of religion and ethnicity, as well as political parties and their failed promises to the masses in KGS and KZN. The chapter also examines the increasing levels of killings and the misuse of political power, bad leadership and governance, greed and a lack of political integrity among politicians in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province and the monetisation of politics and then conclusion is drawn.

### **6.2 Factors Slow Pacing Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Responses from respondents from this study suggests that democracy in Nigeria and South Africa has come under a serious democratic microscope following a downward regression from the key indices that define democracy and its core values over the years. Evidently, there are a number of factors which respondents believe could be responsible for this retrogression against consolidating democracy. Though opinions vary as to the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation, considering the fact that democracy has been in existence since 1994 and 1999 respectively. Reasons adduce for the slow pace vary as the data indicates in matrix 6.2 below.



**Matrix 6.1 Summary of research on factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Subtheme/sub question	Respondents Responses	Source/s
<i>The manipulation of religion and ethnicity</i>	<i>Well, we have the problem of ethnicity. We are not one and because there is this emphasis on ethnicity, it brings us to the level of disunity. So, it is only the person you speak the same language with that you are safe in his hands.</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>There is the issue of religion. You see if you consider religion which is very vital in our politics in this state, it is such that if you put a Muslim performer, whether the Christian can perform or not, you must make him next to him and vice versa. So definitely, we are having problems which are why [we] have not seen consolidation. Therefore, when a leader is elected from each of these blocs, loyalty and attention are being paid to the ethnicity and religion that such a person comes from. Which is not allowing us to make significant progress.</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>Ethnicity. You are not from my tribe; I won't work for you. You are not from my religion; I won't vote for you. Discrimination all over.</i>	FGDLKJ
<i>Formation of political parties and governance</i>	<i>Some of the factors I believe are responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation is from the state of formation of parties. When parties are formed without direction and ideology, you will have serious problems even when such a party eventually forms a government. Now at the beginning of establishing any party, definitely the party must have focus and ideology, which are all embedded in their manifesto</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>The obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in KZN include the ANC and its failed promises. The ANC is one of the major obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in KZN... The ANC could have helped consolidate democracy since 1994 to date but too much of conflict among the rank and file of the party hierarchy. There [is] also a lack [of] internal democracy within the organisation. Nomination and appointment of leaders in the ANC [is] supposed to follow a pattern stipulated in the party's constitution. However, there is a total disregard to the constitution of the party creating loopholes that do not allow for internal party democracy.</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>There is the problem of membership of the ANC and the power to vote particularly at the ward level... The apartheid system and its policies are still very active in the day to day of our lives.</i>	MKHKZN
<i>Bad leadership and governance</i>	<i>In every democratic society, governance is a serious business. Governing people is a serious business. And if you don't have the right people in the right position, there will be great obstacles. If the people (elected officers) do not know why they were elected in the first place that will be a serious obstacle to consolidation of democracy. If the elected officers do not know the problem of the people that elected them, it is a serious obstacle. In essence, we can now say there is a misplacement of priority, which is dangerous! This will affect democratic sustenance. Thus, the inability of the leadership to understand the yearnings and aspirations of the people could be an obstacle to democratic consolidation.</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>Leadership my friend, leadership. Good leadership is one. Put a round peg in a round hold. Let's do away with godfatherism, let's do away with money politics, let us do away with... the issue of the clan is dominant and sensitive. Candidates are voted into power based on their clans regardless of the fact that the candidate may not be competent enough. So, merit is now sacrificed on the platter of mediocrity.</i>	APTKGS
<i>Illiteracy and lack educational and political education among politicians</i>	<i>But you see the young and youths of nowadays, some of them hardly passed through the secondary school level. A lot of dropped out are now found in positions of authority (governance) because of democracy, all in the name of politics because they are now my followers... You can't expect to gain anything reasonable from a secondary school dropped out being a commissioner for water resources...</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>Like I say, most politicians are not educated thus, they know little about politics. The quality of politicians is responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KZN. Because among the politicians, some are criminals while are there for their selfish gains and not the good of the people. There is also the issue of election violence, assassinations and political killings.</i>	SENKZN
<i>Increasing levels of killings and misuse of political power</i>	<i>Some of the factors are incessant political killings and assassinations among politicians in KZN.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>...to incessant violence and more violence...</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>There is also the past history of divisions, infightings and killings...</i>	LGKZN

<i>Greed and lack of political integrity among politicians</i>	<i>Personal integrity is also a problem in Kogi State. When you elect somebody and he doesn't look at his personal integrity, and the rules anyhow, then you cannot have consolidation. He will not even listen to what happened before he became a leader, just like I gave an example earlier.</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>Greed and selfishness. Most of the black political elite are greedy and corrupt. They have no plan and vision for the people and integrity...</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>I said greed because people are so greedy. Maybe, I don't know how they make their money. In summary, though, ignorance on the part of the masses allows this and it is an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy...</i>	NDIKGS
<i>The monetization of politics</i>	<i>One of the factors that does not allow democracy to consolidate in Kogi State is because the politicians use little money to entice the poor people to vote for them</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>I am sure you know what is prevalent in our society is money politics. Who is the highest bidder? Who is the highest bidder is likely going to get the thing (elected)...</i>	APTKGS
	<i>The use of money (when I say money it could be for vote buying, ritual activities and or money can use for anything).</i>	FGDLKJ
	<i>They use money and material items to buy voters (influence their choices of candidates)</i>	KHUKZN

### 6.2.1 The Manipulation of Religion and Ethnicity

Clear as this may appear, responses from respondents suggest that this is a huge problem confronting not just Kogi State, but Nigeria as a whole. The participants for this study revealed that ethnic affinity/chauvinism and religious sentiment have remained the bane of Nigerian politics and has continued to define who becomes a leader at what time, what place and on whose interest. Reacting to the menace of ethnicity and religious sentiments in politics in Nigeria, for instance, a focus group participant stated that:

*Ethnicity... You are not from my tribe; I won't work for you. You are not from my religion; I won't vote for you. Discrimination all over (FGDLKJ).*

This seems to be a very dangerous problem when citizens begin to differentiate themselves on the basis of their ethnic backgrounds rather than being patriotic citizens. Respondents appear to suggest that the seed of division is often instigated by manipulating religion and ethnic sentiment especially by the elite (political and religious elite) in order to gain political advantages that relate to political and economic power. The failure by past leaders to address this menace has continued to constitute a serious obstacle not just for democratic consolidation but to build a nation and create national cohesion and unity. More importantly, this explains the absence of hygiene in politics and the political landscape especially among the political elite who would go to any length to get what they want irrespective of the means through which such a thing is obtained. Once there is a lack of unity among the diverse ethnic nationalities, there is bound to be disagreement which if not properly managed could result in large scale violence as witnessed in Nigeria. Ethnicity manifests in both the formation of political parties, appointments into very important government departments and agencies, as well as party processes. Therefore, matrix 6.1 has shown that religion and ethnicity are have often been manipulated by politicians to advance their selfish interests.

### 6.2.2 Political Parties and their Failed Promises

Data from respondents has shown that political parties, no doubt, play a very central role in any democracy. The data indicates that parties shape the direction and policies of the government, determine the programmes of the government, and decide whether institutions will be built, strong or not. Political parties are supposed to have an ideological position of the kind of economic model it intends to pursue. Above all, these parties and their constitutions are supposed to be above the individual members. Reacting to parties being the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy, a participant agreed that:

*Some of the factors I believe are responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation is from the state of the formation of parties. When parties are formed without direction and ideology, you will have serious problems even when such a party eventually forms a government. Now at the beginning of establishing any party, definitely the party must have focus and ideology, which are all embedded in their manifesto (LKGMKGS).*

The response from the respondent appears to suggest that the nature of the formation of a political party and the type of ideology it is anchored on are the core elements that would remain the fulcrum of the party and continue to drive it in daily decisions and programmes.

Responses in matrix 6.1 state that party members are expected to respect their constitutions and ensure that party decisions, processes and actions are aligned with the party constitutions. Unfortunately, research participants claim that the reverse seems to be the case, particularly in Kogi State and by extension, Nigeria. What is apparent from the responses of respondents is that those with money bags are considered superior and very influential in the parties. Reflecting on the role of political parties on democratic consolidation, respondents stated that there is a total absence of integrity among the politicians. That almost every politician in Kogi state is up for sale.

Data from these respondents shows that political parties like the ANC, having enjoyed the privileged position of being one of the parties that fought hard to bring about an end to apartheid and institute democracy in South Africa, is deemed as the problem of democracy in South Africa. Clarifying the problem, a participant stated that:

*The obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in KZN include the ANC and its failed promises. The ANC is one of the major obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in KZN... The ANC could have helped consolidate democracy since 1994 to date but [there is] too much of conflict among the rank and file of the party hierarchy. There also is [a] lack [of] internal democracy within the organisation. Nomination and appointment of leaders in the ANC [is] supposed to follow a pattern stipulated in the party's constitution. However, there is a total disregard to the constitution of the party, creating loopholes that do not allow for internal party democracy (MKHKZN).*

These problems range from a lack of internal party democracy, corruption, issues of membership at the local level, and total disregard to the constitution of the party. The data also shows that there is a problem with the nomination and appointment of leaders within the organisation coupled with the failed promises of the ANC to the majority black population being another burning issue. And most importantly, participants also show that there is the problem of observance and retention of most of the apartheid policies that are very inimical to black people and the development of South Africa, which in itself, constitutes a real setback to the consolidation of democracy. Thus, the data frowns at why the ANC is still operating such policies and laws even in a so-called democracy.

### 6.2.3 Illiteracy and Lack of Educational and Political Education among Politicians

Responses from the respondents appear to suggest that there is a huge problem when those who are leading (leaders) by occupying very sensitive political positions are either not educated or have a low level of education and knowledge about governance. The assumption is that such would make governance a herculean task as shown by the data in matrix 6.1. This could possibly explain why perhaps, democracy in Kogi State and KZN is struggling for consolidation because the right people (leaders) are not being given the opportunity to lead. Sadly, the data revealed that most of the politicians in active politics in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal are not educationally and politically educated enough to handle leadership responsibilities. This is not only applicable to the old politicians but is inclusive of the young ones, according to respondents. A participant noted that:

*...but you see the young and youths of nowadays, some of them hardly passed through the secondary school level. A lot of [them] dropped out [and] are now found in positions of authority (governance) because of democracy, all in the name of politics because they are now my followers... You can't expect to gain anything reasonable from a secondary school dropped out being a commissioner for water resources... (OGRIKGS).*

The response from OGRIKGS indicates that politicians going into politics lack the requisite education to run for political office. This suggests that politicians without proper education know little about politics. Thus, the education quality of politicians also contributes to the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KZN and KGS, because these politicians lack the knowledge to formulate policies and ideas that would bring about development. A possible consequence of allowing people without proper education is that there could be some who have

a criminal history and are into politics for their selfish gains and not for the good of the people. A participant clarifies this more succinctly:

*Like I say, most politicians are not educated thus, they know little about politics. The quality of politicians is responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KZN. Because among the politicians, some are criminals while [other] are there for their selfish gains and not the good of the people. There is also the issue of election violence, assassinations and political killings (SENKZN).*

This response seems to agree with previous views regarding the quality of politicians who are in politics without a proper level of education in both Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. What participant SENKZN means is that due to the low level of education among politicians, it tends to affect significantly the pace of democratic consolidation. Reason being that most of the politicians are self-centred with no interest in the affairs of the people they claim to represent, while some may have a criminal history which is actually a counter-intuitive to democratic development. And with this lifestyle, the chances of an escalation in violence, political killings and assassinations become common.

#### 6.2.4 Increasing Levels of Killings and the Misuse of Political Power

Participants for this study identified the increasing levels of killings in a democracy and the misuse of power by the political elite as some of the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. Political killings tend to create fear in the hearts and minds of the citizens and politicians alike. This, according to the respondents, has a negative effect on the level of participation in politics as many are afraid of the possibility of being killed in the process. A respondent explains the increasing level of killings as a factor that slow paces the consolidation of democracy in KZN in particular by saying: “*Some of the factors are incessant political killings and assassinations among politicians in KZN (NKOKZN)*”. The response here suggests an increased level of killings/assassinations among the politicians, which in itself is a setback to the consolidation of democracy. Speaking on killings, MKHKZN agrees that there is an increasing level of killings, “*...increases violence and more violence...*”. The possible explanation to this could be due to the desperation for political power among the politicians and the subsequent misuse of political power. This data indicates that there may have been a history of animosity among the political players which necessitated the continuous increase in the rates of killings. A research participant, LGKZN

argued that: “*There is also the past history of divisions, infighting and killings...*”. What the data shows is that any history of violence, killings and infighting among political players that has not been resolved could potentially be very negative to the consolidation of democracy in any democracy, Nigeria and South Africa inclusive. In effect, data from this section has shown that the increased level of killings and the misuse of political power fuels more violence, and it is an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa.

#### 6.2.5 Bad leadership and Governance

Responses from the respondents seem to suggest that most elected representatives in Nigeria and South Africa do not know or understand what governance and leadership entails. Politics is different from governance, and governance is a serious business that must not be handed over to a novice. Regrettably, this has been the norm in Kogi State and Nigeria too. More worrisome is that politics has been dominated by ‘godfatherism’ and those who are secondary school drop-outs with little knowledge of governance, bereft of leadership skills and decency. A respondent explained the importance of quality leadership and its relationship to the consolidation of democracy this way:

*In every democratic society, governance is a serious business. Governing people is a serious business. And if you don't have the right people in the right position, there will be great obstacles. If the people (elected officers) do not know why they were elected in the first place that will be a serious obstacle to [the] consolidation of democracy. If the elected officers do not know the problem of the people that elected them, it is a serious obstacle. In essence, we can now say there is a misplacement of priority, which is dangerous! This will affect democratic sustenance. Thus, the inability of the leadership to understand the yearnings and aspirations of the people could be an obstacle to democratic consolidation (OGRIKGS).*

Of course, as can be seen from the data in Matrix 6.1 above, leadership seems to be at the core of most problems confronting developing countries, including Nigeria. The respondents understood that when the wrong leader is positioned in the right place, more damage can be done than any benefit. Another obstacle to democratic consolidation is a clannish factor which has been the defining factor in the politics of the people of Kogi central. Data shows that the chances of political progression of any politician is dependent of the clan he comes from as well as the relevance of that clan in Ebiraland. This development deters young people with

good ideas of venturing into politics in order to retire the old guards. This explains why ‘godfatherism’ is a common phenomenon in the politics of Kogi State, as these people want to be the king makers in the politics of the state. Thus, bad leadership and governance are one of the factors slow pacing the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

#### 6.2.6 Greed and a Lack of Political Integrity among Politicians

Respondents in this study show that politicians in Nigeria and South Africa are not immune to greed. What prompts the tendencies for greed is the desperate desire to get rich faster than imagined, as indicated by the data in Matrix 6.1 above. This appears to mean that since politics has been monetised, the desperation to become a politician and thereby have access to free money and all the incentives to be rich or enjoy the life of being a politician, is enormous. In trying to realise this potential, some even resort to killing their opponents and show a complete disregard for the law. Responding to the issue of greed as an obstacle which leads to the slow pace of democratic consolidation, respondent KHUKZN affirmed that: *“Greed and selfishness. Most of the black political elite are greedy and corrupt. They have no plan and vision for the people and integrity...”* This response could mean that due to the greed and selfishness of the political elite, they seem to lack any serious vision and plan for the general masses. And due to this anomaly, the politicians demonstrate a general lack of integrity when they become greedy and perhaps, sell out in their politics.

Supporting KHUKZN’s views on greed, another research participant also agreed that:

*I said greed because people are so greedy. Maybe, I don’t know how they make their money. In summary, though, ignorance on the part of the masses allows this and, it is an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy... (NDIKGS).*

This respondent further confirmed that greed on the part of the politicians would not allow them to pursue people-centred policies and programmes which would bring about development. Due to their greedy disposition, they become prey to any potential political machines which may want to buy them off to achieve their own economic and political objectives. This shows a total lack of integrity and decency in politics. Speaking on integrity in politics, a respondent had this to say:

*Personal integrity is also a problem in Kogi State. When you elect somebody, and he doesn’t look at his personal integrity, and if they rule anyhow, then you cannot have consolidation. He will not even listen to what happened before he became a leader, just like I gave an example earlier (LKGMKGS).*



This response could mean that politics being a noble profession could be bastardised by corrupt minds if proper care is not taken. Personal integrity is key to sustaining democratic values and tenets in any democracy, and without which democracy cannot be consolidated. Thus, respondents imply that a lack of personal integrity is a problem to democracy and must be a central component in democratic consolidation.

#### 6.2.7 The Monetisation of Politics

Data in matrix 6.1 shows that democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal has been taken over by money bags politicians. Meaning that politics in Nigeria and South Africa has been monetised at almost all levels, and this constitutes a setback to the consolidation of democracy. A respondent reacting to the monetisation of politics noted that:

*One of the factors that does not allow democracy to consolidate in Kogi State is because the politicians use little money to entice poor people to vote for them (LKGMKGS).*

This response seems to suggest that the politicians use money often to influence the poor masses in Kogi State to vote for them. The implication of this is that elections are not done based on the conscience of the people as the money being given to them is the determinant. Thus, this has a negative impact on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Speaking further on the monetisation of politics, two respondents stated that:

*I am sure you know what is prevalent in our society is money politics. Who is the highest bidder? Who is the highest bidder is likely going to get the thing (elected)... (APTKGS).*

*The use of money (when I say money it could be for vote buying, ritual activities and or money can be used for anything) (FGDLKJ).*

Both respondents APTKGS and FGDKLJ affirm that money has a great influence on the democracy of Kogi State, Nigeria. Money in politics determines the kind of leaders who are elected into positions of power and who, without a doubt, tend to have a lot to do with the type of policies and programmes such a government formulates and their effect on the masses. In the long run, this could also have long-term implications on the consolidation of democracy. What this means is that the type of leadership in positions of authority to a greater extent determines the pace of democratic consolidation in a democracy. Thus, respondents noted that money plays a crucial role in determining the leadership that would emerge. Responding

further on money, respondent KHUKZN stated that: “*They (politicians) use money and material items to buy voters (influence their choices of candidates)*”. This shows the desperation for political power among politicians.

### **6.3 Discussion of Research Findings**

The discussion revolves around the research question that seeks to understand the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa, as stated in the research questions as contained in chapter one.

### **6.4 Obstacles and Factors Slow Pacing Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Among the factors slow pacing, the consolidation of democracy is religion and ethnicity. The manipulation of ethnicity and religion has become a norm in Nigeria and perhaps, a bit of it in South Africa. The manipulation of ethnicity and religion is obviously a huge challenge to building national unity and cohesion, especially in a multicultural society like Nigeria and South Africa. This clearly supports the choice of the elite theory, which explains the ability of the minority to outwit the majority through influence, manipulation and persuasion. Like Vilfredo Pareto puts it, the elite employs the skills of what he describes as foxes and lion. The first, whom he called the “foxes”, are those who dominate mainly through combinazioni (“combination”): deceit, cunning, manipulation and co-optation. The “foxes” clearly describe the behaviours of the elite who have succeeded in using all sorts of tricks to manipulate the people against one another just for personal political gains. The persistence of this ethnic and religious sentiments among people can be attributed to bad leadership. The truth is, politicians, thrive very well in controversies that relate to the whipping of ethnic and religious sentiments in order to win votes. This becomes much easier in places where there is a high level of pauperisation of the citizens by the political class. In Nigeria, for instance, hardly any political decision is taken that does not assume ethnic, religious and other primordial tendencies (Isiaq *et al.*, 2018). These continue to serve as a centrifugal force that frustrates democratic consolidation. In the body of literature, Linz and Stepan (2009:6) identified ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as a big obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in developing countries, particularly multicultural societies like Nigeria. While this may not have played a big part in the politics of KwaZulu-Natal and by extension, South Africa in a more obvious way, there are instances of election violence occasioned by ethnic sentiments. In 2016, ethnic tension was high following the nomination of Thoko Didiza as the African National Congress candidate for the August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2016 election. The choice of Didiza was rejected and perceived as an attempt

to impose a Zulu man in a Tshwana dominated area, thereby leading to massive violence and destruction (The Conversation, June 24, 2016). The attempt by the ANC to impose a candidate outside of his province on another province shows how far politicians will go to achieve their objectives if left unchecked. This has justified the adoption of the elite theory in explaining the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. Which is why Michel, Pareto and Mosca all agree that the autonomy of the elite is inescapable in any society, whether in democratic or egalitarian societies as the world progresses (Yusuf, 2014).

Political parties and their failed promises to the masses also contribute to the pace at which democracy can be consolidated. The findings of this study show that democracy has not been consolidated or is perhaps slow to consolidate because political parties which are seen as instrumental in shaping any democracy are failing the people by the day. Often times, they are deeply enmeshed in inter- and intra-party violence to the detriment of service delivery. The implication of this is that bad leadership and governance would be the outcome. In the documentary sources, Kearsey (2007:iv) examined political parties in South Africa and revealed that the ANC is the major obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. This is exhibited in the failure to institutionalise internal party democratic principles for addressing party processes and decisions. Similarly, the data revealed that the failure by the ANC to fulfil most of its promises to the majority black population is at the heart of the violent reactions at election times. This result can be explained by the fact that this could possibly lead to divisions and factionalisation among party members in order to use the excuse of the failure to meet the needs of the people to break up the party. Often times, those perceived as being kingpins, flagrantly show disregard for the rule of law and are engaged in massive corruption. This accusation appears to share a similar sentiment to the one levelled against the PDP in Nigeria which wasted 16 years of democracy in Nigeria only to spread corruption and wastage without any significant development (Channels Television, 23 November 2018).

The apartheid system and its former structures have been identified as one of the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in KZN. A possible explanation for this could be that the system and structures laid by the apartheid regime are still very visible in South Africa and their presence continues to be a source of social contention in the country, especially among the majority black population. This, coupled with the failed promises by the black South African elite, has raised anger in the hearts of the masses citing betrayal from their leaders. Clarke and Bassett (2016:184) noted that apartheid created a society based on inequality and

dispossession, it is therefore not surprising that since the introduction of democracy in 1994 in South Africa, all efforts at redressing the socio-economic imbalance has been slow. This could explain the reason for the frustration among the masses, which constitutes a constraint to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Crucial to this is the issue of intra-party and inter-party violence that has thrived for quite some time in South Africa. All these are the product of bad leadership, particularly among the ruling black political leaders. Most of the leaders are selfish and self-centered. The failure to achieve consolidation is attributed to the institutionalisation of violence among the youths by the politicians, and until this violence is done away with, democracy will continue to face stiff challenges in Africa at large.

This study equally established that most politicians both in KGS and KZN, do not possess the requisite qualifications to lead people. Most are secondary school drop-outs while a very few possess certificates from tertiary institutions, which is why a good number of them lack ideas about leadership and governance. On the other hand, the electorates too need to be educated/enlighten about making electoral choices devoid of influence from very wealthy and powerful politicians. Voter education, workshops and training are seriously required to help the electorate make reasonable and independent choices that could lead to electing leaders with integrity. In the literature, Birch and Muchlinski (2018:385) explained how voter education, training and enlightenment has given them a new face in politics in South Africa. The inability to do this has opened the door for very greedy individuals to jump onto the ship of politics.

Also important to the understanding of the constraints to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa is the politics of money which has become the common trend. In recent times money has become the medium through which elections are easily won, particularly in Nigeria and South Africa. Specifically, money is used as an incentive to influence the voting pattern of voters, buy votes during and even after elections (Onah and Nwali, 2018). So long as money has been elevated to an enviable position in electoral democracy and politics, democratic consolidation will certainly be a mirage. Money being used for the purpose of vote buying is a situation that is gaining momentum in both Nigeria and South Africa.

The challenge of vote buying, and voter buying is a thorny issue in the electoral process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. Financial inducement from politicians to the voters and often times the electoral commission's staff/ad hoc staff too, has played several roles in changing the course of elections in Africa. Politicians have employed these tactics to sway the

voting pattern in their favour. Most times, money is literally used to buy votes and voters, thereby affecting the quality of elected leaders, leadership and governance in its entirety. In this instance, it becomes a game as each candidate tries to outsmart the other for the ultimate price, which is the office of the President, Governor/Premier etc. This has further justified the adoption of games theory in rationalising the main objective of this study, the relationship between election violence and the consolidation of democracy; and the specific objective is to understand the obstacles and factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN. Money and material gifts are being used to influence the decisions of electorates during elections. Without a doubt, vote buying has the tendency to deny any political society the opportunity to enjoy the democratic principles that have to do with transparency and accountability since vote buyers do not exist to protect the interests the masses (Chul *et al.*, 2017). Workable strategies need to be put in place to ensure that money and other material resources are discouraged from encroaching into the electoral politics of KGS and KZN so that democratic consolidation is fast-tracked in Africa as a whole.

**Matrix 6.2: Summary of research factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Research question	Emergent theme/s	Interaction with literature	Sources
Factors and obstacles responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigerian and South Africa	- Obstacles and factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- that the ANC is the major obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa</li> <li>- the apartheid system and structure has been identified as one of the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy</li> <li>- vote buying and voter buying has remained another thorny issue in the electoral process</li> <li>- ethnicity, religion and clannish factors that have become a norm in Nigeria and perhaps, a bit in South Africa.</li> <li>- the elite are inescapable in any society whether in democratic or egalitarian societies as the world progresses</li> <li>- Politicians both in KGS and KZN do not possess the requisite qualifications to lead people.</li> <li>- Voter education, workshops and training are seriously required to help the electorate make reasonable and independent choices</li> <li>- Quality and good leadership must be encouraged among African leaders</li> <li>- Good governance as good leadership, transparency and accountability have been identified as very necessary</li> <li>- Election violence was identified as a serious setback to the consolidation of democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Keasey (2007)</li> <li>- Kearsey (2007)</li> <li>- Linz and Stepan (2009)</li> <li>- The Conversation, June 24 (2016)</li> <li>- Yusuf (2014)</li> <li>- Birch and Muchlinski (2018)</li> <li>- Authur <i>et al.</i> (2013)</li> <li>- Akinola <i>et al.</i> (2015)</li> <li>- Iheanacho (2015)</li> <li>- Wallsworth, (2015)</li> <li>-</li> </ul>

## **6.5 Conclusion**

In response to the first objective of the study, this chapter has examined the factors responsible for slow pacing democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN. Efforts were made to understand these obstacles that inhibit the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. The chapter began with the assessment of the manipulation of religion and ethnicity, examining political parties and their failed promises in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. The chapter further took a look at the increasing levels of killings and the misuse of political power in Nigeria and South Africa, the obstacles and factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. In addition, the chapter equally discussed bad leadership and governance; the role of greed and the lack of political integrity among the politicians. Lastly, the chapter examined the monetisation of electoral politics in both KGS and KZN and then a conclusion was drawn. In general, therefore, the evidence from this study indicates that the manipulation of religion and ethnicity by the elite contributes to the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. The results of this study further show that poor levels of educational and political education among the political class is a serious factor responsible for the slow pace of democracy and its consolidation in both KGS and KZN. Additionally, the political parties' disregard for the rule of law, and monetisation of elections, are prominent features among the discoveries of this research and they constitute to the many problems affecting consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. Furthermore, there are the problems of bad leadership, greed among the politicians, and lack of integrity and orientation/training/ workshop for both politicians and the electorates. In other words, there is a complete lack of voter education to prepare voters on how to vote independently without being influenced by politicians. The insight gained from this study may be of great assistance to our understanding of the constraints to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South and perhaps to the larger part of the continent of Africa. It is unfortunate that the study did not include all the local governments under Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal due to time and resources. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to the understanding of the factors responsible for the slow pace of democracy and its consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. This study, therefore, suggests that manipulation of the people by the ruling elites, monetisation of politics, greed and a lack of political integrity should not be introduced into politics and that political parties should respect and honour their promises to the people to avoid election violence at election times.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSING THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE OBSERVABLE TRENDS OF VIOLENCE IN KOGI STATE AND KWAZULU-NATAL**

### **7.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter discussed some of the factors responsible for the slow pace of the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter examined how religion and ethnicity are manipulated among the citizens in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal and assessed political parties, and their failed promises to the masses. Similarly, the chapter took a look at how illiteracy and a lack of educational and political education among the politicians' slow paces the consolidation of democracy in Kogi state and KwaZulu-Natal. Bad leadership and governance were analysed as well as greed and the lack of political integrity among the political elite, and then, the place of money in the electoral politics of KGS and KZN. The main emphasis of this chapter is therefore to analyse the two research questions which are; the role of violence in the electoral process as well as the trends of violence during election time in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Before achieving its objective, the chapter will examine in detail the role of violence in the electoral processes of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. Similarly, the chapter will take a look at the observable trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, and then a conclusion will be drawn.

### **7.2 Analysing the Role of Violence in the Electoral Process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

No doubt election violence plays a crucial role in most democracies globally. Central to this is the impact of such a role, be it positive or negative, in the electoral process. This section examines the role that election violence plays in the electoral process through the responses of respondents generated during the interview and focus group discussions. Matrix 7.1 below provides the details of responses from respondents.

**Matrix 7.1 Summary of the role of violence in the electoral process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

<b>Subtheme/sub question</b>	<b>Respondent responses</b>	<b>Source/s</b>
<i>Lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections</i>	<i>The role of election violence in [the] democratic process is destructive. It lowers the pace and space of democracy. When there is election violence, it causes a lot of harm to the processes.</i>	GRAKGS
	<i>The role of election violence in the democratic process is that it interrupts the smooth process of elections, which is a setback to democratic consolidation.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>It instills fear in the minds and hearts of the people (electorates) and some politicians towards politics and future elections.</i>	MKHKZN
<i>Motivated by political business, resources and prevents inclusiveness</i>	<i>Violence is motivated by political business and resources....</i>	SBOKZN
	<i>Election violence hurts democracy and does not allow it to grow and become all inclusive.</i>	LGKZN
	<i>...it also undermines the rule of law in the province.</i>	MKHKZN
<i>It challenges the credibility of elections, electoral processes and outcomes</i>	<i>It makes sure that our elections are never taken serious again. That is, it discredits our elections. This affects the choice of leaders who are believed to be credible. It creates fear in the minds of politicians and the electorates also. Because of this, it directly or indirectly influences the outcome of the elections. Election violence can lead to destruction of life and property.</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>It determines the credibility of our elections. Two, it determines the quality of our leadership and three, it is a threat to our existing laws.</i>	SNHKZN
	<i>Election violence has continued to shape the politics of the province through politically motivated killings and assassinations.</i>	FGDKZN1
<i>It creates enmity and thwarts the realisation of democratic goals</i>	<i>Election violence plays a negative role in the electoral process in KZN. Among them is political killings that are based on the failure to honour gentleman agreements. It leads to the formation of armed groups; animosity and divisions among comrades, and the imposition of personal interests and ideas above party interests.</i>	FGDKZN 2
	<i>...it creates enmity. It can even go to the extent of separating families.</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>Election violence has thwarted the realisation of democratic goals in Kogi State.</i>	NDIKGS
<i>It disenfranchises voters during elections and affects the choices of the people</i>	<i>It reduces or interferes with the figures in any elections. In other words, it affects the credibility of the polls in its entirety. It also affects the number of voters who are supposed to come out and cast their votes. Because of the violence, some electorates would decide I am not going to cast my vote again. I will stay at home thereby affecting the number of votes and voters.</i>	KOKOKGS
	<i>The role of election violence in the democratic process leads to killings and destruction. It also helps to scuttle the choices/will of the people.</i>	OBEDUKGS



### 7.2.1 Lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections

From the responses above, a number of things are visible: one, the role of election violence in the democratic process is negative (which could be interpreted to mean, destructive). Two, it lowers the pace and space of democracy and its core ideals and values. Meaning, it interrupts the smooth process of elections and by extension, democracy, which is a setback to the consolidation of democracy. In essence, in any democracy where these problems are prevalent, certainly, no meaningful progress can be made. Just like MKHKZN and SNHKZN both stated that violence instils fear in the minds and hearts of the people (electorates), as well as some politicians, towards politics and future elections. These respondents believe it is a defeat to democracy which it is centred around dialogue, consensus, and debate and sometimes, compromises, and if the right atmosphere is not created for this to thrive, then democracy cannot be practised effectively. Fear must never be associated with the exercise of one's democratic rights. All the factors motivating people to fear and become politically apathetic should be eliminated to pave the way for the expression of the rights of the people.

### 7.2.2 Motivated by political business and resources and prevents inclusiveness

The responses in Matrix 7.1 above explains how politicians have used violence for political gains. This means, any form of manipulation meant to achieve a set objective by the politicians, explains why eliminating/eradicating election violence is becoming difficult by the day because of its benefits. Speaking further on the benefits of the role of election violence on the consolidation of democracy, respondent SBOKZN stated that, "*Violence is motivated by political business and resources...*" What this means is that the politicians see the ascension into political office as an opportunity to go into business and preside over state resources. Another possible explanation for this is that violence at elections is motivated by the resources that the politicians anticipate he/she would have control over after being elected. Obviously, election violence has actually tested the efficacy of the rule of law in Nigeria and South Africa. The truth is that offenders of the electoral act and laws are rarely prosecuted as in one way or the other they have been found to have been influenced by some very powerful and influential politicians. Therefore, the impact is very negative and does not promote democratic consolidation. There are many constraints when violence becomes pervasive in any electoral democracy. The chances of growth, inclusiveness and consolidation will be dim as the voices of the majority are never allowed to prevail above those of the few, which is why most of the electorates and perhaps the youths in Africa do not take elections seriously any longer owing

to the continuous neglect they suffer from elected leaders. Similarly, the same old guards are being recycled without fresh ideas being injected into the system, thereby allowing a lack of development being witnessed in most countries in the continent. Respondents also indicated that another role that election violence plays in the electoral process of KGS and KZN is that it leads to political apathy among the electorates and discredits elections and democracy. People tend to give up because no one wants to die for nothing since the perpetrators are too powerful to be persecuted even when it is obvious that they are well known.

### 7.2.3 Challenge the credibility of elections and electoral processes and outcomes

Judging from the responses in Matrix 7.1 above, it is evident that the role of election violence does not only create political apathy among the people but presents a very bad impression about Nigeria and South Africa's willingness to entrench democratic ideals and values through good governance in their political systems. Another respondent, SNHKZN, sums up that the role of violence in the democratic process is that, *"It determines the credibility of our elections. Two, it determines the quality of our leadership and three, it is a threat to our existing laws"*. This no doubt is a stark reality and assessment of elections and democracy in South Africa and Nigeria. Election violence puts to test and questions the credibility of elections and electoral laws as well as the capacity to conduct free and fair elections. Beyond this, it is equally telling on the quality and calibre of leaders elected and the services expected to be delivered thereto.

Without a doubt, it is common knowledge that election violence has often left memories of destruction, killings and assassinations. FGDKZN1 remarked that election violence has continued to shape the politics of the province through politically motivated killings and assassinations. The shaping comes in the form of policy changes and amendment of electoral laws and other laws necessary to strengthen democracy. Sometimes the failures and violence inform the shaping either in a positive dimension or otherwise.

### 7.2.4 It creates enmity and thwarts the realisation of democratic goals

Data from Matrix 7.1 shows that election violence has left dark images in KZN. Participants noted that:

*Election violence plays a negative role in the electoral process in KZN. Among some of these roles include political killings that are based on the failure to honour gentlemen's agreements. It leads to the formation of armed groups;*

*animosity and divisions among comrades, and the imposition of personal interests and ideas above party interests (FGDKZN 2).*

The respondent in the statement above seems to suggest that most of the political killings in the province of KwaZulu-Natal have arisen principally because politicians have failed to respect collective decisions taken either at a party level or even at group levels. The resulting consequences could lead to the formation of armed groups and thugs meant to inflict serious injuries on people. Beyond the formation of armed groups, respondents equally identified an increase in animosity and division among comrades that sometimes facilitate the imposition of personal interests and ideas above party interests. As serious as this may appear, it remains the greatest problem confronting African democracies, especially where personal interest supersedes the party/general interests. As this continues, it does not only create division among the elite but even enmity among the political gladiators. The role of election violence in the electoral process is that besides the enmity that it creates among the political elite, it has even torn some families apart owing to political differences. This, in the long run, constitutes a real setback to the realisation of the democratic dream of consolidation.

As sad as it is, election violence has gone to the point of not only creating enmity among people but separating families, as stated by the respondent in Matrix 7.1 above. This is, without a doubt, totally against the ethos of democracy, which is more centred for the people rather than being against them. Whereas it is normal for political opponents even within/among families to disagree in politics, the bond that keeps them must never be destroyed on the basis of political differences. With this disposition, the democratic goals may never be realised. A respondent (NDIKGS) remarked that “*election violence has thwarted the realisation of democratic goals in Kogi State*”. What this means is that the initial purpose of introducing democracy seems to be eroding owing to incidences of election violence. In other words, the data shows that due to violence at elections, it has been difficult to realise the democratic goals and objectives desired, particularly in Kogi State, over the years. And it can only be possible to achieve these noble objectives if the spate of violence and killings can be significantly reduced or at best, eradicated completely from the politics of the state.

#### 7.2.5 It disenfranchises voters during elections and affects the choices of the people

The data in Matrix 7.1 above reveals that one of the roles that election violence plays in the electoral process is that it affects the true figures of votes that are supposed to be cast during elections. What this means is that the violence will literary chase the voters away from voting

thereby allowing those behind the violence to rig the election in favour of their preferred candidate. As a result of the violence, some voters are disenfranchised from exercising their fundamental right to vote, and voters begin to doubt the neutrality of the electoral umpire and other stakeholders owing to a lack of transparency in the electoral process. Ultimately, the credibility of the entire process is put to question thereby leading to political apathy among the electorates. There is no doubt that killings and destructions have been part of election violence in South Africa and Nigeria, and it has played a very negative role in the electoral process. Thus, election violence and destruction in KZN and KGS cannot be dismissed with the wave of the hand and as such, remains a real setback to the sustainability of democracy. Above all, the data shows that this trend scuttles the choices and the will of the people as the best candidates do not get the chance to be elected as suitable representatives of the people.

### **7.3 Observable Trends of Election Violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

In the course of conducting several elections in Nigeria and South Africa, there were a number of occurrences that may be considered as a trend of election violence. They do not define the election per se but are very visible traits. Inferences can be drawn from respondents who identified some of these trends differently.s

**Matrix 7.2 Summary of observable trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

Subtheme/Sub question	Respondents' Responses	Source/s
<i>Imposition of candidates</i>	<i>Impunity, imposition of candidates. These occur due to [a] lack of internal democracy. People buy forms to contest for election and those who won the screening are not considered. Only those with connections are picked.</i>	GRAKGS
<i>Intra- and Inter-party violence</i>	<i>Election violence sometimes takes the form of intra-party and inter-party. In this violence, the main target is to eliminate my opponent either by killing him or weaken him in order to guarantee my chances of winning the election.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>There was serious election violence, especially in Kogi Central Senatorial District between two parties. i.e., the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN).</i>	OGRIKGS
<i>Violence, killings and destruction of life and property and uncertainties</i>	<i>...some people are rendered incapable of doing anything to get their daily food; because in the process of the violence, some people are being maimed and forever may never recover, some people may lose arms, some legs and apart from that, some people will lose property.</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>A lot of houses were burned down, lots of people died. Some families migrated from their homes and never returned till today, it has led to lots of broken homes.</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>...of course. There is killings, destructions of life and property...</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>The killing of people and destruction of property have been part of elections in Nigeria, Kogi State and Ebiraland in particular for a very long time.</i>	KOKOKGS
	<i>Because based on what is going in on now in the state and the country, there may like be violence, killings and destructions in the 2019 elections.</i>	RMTKGS
<i>General level of fear and uncertainty</i>	<i>...there is generally fear and uncertainty among the people when it comes to election times. Sometimes, it is time for retaliation from previous violence against certain individuals who were not treated fairly...</i>	SBOKZN
	<i>there is always fear and uncertainty during elections.</i>	KHUKZN
<i>Manifestation of cultism, clannish and family crisis</i>	<i>Cultism, family and clannish crises have formed a trend. For instance, here in Kogi central, if you hear that a man coming from clan A has defeated a man from clan B, the people of clan B will mobilise themselves and begin to attack people of clan A. Not even minding whether those people in clan A voted for the clan B man. You understand.</i>	APTKGS
<i>Vote buying using material inducement and manipulation of lists</i>	<i>...vote buying, it is of recent that we are now realising there is a word called vote buying. The moment you offer money for votes against the conscience of the voter, it is vote buying which has been on for a very long time in the politics of Nigeria...</i>	FGDLKJ
	<i>...some of them instigate the violence through the youths, while others use money to incite the voters against other parties or voters. i.e., vote buying.</i>	LGKZN
<i>Intimidation, destruction and snatching of ballot boxes</i>	<i>That includes snatching of ballot boxes; killings and intimidation of both voters and opponents.</i>	FGDLKJ
	<i>There are always strikes, killings and snatching of party lists...</i>	FGDKZN.2
	<i>...destruction of electoral materials</i>	FGDKZN.1
	<i>... killings, destructions of property</i>	OBEDUKGS
	<i>There is always recurring fighting/violence from one place to another. This leads to chain reactions that have become a norm.</i>	SPAKZN
<i>Funding of thugs and assassinations</i>	<i>...The rich politicians will be financing thugs to ferment troubles.</i>	FGDKZN.2
	<i>... killings and assassinations.</i>	LGKZN
	<i>...during the governorship election of April 14, 2007. Where many houses were burned in Kogi Central, some were forced out of Ebiraland and had to relocate to Lokoja. The gory scenes are still there up to today. Since then, some people have not been able to reconstruct their houses up to today and the pain is still there.</i>	OBETKGS

### 7.3.1 Impunity and Imposition of Candidates

The data in Matrix 7.2 above show that impunity and the imposition of candidates is a common phenomenon in most democracies in Africa. In Kogi State, for instance, political impunity and political imposition often lead to violence as a form of reaction from those who may perceive to have been short-changed in the process of party nomination. Reacting to the trend of the imposition of candidates for elective positions, a respondent noted that:

*Impunity, the imposition of candidates. These occur due to lack of internal democracy. People buy forms to contest for election, and those who won the screening are not considered. Only those with connection are picked (GRAKGS).*

This statement appears to mean that for any prospective contestant, for any political office, to excel, he or she must be well connected to the top echelon of the party to increase the chance of being nominated or selected. This appears to make electoral democracy look like a game of gladiators, rather than being a governance system based on ideas, popularity and consensus. At other times, it is to show disapproval over the way, and manner nominations are conducted in the parties, without due recourse to the party's established procedures, and with a lack of transparency. The data further shows that imposition of candidates, impunity and lack of internal party democracy among political parties is not only a common trend that fuels election violence, but a real setback to the possibilities of consolidating democracy. These are obviously the scenes that are more visible when it comes to election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Specifically, the imposition starts from the nomination and screening of candidates, where only those with strong connections with the top power brokers within the party are accepted and pose as party representatives for elective positions.

### 7.3.2 Intra- and Inter-party Violence

There is no doubt that political parties have contributed immensely to the development of democracy in both Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. At the same time, they have equally contributed to the destruction of democracy, through the manipulation of election violence, as seen over the period under review. Respondents in this study indicated that frequently the violence assumed the position of intra-party squabbles, while at other times it is from an inter-party dimension. Intra-party violence reveals the level of disaffection among the party faithful, and sometimes also competition over positions, privileges and appointments. If not handled wisely, it could result in anti-party activities, fighting and killings of perceived

opponents and eventually to the implosion of the party. While inter-party violence often occurs as a result of competition over who captures power at a particular location and time, it could also be based on disagreement over the procedures and strategies for the conduct of elections. The essence of inter and intra-party violence as alluded to by the data in matrix 7.2 above is to eliminate their opponent from posing, as obstacles to realising their political ambitions. At times the objective of the violence is meant to eliminate people seen as a threat to an individual's aspirations, or a party's goal. In this process, the data reveals how violence could break out as a resolution mechanism.

### 7.3.3 Violent killings and destruction of life and property amidst uncertainties

Responses from the respondents appear to suggest that evident in most election violence are killings and the devastating destruction of property. Participants decried the rate of destruction and killings during elections in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. From the data in Matrix 7.2 above, it seems to suggest that the trend of election violence in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal was not only destructive in terms of human life and property, but it has also created a psychological burden on people. Affirming this statement, a respondent admitted that:

*... some people are rendered incapable of doing anything to get their daily food; because in the process of the violence, some people are being maimed and forever may never recover, some people may lose arms, some legs and apart from that, some people will lose property (LKGMKGS).*

This response reveals the intensity and devastating effects of violence during elections. The respondents describe how people have been badly affected by the spate of violence during elections. It is further suggested that as a result of the intensity and frequency of the violence, many people have been incapacitated with very serious physical injury, which would permanently affect their lives. Furthermore, the data indicates how the trend of violence has resulted in some families being separated and permanently migrated to new locations and never returning back to their former places of residence.

### 7.3.4 General level of fear and uncertainty

Respondents in this study have indicated that election periods in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal generally come with a lot of uneasiness and uncertainty about what could happen, and to whom it could happen. This uncertainty seems to have arisen as a result of the history of violence that has characterised elections in these selected locations. The data indicates that

there is always an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, especially from those who have previously been victims of election violence. In other cases, victims of previous violence fear retaliation as a consequence of unresolved issues, or from perpetrators remaining at large as a result of not being prosecuted. Furthermore, there are perceptions that since justice is never served for those whose rights have been violated, it leaves people with no choice but to seek out ways to defend themselves by all means possible. It is this sense of injustice that generates anger and violent reactions during elections.

#### 7.3.5 Manifestation of cultism and clannish crises

Respondents identified a new twist in election violence trends, with the introduction of clannish behaviour, family lineage and cultism into electoral politics. Clannish and family crisis behaviour has become a common trend, especially in the Okene axis of Kogi Central Senatorial District in Kogi State, Nigeria. Respondents indicated that Clannish status and prominence determines to a large extent, the chances of candidates winning elections in the affected district. Affirming this assertion, a respondent stated that:

*Cultism, family and clannish crisis have formed a trend. For instance, here in Kogi central, if you hear that a man coming from clan A. has defeated a man from clan B. the people of clan B will mobilize themselves and begin to attack people of clan A. not even minding whether those people in clan A voted for the clan B man. You understand (APTKGS).*

The Ebira people of Kogi Central are organised along clan lines, with each clan considering itself superior to the others. Therefore, a clan member's political and economic relevance, and to some extent, even a person's career prospects in the private sector, is largely determined by the name of the clan that such a person comes from. This appears to be closely followed by the type of family from which a political candidate was borne into, and the influence the family holds in the community. When a candidate originates from a family below the deemed acceptable social ranking (strata), it most likely becomes difficult for such a person to excel above their deemed social ladder status. Participants also noted that some families had been torn apart because of politics and elections, as a participant (APTKGS) shows. Furthermore, clannish disagreements often leave a bitter experience of violence and deadly destruction in Ebiraland, with cultists having a field day. This is, without a doubt a common trend during elections in Kogi State, Nigeria, as revealed by the participants in this study.



### 7.3.6 Vote buying using material inducement and manipulation of lists

Respondents in this research revealed that vote-buying, although having been in existence for a long time, has become more pronounced in the politics of KGS and KZN. The respondents indicated that as a recent introduction into the electoral democracy of Nigeria and South Africa, vote buying is gaining in momentum as politicians are more disposed to its benefits, rather than following the prescribed democratic norms. Vote buying is gaining greater prominence in the politics of both Nigeria and South Africa, as politicians become desperate to win votes at all costs. Respondents shared their views regarding this menace in KZN, agreeing that vote buying is a trend in most elections. Beyond vote buying, some have gone to the point of inducing the voters with material gifts in order to influence them to vote for them and their political parties. The use of material gifts to induce voters has the potential of influencing the voting pattern contrary to the will of the people. Politicians themselves have equally designed other means of realizing this objective, such as with the manipulation of party lists. Party lists are manipulated to enable them to realize their objective of winning elections or retaining and consolidating political power.

### 7.3.7 Intimidation and snatching of ballot boxes

Research participants in this study identified how violence during elections usually starts. Respondents identified the use of intimidation and snatching of ballot boxes as a common phenomenon in the electoral democracy of Nigeria. Affirming this assertion, (FGDLKJ) stated that election violence begins with, “...*snatching of ballot boxes; killings and intimidation of both voters and opponents*”. Another participant further revealed that “*There are always strikes, killings and snatching of party list...*” (FGDKZN.2). These two responses affirmed that intimidation is often used as a tool to scare voters away, and immediately after which ballot boxes are snatched, to pave the way for votes to be inflated in favour of the strongest or popular party. The implication of this problem, as observed by respondents, is that it leads to, “...*destruction of electoral materials*” (FGDKZN1). Further to this, data equally shows that there are always “...*killings, destructions of property*” (OBEDUKGS). The data from this study further revealed that thugs financed by very influential and powerful elite persons instigate the intimidation and snatching of ballot boxes, with the aim of either discrediting the elections or giving an upper hand to their candidate. The snatching of ballot boxes, papers or even party lists has not only been an increasing trend but is also degrading and counterproductive to the drive toward democratic consolidation. Consequently, the aftereffect has always been

devastating. Respondents have differing reactions to the trend of election violence. SPAKZN noted that there is always recurring fighting and violence from one place to another. This leads to chain reactions that have become the norm. HADKZN observed that it leads to some destruction of property while (OBEDUKGS) suggests that there is always destruction.

#### 7.3.8 Funding of thugs and assassinations

Thugs and thuggery activities are not only prevalent in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal but are a real threat to the survival of democracy, as the data seem to suggest. Mostly, these thugs are funded by the political elite who are desperate to be relevant in the political arena. Their activities are not only limited to the disruption of elections, voting and snatching of ballot boxes but also include the assassination of people perceived to be strong opponents of their superiors. FGDKZN2 describes this as follows, “...*The rich politicians finance thugs to foment troubles*”. This confirms that thuggery and assassinations are a common trend during elections. The data from the respondents also indicate that not only have lives and property been lost during election violence, but some people have also been forced to relocate (forced migration) from their communities to places unfamiliar to them, and have since not returned back to their ancestral homes. Whilst this cycle of migration continues, it is further creating new types of problems and conflicts within the state. This scenario could best explain the conflict between settlers and indigenous people, especially in Nigeria today.

### 7.4 Discussion of Findings

The discussion of the findings of this study is specifically based on the research questions relating to the role of violence in the electoral process, as well as on the trends in violence in both Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal province.

#### 7.4.1 Analysis of the Role of Violence in the Electoral Process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal

Without a doubt the role of election violence in any democracy is very destructive and unacceptable. The findings of this study show that violence, especially election violence, is not only harmful to the sustainability of democracies, but also lowers the pace and space of democracy. The study observed that as violence intensifies, it instils fear in the minds of the electorates, thereby contributing to low voter turnout, political apathy and subsequently to disenfranchisement. Election violence also erodes the values of democracy, undermines democratic norms, rules, laws and ideals. Essentially, the goal of any election violence is to push democracy to total regression or erosion (O'Donnell, 1992; Schedler, 2002).

A further finding of this study reveals that election violence is motivated by business and resource considerations. The driving force behind election violence by politicians is the lure of economic interest or gains, with such politicians believing that they stand to gain should they capture political power. The general assumption among such politicians is that political power empowers them to exercise all forms of control over every facet of the nation's economy. It is this controlled privilege that they seek to gain through the manipulation of violence during elections. Violence during, or even after, elections attracts the attention of the government, such that funds are most often released to address the effects and damages caused by the violence. Through this medium, politicians make great fortunes from it, as they make claims for security votes and other financial misdemeanours. Therefore, the greater the occurrence of violence, the more the credibility of the election is questioned. At the same time, this determines the motivation, the rate and frequency of political killings that will be witnessed. Adesote and Abimbola (2014:146) in the literature stressed the killings and assassinations associated with elections, saying that it does not only stifle democratic consolidation but is capable of causing a large-scale national crisis if not managed properly. They further remark that when this persists, enmity is created among the political gladiators, animosity and divisions sets in among the comrades, and consequently, the formation and funding of armed groups. The destruction that accompanies most elections is planned, often by the elite, and executed by thugs who are mostly manipulated and financed by this powerful elite. Gaetano Musca's (1858–1941) conviction that democratic regimes—like all other types of regime—are controlled by elites, who manipulate public opinion and the levers of power for their own ends, aptly explains this. Due to their ability to be organised and strategic, they are able to achieve their intentions without much stress by manipulating and pschying the gullible unemployed youths to help them achieve their aims. This has clearly affirmed the adoption of the elite theory, which explains the role of the elite, that although being a very tiny minority are organized well enough to control the majority.

#### 7.4.2 Explaining the observable trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal

Generally speaking, there are trends that are very visible when it comes to election violence in most democracies, Nigeria and South Africa inclusive. It is common knowledge that inter- and intra-party violence has been a recurrent theme in Africa's democracy. In KZN there has been a bitter conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that has manifested itself at elections (Taylor, 2002; Johnston, 1996; Bruce, 2013). The rivalry between these parties can be traced to the apartheid era and when democracy was

introduced in 1994. Between these parties, election violence has resulted in the death of thousands of people. In recent years the spate of violence has significantly reduced, but the animosities and threats of violence have not been eliminated yet. A similar scenario can be related to Kogi State, where the People Democratic Party (PDP) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) had clashes with devastating consequences (Nmom, 2013; Aleyomi, 2013). Therefore, the findings of this study show that inter and intra-party conflicts have become a common phenomenon and do not promote the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. However, data further proves that intra-party conflicts are gaining more currency while the inter-party violence is on the downward trajectory.

The findings of this study have observed that impunity leads to the imposition of candidates in elective positions, with the result that it leads to party conflicts that often affect policies and programmes of government. Besides party conflicts, there is a new trend of vote buying and inducement of electorates with material incentives to influence their vetoing pattern in favour of the givers of these incentives. Vote buying and material inducement is not just inimical to democratic development but is dangerous and encourages political recklessness and irresponsibility among the ruling class. Interestingly, the findings of this study show that there is a frequency of political killings and assassinations both in KZN and KGS. Essentially, these are meant to instil fear in the minds of those who are perceived as a threat to the powers that be, or those seeking to alter the existing status quo. Coupled with this is the destruction of life and property, resulting in great fear and uncertainties from both the politicians and the electorates. Even more worrisome is the emergence of cultism, family crisis and sadly, clannish divisions and infighting. As a result of this chaotic scene, and when their efforts begin to fail, they resort to the manipulation of party lists as well as using thugs to snatch ballot boxes. This mission is easily accomplished by thugs (youths) which they have formed, funded and manipulated for the same purpose. The manipulation by the elite has confirmed the choice of elite theory to be appropriate in analysing the role of election violence in the electoral process of KGS and KZN.

**Matrix 7.3: Summary of research analysing the role of violence in the electoral process and the observable trends of violence in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal**

Research question	Emergent theme/s	Interaction with literature	Sources
Analysing the role of violence in the electoral process and the observable trends of violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the role of violence in the electoral process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal</li> <li>- trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections</li> <li>- Motivated by political business, resources and prevents inclusiveness</li> <li>- it challenges the credibility of elections, electoral processes and outcomes</li> <li>- it creates enmity and thwarts the realisation of democratic goals</li> <li>- It disenfranchises voters during election and choices of the people</li> <li>- Imposition of candidates</li> <li>- Intra- and inter-party violence</li> <li>- Violent killings and destruction of life and property and uncertainties</li> <li>- General level of fear and uncertainties</li> <li>- Manifestation of cultism, clannish and family crises</li> <li>- Vote buying using material inducement and manipulation of lists</li> <li>- Intimidation, destruction and snatching of ballot boxes</li> <li>- Funding of thugs and assassinations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- O'Donnell (1992);</li> <li>- Schedler (2002)</li> <li>- Adesote and Abimbola (2014)</li> <li>- Taylor (2002)</li> <li>- Johnston (1996)</li> <li>- Bruce (2013)</li> <li>- Nmomo (2013)</li> <li>- Aleyomi (2013)</li> </ul>

## **7.5 Conclusion**

This chapter set out to analyse the role of violence in the electoral process and the trends of violence in Kogi state and KwaZulu-Natal Province. The chapter began with a discourse in how violence lowers the pace, space and smooth process of elections. This study has identified that election violence is motivated by political and business resources among the ruling class, with the consequence that it prevents inclusiveness in politics. The chapter further examined the role of violence as a challenge to the credibility of elections and electoral processes, as well as the outcome of the polls. The consequence of disagreement regarding the credibility of the polls, can often degenerate into enmity that thwarts the realisation of democratic goals. The chapter similarly analysed how violence disenfranchises voters during elections, thereby scuttling the choices of people. Subsequently, the chapter explained the observable trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. In general, the study found that the role of violence in the electoral process in KGS and KZN is detrimental to the sustainability of democracy in KGS and KZN owing to a number of factors: greed, political killings and assassinations, destruction of life and property. The study contributes to our understanding of how the role of election violence in the democratic process lowers the pace and space of democracy and its consolidation. These findings serve to show how election violence is a hindrance to the growth and development of democracy in KwaZulu-Natal and Kogi State. This study was limited by the absence of time and enough resources to cover all the key areas needed. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study suggests that a wider and larger study should be carried out to gain more insight into the role that violence plays in the electoral process and the trends of election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, Republic of South Africa.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: INTERROGATING THE WAYS ELECTION VIOLENCE UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA**

### **8.1 Introduction**

Through election violence, the democratic space and pace has shrunk while inept leaders have often emerged with virtually no proper grasp of what governance and leadership constitute. This chapter interrogates the ways through which election violence has and still is undermining the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter undertakes an examination of the ways in which election violence continues to undermine efforts at consolidating democracy to include: the inability to conduct free and fair elections; rampant destruction of life and property; astronomical increase in the levels of instability and widespread lawlessness; conspicuous sharp divisions among the citizens and unhealthy rivalry amongst political players. There is also open intimidation of members of opposition parties and political killings; loss of credibility in the electoral process and then lastly, political parties and their bad leadership style. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.

### **8.2 Identifying ways in which election violence undermines democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

There are several means through which violence has undermined the chances of consolidating democracy. These means are diverse depending on the socio-political setting and the circumstances that may have warranted them. While some of these problems are manmade, others could be technical, perhaps beyond human influence. Therefore, this section examines the different ways through which election violence undermines democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Matrix 8.1 gives details of responses from respondents.

**Matrix 8.1 Summary of the ways in which election violence undermines democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

<b>Subtheme/sub question</b>	<b>Respondents' responses</b>	<b>Source(s)</b>
<i>Lack of free and fair elections</i>	<i>Where you are supposed to have a free and fair election, where the election is supposed to go smoothly, with violence definitely you won't get a positive result. If for example there is a voting process going on, and there is violence, you can't justify that result to be authentic. How do you get that result? So, violence sometimes gives victory to an undesirable person.</i>	GRAKGS
	<i>You start seeing apathy, yes apathy and so, the quality of [the] election, for even, the quality of democracy is now gradually dwindling.</i>	LKGMKGS
<i>Destruction of life and property</i>	<i>Through the destruction of life and property; destroying the democratic institutions, culture, values, and complete disregard to the rule of law. It equally undermines the institutions of the state and their effectiveness.</i>	NDIKGS
	<i>It also affects or undermines the rule of law.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>...in the then western region of Nigeria, political opponents were at loggerheads, burning houses and killing each other. The same thing is applicable in recent time in the fourth republic. If the desire of the people is to democratise the society, and then you take away the peace of that society, how do you now achieve that democracy and consolidate it?</i>	APTKGS
<i>Increasing levels of instability and lawlessness</i>	<i>Once there is election violence, it increases the political divide among the people and the politicians too. And so long as there is an unhealthy atmosphere, it will affect the governance structure in the society. There is also an increase in the rivalry between and among political parties which has an effect on the consolidation of democracy.</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>...instability scares off investors from investing in the province and the country. It leads to increases in [the] crime rate. There is violence and lawlessness across the country. There is constant fear to participate in politics by the citizens.</i>	SNHKZN
	<i>...where there is violence, there can't be peace. Where there is no peace, you cannot pursue the desire of the people...</i>	APTKGS
<i>Sharp divisions and unhealthy rivalries</i>	<i>...the people are now being used against the people. People are being used against themselves... There is[a] lack of trust, no confidence building, people see one another as enemies...</i>	OGRKGS
	<i>It creates deep division between and among people.</i>	SPAKZN
	<i>Sharp division among the political elite. There is also an increasing level of unhealthy rivalry among the politicians and political parties. It continues to portray democracy as being unsuitable to Africans.</i>	LGKZN
<i>Intimidations and political killings</i>	<i>That is through the intimidation of the people, political killings, destruction of property and the unfair process of selecting leaders. In the ANC, the selection of leaders has been very suspicious. But who are you to talk?</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>...through the lawlessness of the politicians as well as the issue of electing credible leaders.</i>	FGDLKJ
<i>Loss of credibility in the electoral process</i>	<i>And there is violence, you can't justify that result to be authentic. How do you get that result?</i>	GRAKGS
	<i>...It will further question the credibility of our electoral management body in conducting credible polls.</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>It undermines the credibility of our elections and sanctity of our laws... The credibility of the electoral process actually affects the quality of leaders...</i>	LGKZN
<i>Political parties and the leadership style</i>	<i>It still boils down to the leaders that are in politics. In [the] PDP every leader has his own agenda, plans, and objectives of being in the party. And once they are not getting what they want in the party, they may decamp to another party. So, this in itself undermines democratic consolidation.</i>	KOKOKGS
	<i>It influences the choice and quality of leadership</i>	SNHKZN



### 8.2.1 Lack of free and fair elections

Responses from this study identified one of the problems confronting democracy and its consolidation in post-colonial Africa to be the issue of free, fair and credible elections as itemised by the respondents. This means that the inability to meet the basic democratic standard of acceptable elections seems to have put democracy and elections under severe strain. That is why data from both the interviews and focus group discussions revealed that a lack of free, fair and credible elections has resulted in a large chunk of electorates refusing to vote during the elections. The reason for refusing to vote to be that the will of the people will not prevail at the end of the polls, thereby leading to political apathy. A participant noted that:

*You start seeing apathy, yes apathy, and so, the quality of election, for even, the quality of democracy is now gradually dwindling (LKGMKGS).*

The response here explains one of the ways in which the electorates react to violence during elections. There is political apathy among the electorates because the electoral process is not free and fair enough to allow the will of the people to prevail. Research participants also noted that election violence does not only lead to political apathy among the electorates but affects the integrity of the entire electoral process. As this persists, the quality of democracy will begin to dwindle giving room for authoritarian leaders to fester in the political system. Another respondent noted that:

*Where you are supposed to have a free and fair election, where the election is supposed to go smoothly, with violence definitely you won't get a positive result, if, for example, there is a voting process going on, and there is violence, you can't justify that result to be authentic. How do you get that result? So, violence sometimes gives victory to an undesirable person... (GRAKGS).*

Contested elections are always prone to violence as the losing parties often cite claims of irregularities. Most times, the politicians tend to make statements refusing to recognise the winning candidate, thereby creating the atmosphere for violent reactions from their supporters and long legal tussles over the outcome. This, in itself, undermines the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, apart from the fact that violence has often facilitated the emergence of undeserving candidates as winners of elections, political apathy has created the platform for such politicians to emerge as winners. Therefore, the moment the people choose not to vote

again, it opens the door for the dominant party, or ruling party to produce the leader who may not necessarily be the right person for the job.

#### 8.2.2 Destruction of life and property

The data in matrix 8.1 seem to suggest that evident in every election violence is the visible identification of destruction of life, property, and general tension and instability. A possible explanation for this response is that violence during election times, in most instances, is meant to put fear in the hearts of the electorates and create an opportunity for parties and individuals alike to win elections with ease. The data in matrix 8.1 above shows that this undermines the credibility of the elections and the electoral management. Similarly, it goes further to challenge the constitution, electoral act(s), electoral laws and the electoral institutions. More importantly, the rule of law appears to be put into question; the democratic culture and values are undermined (affected) and destroyed as well as serving as a big test on the institutions of the state. With the onset of violence, peace may appear to become very elusive, and then the desire of the people under democracy may not be met. Therefore, as a result of election violence, forces such as political instability, destruction of life and property, and complete disregard to the law of the state is one of the means through which democracy has been undermined and continues to constitute a serious setback to the consolidation of democracy in both Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa.

#### 8.2.3 Increasing levels of instability and lawlessness

Responses from participants of this study show that election violence does not only revolve around the destruction of life and property, snatching of ballot boxes, intimidation and thuggery activities but also increasing levels of instability in the polity. The data also added that instability increases the rate of lawlessness in the political society and escalating crises that sometimes have the potential to metamorphose into civil wars if not managed wisely. A respondent described the impact of instability on the polity in the following way:

*...instability scares off investors from investing in the province and the country. It leads to increases in [the] crime rate. There is violence and lawlessness across the country. There is constant fear to participate in politics by the citizens (SNHKZN).*

What this response clearly means is that instability occasioned by election violence has the potential to scare off people who want to invest in the economy of the country owing to fears

of political instability. Similarly, the more instability you have, the more the likelihood is of an increase in the rate of crime in that society. An increase in the crime rate also leads to more violence and widespread lawlessness among citizens. The implication is that the citizens would begin to live in constant fear of either being killed or attacked, consequent upon the general lawlessness and instability. This shows a total breakdown law and order, which is a sign of defeat to national unity and cohesion. Respondent MKHKZN painfully stated that,

*Once there is election violence, it increases the political divide among the people and the politicians too. And so long as there is an unhealthy atmosphere, it will affect the governance structure in the society. There is also an increase in the rivalry between and among political parties which has an effect on the consolidation of democracy (MKHKZN).*

What this response means is that once a country is trapped in this web of election violence and instability, governance becomes a herculean task. This tends to undermine all attempts to build nationhood and bring about economic development. More divisions and rivalries will continue to shape the political dimension of the country.

#### 8.2.4 Sharp divisions and unhealthy rivalries

Generally, the election period generates fear, tension, and unhealthy relationships, particularly in multi-cultural or heterogeneous societies like Nigeria and South Africa, as the data indicated. As part of the strategies to win elections, the politicians employ the use of material incentives to induce voters, which often times leads to violence, especially from those who are not beneficiaries of such incentives in many developing democracies. From the data in matrix 8.1 above, it is very clear that sharp division among the political elite and sometimes among the voters too could heighten tensions. This makes the conduct of elections by the electoral commission more difficult owing to the tension which could potentially lead to violence. A participant clarifies that:

*Once there is election violence, it increases the political divide among the people and the politicians too. And so long as there is an unhealthy atmosphere, it will affect the governance structure in the society. There is also an increase in the rivalry between and among political parties which has an effect on the consolidation of democracy. Because political parties are supposed to drive*

*democracy and shape the policies of government as such, they stand a good chance of bringing about democratic consolidation (MKHKZN).*

One major challenge with election violence is that it tends to open up more room for further violence and other socio-economic and political problems within the society. And when the politicians notice these loopholes, they quickly take advantage of them by perpetuating themselves using centrifugal forces on the people in order to have full control of the structures of government. Respondent OGRIGKS noted that as the spate of instability increases, you will see that, “...*the people are now being used against people. People are being used against themselves... There is [a] lack of trust, no confidence building, people see one another as enemies...*” Equally sensitive as the data shows is the current phenomenon of vote buying that has become the order of the day. This does not only instigate violence but appears to increase the rivalry among political parties and politicians, thereby undermining the consolidation of democracy in the process.

#### 8.2.5 Intimidations and Political Killings

Data gathered from this study shows that intimidation of members of the opposition and even voters in areas perceived to be the stronghold of the opposition during elections could sometimes metamorphose into violence. Election violence gives the ruling government the room to arrest and prosecute members of the opposition accusing them of inciting violence. This allows the government to ensure that most opposition leaders are suppressed beyond the limit in order to cripple them from challenging the status quo. Often times they are charged by the courts (politically controlled courts) with treason with the intension of incarcerating them and banning them from politics. This singular act increases the level of tension, fears and political instability. Protest and violent rebellion become the norm while other forces (centrifugal forces) are introduced by some unscrupulous politicians to win public sympathy. Extrapolating further on election violence, KHUKZN confirms that it manifests “...*through the intimidation of the people, political killings, destruction of property and the unfair process of selecting leaders. In the ANC, the selection of leaders has been very suspicious, but who are you to talk?*” What this means is that even within a political party, any form of an unfair selection of party leaders and nomination of candidates for elective positions could turn members and their leaders against one another with the potential for violent escalations. Without a doubt, as this continues, aggrieved members could react by engaging in anti-party activities by working with the opposition with the intention to frustrate the ruling/dominant

party. Once this becomes public knowledge to the ruling/dominant party, revenge missions in the form of political killings and assassinations of persons perceive to be a potential threat to the realisation of their political ambitions becomes obvious. Consequently, the institutions of the state are tested and challenged to respond to the injustices and lawlessness being perpetrated. Thus, skewed selection of leaders has been the hallmark of the ANC and the PDP in KZN and KGS respectively as revealed by the data from matrix 8.1 and has played a prominent role in the escalation of violence during election times.

#### 8.2.6 Loss of credibility in the electoral process

Respondents in this study indicated that once an election has lost its credibility before the electorates, it is most likely to be susceptible to violence. This seems to suggest that the manner in which such leaders emerged during elections, bearing in mind the credibility of such electoral process and the integrity of the electoral management body, determines to a large extent the legitimacy of such a government. Therefore, respondents think that the chances of conducting free, fair and credible elections, apart from the role played by the electoral commission, largely depends on the role played by political parties and their quality of leadership. Without a doubt, political parties and the politicians are among the agencies that drive democracy and democratic consolidation.

Reacting to election violence and the ways it undermines the consolidation of democracy, participant GRAKGS observed that, “...and when there is violence, you can’t justify the result to be authentic. How do you get that result?” Clearly, from this statement, it shows that contentious election outcomes allow for violent contestation and reaction from supporters of the perceived victims of the claim of fraud. Another respondent agrees with GRAKGS stating that, “...It will further question the credibility of our electoral management body in conducting credible polls” (MKHKZN). Once the credibility of the electoral institutions is subjected to questions by the electorates, violence and conflict become inevitable. Respondent LGKZN affirms that “It undermines the credibility of our elections and sanctity of our laws... The credibility of the electoral process actually affects the quality of leaders...” A possible reason for this response could mean that an election with the problem of credibility will undoubtedly produce leaders without legitimacy, and an illegitimate leader would lack the support needed to rule his country effectively. This, by implication, is one of the ways election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. In general, therefore, the data reads that election violence promotes

lawlessness; and the choice of poor-quality leadership can compromise governance and affect development. Above all, the inability to conduct credible elections could lead to election violence and pursuant problems/issues. Above all, democratic consolidation may appear very elusive.

#### 8.2.7 Political parties and the leadership style

Participants for this study clearly stated that political parties are one of the main drivers of any democracy in the world. What this means is that these parties are managed by people whose philosophy is based on the ideology upon which such a party was formed. Now, the type of services rendered by any government is dependent on the choices of leaders and the leadership quality of such political party. More so, it has a lot to do with leadership recruitment. Reacting to the role of political parties and leadership in election violence and the consolidation of democracy in post-colonial Africa, a respondent agreed that:

*It still boils down to the leaders that are in politics. In the PDP, every leader has his own agenda, plans, and objectives of being in the party. And once they are not getting what they want in the party, they may decamp to another party. So, this in itself undermines democratic consolidation (KOKOKGS).*

The leadership of a political party to a larger extent determines the stability of such a party and the country. Thus, the quality of leadership and the ideology that the leadership holds dear tends to determine how violence is accommodated in their rank and file. This in effect ultimately contributes significantly to the understanding of the ways election violence either contributes to or undermines the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

Collectively, therefore, this section believed that a tense political atmosphere characterised by destruction, intimidation, injustice, lack of free and fair elections, increasing levels of instability, sharp divisions, bad leadership and lawlessness are inimical to the survival and consolidation of any democracy. More importantly, also, these are the means through which election violence continues to undermine the possibility of consolidating democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of the Republic of South Africa.

### 8.3 Discussions of Research Findings

The discussion of the findings of this research is based on the research question that speaks on the ways through which election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN.

#### **8.4 Ways through which election violence undermines democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

The findings of this study have revealed that when an election lacks the ingredients of freeness, fairness and a wider credibility, election violence is most likely to erupt. And when violence erupts, it is without any iota of doubt will lead to a set back to the sustainability of democracy. This is because election violence is one of the ways through which democratic consolidation is being undermined in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. This is made possible when the electoral process is not transparent and acceptable enough, the chances of violence will be obvious (Ndulo and Lulo, 2010; Fatai, 2017). The inability to meet the basic democratic standard of acceptable elections has put democracy and elections under severe strain. Loss of life is a common phenomenon in the politics of Nigeria and South Africa since the introduction of electoral democracy. Yorom (2019) remarks that loss of life and destruction of property during elections has been made possible owing to the accumulation and use of arms by the politicians whenever elections are about to be conducted or being conducted in some instances. The violence and the destruction appear to heighten the political divide among the political class and the citizens alike through an unhealthy political rivalry leading to political assassinations/killings. In all fairness, this is game to the politicians. These assassinations are mostly targeted at politicians perceived to be potential threats to the realisation of the political ambitions of some politicians. The province of KwaZulu-Natal is notorious for political assassinations, especially during elections (Thomas, 2018). Thomas further revealed that between 2000-2017 there have been 291 reported cases of political assassinations in South Africa. These kinds of assassinations have negative repercussions on the democratic project (consolidation). It also increases the sharp division among citizens along different divides. This division is a typical display of how each player in the games' theory proves how smart he/she is in the political arena. With this development, elections suffer a loss of credibility in the electoral process due, in part, to the failure of the political parties to formulate people-oriented policies and a lack of good leadership. This study has justified the choice of games theory for analysing the interplay between the way in which election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Reacting to bad leadership and election violence, Afrika (2018) lamented that irresponsible leaders and their unruly hooligans are responsible for the senseless death of innocent citizens during elections. This development gives room for a flagrant disregard for the rule of law. Sadly, the governance structure is brought to question as is the capacity of leaders to strengthen the institutions of the state and respond to injustice, and lawlessness remains questionable.

**Matrix 8.2: Summary of research questions, emergent themes and the literature**

Research question	Emergent theme/s	Interaction with literature	Sources
Ways through which election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN	- Ways election violence undermines democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal	-Lack of free and fair elections -Destruction of life and property -Increasing levels of instability and lawlessness -Sharp divisions and unhealthy rivalries -Intimidations and political killings -Loss of credibility in the electoral process -Political parties and the leadership style	- Maduegbuna (2015) - Ndulo and Lulo (2010) - Lotshwao (2009) - Ikeanyibe (2014) - David and Manu (2015) - Thomas (2018) - Afrika (2018) - Ndulo and Lulo (2010) - Fatai (2017)

## 8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has successfully interrogated the ways in which electoral violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. Through the data collected, the findings of this study have shown that the conduct of the politicians in seasons of elections has been very bad, hence the frequency of violence. The study further identified some of the ways through which election violence undermines democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN to include the inability to conduct free and fair elections. The reactions that accompany fraudulent elections often lead to massive loss of life and destruction of property, increasing the rate of instability across the country through widespread lawlessness, particularly championed by the youths. The result of this study equally indicates that elections that lack credibility would most likely lead to sharp divisions among the political players and citizens, political killings and intimidations. In general, therefore, it seems to suggest that the root cause of all these anomalies is caused by political parties with a bad leadership philosophy. This thesis has provided a deeper understanding of the ways through which election violence undermined and continues to undermine efforts at ensuring that democracy is fully strengthened and developed to the fullest level in Nigeria and South Africa.



## **CHAPTER NINE: THE IMPLICATIONS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR ELECTION VIOLENCE ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN KOGI STATE AND KWAZULU-NATAL**

### **9.1 Introduction**

Election violence, without a doubt, has been one of the challenges confronting democracies in developing societies, Nigeria and South Africa inclusive. Serious as this problem may appear and couple with the efforts being made by both governments, groups and international institutions and organisations in stemming the menace of election violence, much is yet to be achieved in the real sense. The implications of this violence on the efforts to consolidating democracy are enormous. This chapter, therefore, examines the two research questions, which seek to understand the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, and the mitigation strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation. This chapter will have a separate section on the discussions of the findings relating to the data on the research questions outlined above against existing scholarly literature, and then, a conclusion will be drawn.

### **9.2 Implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Every action has its consequences and implications, either in the short-term or in the long-term. There is no doubt that election violence has numerous implications on the consolidation of democracy. This section, therefore, examines the implications of election violence on the sustainability of democracy in KGS and KZN. Matrix 9.5 provides details of the responses of participants for aiding the analysis of this study.

**Matrix 9.1 Summary of implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Subtheme/sub question	Respondents' responses	Source/s
<i>Deepened division and ethnicisation of politics</i>	<i>It will further deepen the division among the black population.</i>	FGDKZN1
	<i>It leads to more violence both electoral, political, economic, ethno-religious and even social violence in the polity.</i>	GRAKGS
	<i>...it could lead to enmity among the people, ethnic and religious groups.</i>	ENGRKGS
<i>Lack of electoral credibility and increasing lawlessness</i>	<i>...It questions the credibility of our electoral management body in conducting credible polls.</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>It leads to increases in [the] crime rate, violence and lawlessness across the country.</i>	SNHKZN
	<i>It undermines the credibility of our elections and sanctity of our laws.</i>	LGKZN
	<i>It hinders the election of credible candidates, it affects the democratic process and finally, it increases more violence.</i>	GRAKGS
<i>Inducement of political stagnation and absence of fresh ideas in governance</i>	<i>...it brings about political and economic stagnation as well as retrogression.</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>And you don't get fresh ideas into the political system (spectrum) because people are now afraid to say the truth.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>It prevents the injection of fresh ideas into the system, and it continues the recycling of the same old guards in government.</i>	HADKZN
<i>Worsening economic situation and political apathy</i>	<i>...There is political and economic stagnation.</i>	SPAKZN
	<i>It affects development and growth of the economy. It prevents the inflow of foreign investment into the province...</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>The implication is that people became discouraged, they don't want to participate in politics anymore.... How would you want to participate in an election where your votes do not count or matter?</i>	APTKGS
	<i>It will create fear in the hearts of the people from participating in political. This will result in political apathy among the people.</i>	MKHKZN
	<i>...It leads to fear and political apathy among the people...</i>	LGKZN
<i>It slows down the pace and space of democracy</i>	<i>The implication is that it will reduce or slow pace the electoral process.</i>	KOKOKGS
	<i>...It hampers the choice of leaders in a democracy and also influences the decision of the people in terms of [the] election. It creates fear and affects political participation among the masses.</i>	SBOKZN
	<i>Political instability; it scares off investors from investing in the province and the country too. It leads to increases in [the] crime rate. There is violence and lawlessness across the country.</i>	SNHKZN

### 9.2.1 Deepened division and ethnicitisation of politics

Among the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation according to the data presented in Matrix 9.1 above, is that it leads to deepened divisions among the different ethnic nationalities. Further to this, it opens up the avenue for the ethnicitisation of politics along primordial lines. Meaning, once ethnic chauvinisms assume centre stage in the politics of any society, the chances of sustaining democracy in that political entity will be very challenging. What this means is that, when election violence is not contained, it could have catastrophic consequences, especially relating to national unity, cohesion and integration. The implication is that the possibility of building strong national bonds and nationhood would be herculean, if not impossible, to say the least. Evidentiary to this problem, as the data has shown, is that if it not addressed, it could potentially metamorphose into different dimensions; a much wider ethnic-religious, political and or economic dimension in disguise, especially in multi-cultural societies like Nigeria and South Africa. Reacting to this, respondent GRKGS stated that unchecked persistence of election violence “...leads to more violence both electoral, political, economic, ethno-religious and even social violence in the polity”. This clearly shows that uncontrolled incidences of election violence could have wider repercussions if concrete steps are not taken to stem the tide.

Among some of these wider implications are that populous and politically powerful ethnic groups could hijack the structures of government and then begin to impose and politicise governance through ethnicity. Participants in this study further identified some of the repercussions of untamed cases of recurrent election violence to say that, “...it could lead to enmity among the people, ethnic and religious groups” (ENGRKGS). A possible explanation for this response could be situated within a historical context occasioned by deep divisions among both the elite and the citizenry. Corroborating the idea of deep division as a possible implication for more violence, research participant FGDKZN warned that the implications of untamed election violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa is that it has the tendency “...that [it] will lead to further deepened division among the black population...”. Thus, a divided society along religious, ethnic, racial and political divides is susceptible to all kinds of problems. It could make governance very difficult, as loyalty is no longer attached to the state but the different ethnic nationalities that the top political elite are linked to. The responses from respondents seem to suggest that once these symptoms begin to manifest, it will naturally continue to increase until a drastic decision is taken to stem the tide. Therefore, election

violence increases animosity and enmity among people and has a very negative implication towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa as the menace persist.

#### 9.2.2 Lack of electoral credibility and increasing lawlessness

Electoral credibility is central to the development and survival of any democracy, which is evident from the data in matrix 9.1 above. Indeed, election violence affects the credibility of the elections and undermines the electoral laws and regrettably deepens the division among the different stakeholders involved. What this means for democracy and elections in Nigeria and South Africa, as shown in Matrix 9.1 above is that “... *It questions the credibility of our electoral management body in conducting credible polls*” (MKHKZN). This response indicates that once the body saddled with the responsibility to conduct elections has been challenged regarding its worthiness and competence, its acceptance is very unlikely. Nevertheless, most importantly, the participants in this study reveal that election violence does not only affect the credibility of the polls but the sanctity of the laws of the country. Respondent LGKZN puts it more succinctly by stating that election violence “...*undermines the credibility of our elections and sanctity of our laws*”. This seems to suggest that election violence does not only undermine the sanctity of laws of the country but also makes them irrelevant as the perpetrators of this crime often go unpunished. Whereas the laws of the country are supposed to be sacrosanct, the data seems to indicate that those violators of electoral laws and the constitutions appear to challenge the supremacy of the laws.

A respondent also identified another implication of election violence to the consolidation of democracy which is that “*It leads to increases in crime rate, violence and lawlessness across the country*” (SNHKZN). This could mean that the supporters of the losing candidates of the election might take to the streets announcing their displeasure over the outcome of the polls, and lawlessness will surface. In other words, election violence creates room for a disorder,

especially among the youths who have been identified as foot soldiers of the politicians. The data shows that lawlessness brings about the manifestation of crime, and crime brings about heightened insecurity. Thus, an insecure political entity cannot witness any meaningful development, and instead, it will continue to see more violence and conflicts of all sorts. Confirming this, respondent GRAKGS stated that, “*It hinders the election of credible candidates, it affects the democratic process, and finally, it increases more violence*”. The response from this respondent clearly shows that election violence contributes to the election of people who lack credibility in politics, a situation which the data says affects the democratic process and ultimately leads to more violence. In effect, the absence of electoral credibility is

susceptible to increasing levels of lawlessness, and this is a setback to any attempt at consolidating democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

### 9.2.3 Inducement of political stagnation and absence of fresh ideas in governance

Data from respondents shows that election violence induces political stagnation and prevents people with fresh ideas of gaining access to top political positions. This means that those with brilliant ideas about governance are either tactically excluded from participating or denied the opportunity to show their political popularity and credentials for political office. At this stage, the old guards are suspicious of those (politicians) with fresh ideas of how to grow the economy and bring about political and social reforms. Therefore, to maintain the status quo, they introduce violence at all stages of the elections with the aim of countering the chances of those with fresh ideas. This means that often times, it is those politicians who have virtually nothing to offer in terms of governance, that orchestrate some of these violent uprisings so that they can perhaps realise their hidden objectives. Reacting on the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation, participant OGRIKGS reiterated “...it brings about political and economic stagnation as well as retrogression”. This response could possibly relate to experiences of slow political development being witnessed in most democracies not just in Nigeria and South Africa alone but across most parts of the continent of Africa. Analytically, this simply means that election violence affects the political processes that bring about political development, governance and national unity. The consequences for this seem to suggest that the leadership will no longer be responsive and responsible, which could potentially lead to system collapse. The implications of election violence on the consolidation of democracy are that it leads to political retrogression. Beyond political as well as economic retrogression, it also prevents the injection of fresh ideas into governance owing to the fear of allowing people with radical views to take over as the old guard continues to be recycled in government. A respondent agreed with this statement saying that the long-term implications will be:

*...You do not get fresh ideas into the political system (spectrum) because people are now afraid to say the truth. Also, we continue to have the same old guard and the new ones are rejected because their ideas are considered strange” (NKOKZN).*

*...It prevents the injection of fresh ideas into the system. And it continues the recycling of the same old guards in government (HADKZN).*

The responses from NKOKZN and HADKZN all unanimously agree that election violence does not allow fresh ideas to be injected into politics by electing people with better ideas and a vision for governance. However, if this cycle of violence persists, the data shows that large-scale violence could erupt, and the problem of political apathy will emerge thereby affecting the chances of democratic consolidation.

#### 9.2.4 Worsening economic situation and political apathy

Respondents from this study identified one of the implications of election violence on the consolidation of democracy to be worsening economic conditions that could have ripple effects on the attitudes of the electorates towards elections, which is, political apathy. Corroborating this claim, a respondent stated that:

*The implication is that people become discouraged they do not want to participate in politics anymore.... How would you want to participate in an election where your votes do not count or matter? (APTKGS).*

*It will create fear in the hearts of the people from participating in politics. This will result in political apathy among the people (MKHKZN).*

A worsening economic situation occasioned by election violence comes with the repercussions of citizens not wanting to participate further in the electoral process. Once political apathy sets in, elections will lack credibility and will directly affect the democratic process. This will further put the electoral management in question regarding its credibility to conduct elections, hence the discouragement from the people. Describing the consequences of election violence on the economy and the consolidation of democracy, respondents stated that:

*... It scares off investors from investing in the province and the country too. It leads to increases in the crime rate. There is violence and lawlessness across the country (SNHKZN).*

*It affects the development and growth of the economy. It prevents the inflows of foreign investment into the province... (KHUKZN).*

The picture portrayed in these responses is very discouraging, as it does not give any sign of hope for a better democracy. The violence, as respondents have noted, no doubt, affects the development and growth of the economy and hinders the flow of foreign investment into the

country. Respondents also admitted that it could result in increases in the crime rate and high levels of lawlessness across the country. Hence, the data in matrix 9.1 above shows that destruction of property and infrastructure do lead to political and economic stagnation which hinders economic growth and ultimately serves as a setback to democratic consolidation effort.

#### 9.2.5 It slows down the pace and space of democracy

Participants for this research revealed that a good sign of any democracy is that it is growing at a steady pace and it is all-inclusive. On the other hand, where there are signs of slowing down in pace and space, it suggests that the implications of election violence are negatively affecting the chances of consolidating democracy. Reacting to the implications of election violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa, respondent KOKOKGS admitted that, “*the implication is that it will reduce or slow pace the electoral process.*” (KOKOKGS). What this implies is that the processes that bring about growth and development of democracy are deliberately slowed down, thereby affecting/weakening the sustainability of democracy. This could mean that the choice of potential leaders for reasonable transformation could be derailed owing to the incidents of fear occasioned by violence. A respondent affirms that:

*...It hampers the choice of leaders in a democracy and influences the decision of the people in terms of [the] election. It creates fear and affects political participation among the masses (SBOKZN).*

The response from SBOKZN could mean that democracy is supposed to bring about peace, prosperity and create the platform for citizens to realise their best potential without any fear. However, the moment fear sets in; it indicates that democracy has not been fully entrenched. Thus, violence prone democracy comes along with several forms of instability that have the tendencies to put fear in the minds and hearts of the people. Corroborating this claim, a respondent noted that:

*Political instability; it scares off investors from investing in the province and the country too. It leads to increases in [the] crime rate. There is violence and lawlessness across the country (SNHKZN).*

From this response, it shows that the more election violence a democracy witnesses the higher the chances of violence on a frequent basis. The implication for this development is that crime levels will surge across the country as investors and their investment packages have already left the country.

Altogether, this section has examined the observable implications of electoral violence on the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. Findings have shown that apart from its destructive nature, election violence has a negative impact on the economy of the country as it brings about political and economic stagnation. This could lead to economic crisis, unemployment, poverty and social dislocation at large. Above all, there is the possibility that this could serve as a setback to the consolidation of democracy.

### 9.3 The Mitigation Strategies for Election Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa

The presence of election violence in any democracy does not, in most cases, bring about anything good other than destruction and a complete setback to every opportunity to promote and sustain democracy. Sometimes this violence tends to unravel some of the hidden complexities of society. Thus, election violence, to some degree, does expose these complexities, perhaps to give policy makers and leaders an idea as to what to do. This section, therefore, looks at some of the mitigating strategies proposed for addressing the impact of electoral violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Details of all the responses from respondents are contained in Matrix 9.2 below.



**Matrix 9.2 Summary of the mitigation strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Subtheme/sub question	Respondents' responses	Source/s
<i>Emphasis on extensive voter education and respect for the rule of law</i>	<i>Conduct voter education and uphold the rule of law.</i>	APTKGS
	<i>Most politicians are not educated enough and therefore would require some training on what constitutes politics.</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>Respect the constitution of SA and the electoral Act.</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>Respect for the rule of law.</i>	LKGMKGS
	<i>Respect for party constitutions.</i>	SBOKZN
<i>Fight corruption and ensure credible elections through good governance</i>	<i>...ensure good governance at all levels of government.</i>	FGDLKJ
	<i>...Stiff punishment for corrupt politicians.</i>	NKOKZN
	<i>...The problem of tenders must be addressed headlong...</i>	KHUKZN
	<i>Conduct free and fair elections...</i>	NDIKGS
<i>Introduction of morality and decency into politics</i>	<i>Politicians must have self-discipline and party discipline. They should be able to see beyond the mere fact that they are politicking. There should be humanity in politics. And they should know that human value (life) is far more important than material gains.</i>	OGRIKGS
	<i>Character reorientation of the politicians...</i>	OBEDUKGS
	<i>Remove all criminal elements in politics and government, and then reform the system.</i>	NKOKZN
<i>Youth's education and employment</i>	<i>Employment and educating the youths.</i>	GRAKGS
	<i>It is to create employment for the youths. Stop thuggery and violence; and ensure good governance.</i>	FGDLKJ
	<i>There is the need for urgent job creation in order to arrest the rising youth unemployment.</i>	HADKZN

### 9.3.1 Emphasis on extensive voter education and respect for the rule of law

Responses from research participants for this theme appear to indicate that in order to address the prevalence of election violence, some of the strategies that need to be devised would include extensive voter education. Further to this, it would require that the citizens and the politicians would need to be educated on the need to respect and uphold the constitution and other extant laws of the country. A research participant agreed with the call for voter education, saying, “*Conduct voter education and uphold the rule of law*” (APTKGS). Well-informed voters and citizenry would certainly make better electorates and leaders as inferred by the response from APTKGS. Beyond voter education, a general level of orientation and training of the current crop of politicians is needed to change their perception about politics and governance.

Respondents believe that this will be significant in coping with the incidences of recurrent election violence. Espousing these views, a research participant stated that:

*Most politicians are not educated enough and therefore, would require some training on what constitutes politics (KHUKZN).*

Looking at the response from KHUKZN in matrix 9.2 above, it shows a negative picture because there are a number of issues that need to be addressed before democracy can make inroads in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. First, there is a problem of uneducated politicians already in politics who would require serious orientation and training before embarking into active politics. Secondly, there are rampant acts of disobedience to the constitution of the country, which would require character re-orientation and training on patriotic citizenship. Corroborating these assertions, two research participants concurred that:

*Respect the constitution of SA and the electoral Act (KHUKZN)*

*Respect for the rule of law (LKGMKGS)*

What is interesting about the responses from the two respondents is that they came from participants from two different countries (that is, Nigeria and South Africa), which shows that the problem is widespread and requires urgent attention to address the incidence of election violence. Disregard for the constitutions, electoral acts and constituted authorities appears to be common in both Nigeria and South Africa. Therefore, respondents proposed that a deliberate act of teaching citizens and politicians to respect the laws of the land must, as a matter of urgency, be encouraged. More interestingly, respondent SBOKZN suggested, “*respect for party constitutions.*” What this means is that teaching the act of respect for the constitution should begin at the party level first, among the politicians, before taking it to the general citizens. SBOKZN implies that once the politicians learn to respect their party constitutions, it would set the tone for a total and comprehensive turn-around regarding democratic consolidation. Acts of disobedience and corruption would give way to credible elections and good governance.

### 9.3.2 Fight corruption and ensure credible elections through good governance

Respondents in this study suggested that for election violence to be nipped in the bud, and the consolidation of democracy guaranteed, there is the dire need to ensure that corruption of all kinds is tackled head on. In addition, credible elections that meet the basic international standards are organized and conducted as well as good governance. Speaking of good

governance, participant FGDLKJ agreed that good governance is key to tackling the problem of election violence. Good governance, FGDLKJ stated, “...ensures good governance at all levels of government.” This seems to suggest that without good governance, there cannot be the consolidation of democracy, meaning that violence during election time would be inevitable. Thus, this respondent suggests that good governance and the conduct of credible elections is key to addressing these anomalies. Espousing this view, respondent NDIKGS categorically recommends the “conduct free and fair elections...” A free and fair election will be a good recipe for addressing the impact of election violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Further to this, participants in this study have equally identified that the problem of corruption should be addressed with stiff punishment for the corrupt and their corrupt practices. Participants stated that:

*...Stiff punishment for corrupt politicians (NKOKZN)*

*...The problem of tenders must be address headlong... (KHUKZN)*

The responses from the two respondents is very emphatic and clear that punitive action must be taken against corruption and corrupt individuals as a sure way to addressing the problem associated with election violence that hampers the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. This, in effect, is a way of introducing morality and decency in the democracy of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa.

### 9.3.3 Introduction of morality and decency into politics

Without a doubt, there are several problems confronting democracy in Nigeria and South Africa among which is the absence of morality and decency among the political players as well as the followers, as revealed in the data in Matrix 9.2 above. Meaning that the political players and their followers lack the moral standing required to be active participants in politics. While politics may not be all about morality, however, the data seems to suggest that morality is needed to help build sanity into the political scene. This implies that politicians are supposed to be disciplined in both politics and governance, as respondents in this study have suggested. For instance, one participant suggested that:

*Politicians must have self-discipline and party discipline. They should be able to see beyond the mere fact that they are politicking. There should be humanity in politics. And they should know that human value (life) is far more important than material gains (OGRIKGS).*

What this response from OG33333333RIKGS implies is that politicians must imbibe self-discipline before they can be disciplined in matters regarding party discipline. Respondents further admonished politicians to be humane in politics saying, human lives are far more valuable than mere political positions and political power, which they insist, is transient. This explains why participants for this study recommend that character re-orientation is needed in politics. Corroborating this assertion, respondent OBEDUKGS stated that, “*character re-orientation of the politicians...*” This is obviously needed to address the impact of election violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. This will also require that all persons with questionable characters in politics be phased out to create a smooth environment for democracy to thrive freely. Respondent NKOKZN subscribes to this saying, “*Remove all criminal elements in politics and government, and then reform the system.*” Apparently, what this response means is that to reform the system, there is the need for a comprehensive and total clean-up in order to fish out the bad eggs in the system. A reformed society and political system would have a positive impact on the youths who have been used by the politicians for their parochial gains.

#### 9.3.4 Youths education and employment

Data from matrix 9.2 shows that in every democracy, the youth are the oil that smoothes the wheels of the democratic processes. Besides the fact that they are very energetic and useful during electioneering campaigns, they are at the same time very vulnerable. The data in matrix 9.2 shows that due to their vulnerability, they have been used for the wrong reasons by the politicians to perpetrate election violence. Participants in this study identified unemployment as one of the major reasons for their involvement in election violence. As a measure to bring them out of the mess of election violence, respondents have suggested, “*Employment and educating the youths*” (GRAKGS) be a priority. Being the future of the country, respondents suggested that the youth should be educated formally through western education and morally by letting them understand that election violence is counter-productive to their future wellbeing and the good of the country. Similarly, the government should create and provide employment opportunities for them. Affirming this suggestion, a respondent agrees that:

*It is to create employment for the youths. Stop thuggery and violence and ensure good governance (FGDLKJ).*

*There is the need for urgent job creation in order to arrest the rising youth unemployment (HADKZN).*

Both respondents FGDLKJ and HADKZN identified the need for employment opportunities for the growing youth population in order to keep them from the temptation to engage in election violence. These respondents believe that the creation of job opportunities for the youth will be a very powerful way of addressing the menace of election violence in Nigeria and South Africa in the long term. This will also help arrest the rising youth unemployment in the society.

Collectively, this section has examined the proposed strategies for addressing the impact of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. The data has shown that the strategies needed to address the problem of election violence and its impact on the consolidation of democracy would require that voters in Nigeria and South Africa be extensively educated on the importance of non-violent elections. Additionally, corruption and all corrupt tendencies through tenders (award of contracts) should be dealt with severely; credible elections should henceforth be the hallmark of elections. Importantly, good governance should be entrenched in all facets of government. In addition, given the high level of moral decadence in politics, morality has been recommended as a prerequisite for politicians. Lastly, respondents emphasised the need for young people (youth) who are mostly unemployed to be meaningfully engaged through job creation in order to stem the tide of election violence and other crimes.

#### **9.4 Discussions of Findings**

The discussion of the findings of this chapter is predicated on the two research questions that seek to understand the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation and the proposed strategies needed to address the impact of electoral violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and Kwazulu-Natal Province, South Africa.

##### **9.4.1 Discussing the observable implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

Election violence has numerous implications on both peace and security, peaceful co-existence, economic development, social and security of the country as well as the survival of democracy. Data from this study has shown that among some of the implications of election violence is that besides the fact it allows more avenue for further violence to be created, it deepens the political divide among the political elite and the citizens alike, thereby making governance very

difficult. In deeply divided political societies, once the democratic political space becomes very charged, the elite takes advantage of this situation to perpetuate ethnic chauvinism that makes consolidation of democracy very difficult. The findings of this research are in line with those of Onuoha and Ufomba (2017:212-214) which explored the role and impact of ethnicity and electoral violence in Africa drawing influence from an elite theory perspective. As the political elite employs the ethnicisation of politics and violence during elections, this violence could assume different dimensions such as ethnic violence, religious bigotry and even political divisions; which could have negative implications on the economy and the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, since the mechanisms for resolving conflicts are very weak and perhaps, may never be neutral enough, the victims of this violence would ordinarily seek retaliation with subsequent violence. This has confirmed the findings of Ashindorbe (2018), who noted that election violence in plural societies have the tendencies to lead to further violence. Aluaigba (2016) agrees with this finding that unchecked and untamed election violence has the potential to explode in more violence using different dimensions, which undermines the possibility of consolidating democracy.

Besides the destruction of life, property and infrastructure, election violence hinders the conduct of credible elections capable of producing good leaders. Any election that is devoid of credibility could potentially open the door for lawlessness, especially among the young people. Moreover, most dangerously, the unemployed who see this as an avenue to ventilate their frustration on both the political elite and the system itself. This being the case, it becomes very difficult for a democracy to be consolidated amidst questionable elections that may never be legitimised by the stakeholders in the polity. This justifies the adoption of the frustration-aggression thesis for this study. Beuer and Elson (2017:1) note that the frustration-aggression theory relates to the acts of violence occasioned by frustration when the expectations of the people are not met, which results in aggression that manifests in the form of lawlessness. In addition, with visible high level of corruption among the politicians, poverty among the people, lack of development, violence, the decay of infrastructure, and general level of lawlessness, increases the frustration among the people. Therefore, elections that lack credibility are predisposed to litigations, legitimacy crises and ultimately, slows down any effort at consolidating democracy. Innocent *et al.*, (2018:208) affirms the need for credible elections. However, elections without credibility cannot enjoy popular support, will experience serious security challenges, lawlessness, and may never improve human development through effective governance. In addition, when these key indices are missing, consolidating the gains

of democracy becomes a herculean task. Lack of free and fair elections coupled with the tactics and tantrums of the politicians has become a threat to the survival, growth and the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

Election violence no doubt affects the growth and development of the economy of any political society that has undergone violence caused because of electoral disputes. Violence prevents economic activities from taking place, thereby leading to slow economic growth, loss of jobs and currency values as well as high inflation. In addition, it scares off foreign investors from investing in the economy, as the investors will be wary of their returns when investing in uncertainties. The overall implications of this will be increased unemployment, crime and poverty. With widespread poverty and crime levels surging, it could lead to blatant lawlessness, especially among the youths who are mostly unemployed. Besides the worsening economic conditions, there is the possibility of political apathy especially among the youths and the unemployed who feel neglected by the government. This explains the implications of the games played by the politicians during elections that manifest in the form of economic woes. Using games theory to extrapolate the interplay between election violence, worsening economic conditions and democratic consolidation, Bonanno (2018) draws attention to the actions of political players, which has repercussions on others. Essentially, what is crucial in any game is not just the situation that describes the act, but the strategic act of individuals that leads to the outcomes. Thus, the strategic actions of individual political players (election violence) causes worsening economic conditions that make governance and consolidation of democracy much harder.

Another implication of election violence on the consolidation of democracy, from the findings of this study, is that it stalls the injection of fresh ideas into the political system as the old guard continues to dominate the political scene. This discourages the people from participating in the political process, thereby leading to mass political apathy. Further to this is the overall implications of political stagnation in the polity, which is the consequence of a lack of injecting fresh ideas into the system. If this persists it slows the electoral process, sending dangerous signals to the polity as the possibility of political stagnation and retrogression becomes very likely. Ultimately, election violence stalls good governance because the preferred candidates are never elected (Igwe, 2015). Unfortunately, the candidates of the powerful elite (cabals) who are bent on sucking the resources of the state dry will eventually be declared the winner. Above all, there will be a downward trend towards democratic sustainability. In other words, it could result in slowing down the pace and space of democracy. By pace, it means the rate at which

democracy grows from its foundation to the stage of maturity. While space denotes the level of inclusiveness in democracy, this clearly explains whether the political space has really been democratised as claimed.

#### 9.4.2 The mitigation strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa

Given the damage caused by election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, this study has identified some mitigating strategies it has proposed to help address the impact of election violence on the consolidation of democracy. To address the impact of election violence on the consolidation of democracy, this study has found that there is an urgent need for voter education for both the electorates and the politicians. Most of the electorates have often times been manipulated by the politicians regarding their voting pattern. Thus, it behoves that the institutions saddled with the responsibility of conducting elections must educate voters on how to vote. Botchway (2018) agrees with the need for voter education as a powerful weapon in enlightening voters on whom to vote for and how to vote during elections. Botchway, using his experience in Ghana coupled with the role played by civil society organisations (CSOs), believes that this can help improve the integrity of voting and elections generally. Equally important is that the politicians will need some form of political and educational training on politics to be able to lead, as many of them lack a sound understanding of what politics entails. Reason being, as the findings of this study have shown, is that most politicians are not educated enough and would, therefore, require some training on what constitutes politics. The implications of allowing politicians with little knowledge into politics would result in bad governance, corruption and lawlessness. While this may not be good in itself, however, there are some reservations that the findings of this study suggest need to be taken seriously into consideration. Whether it is voter education or political education, it is still part of the consequences of the incorporation of African countries into the international capitalist system. Drawing influences from the postcolonial constructivist theory, the education of voters as well as the politicians are seen in such a way that elections in Nigeria and South Africa would not only meet international standards, but reflect the desire, requirements and the ideals necessary to interact in an international capitalist system. This resonates correctly with Okpotu (2015) that the colonial historical subjugation of Africa, coupled with the current relations with the international society, especially the West, explains why African countries cannot be realistically and independently governed without undue influence from the West. Thus, the gulf, especially between the western democratic theoretical



expectations of African countries and the on-the-ground cultural practices, can in itself be a real source of violent conflicts (Darby, 2004:18). Therefore, the opposition to these so-called western practices and expectations that do not accommodate African cultural practices and values gives room for lawlessness, particularly among the politicians.

Reflecting on the place of the rule of law on democratic consolidation, Steve *et al.* (2019) note that it is the anchor that holds and keeps democracy stronger and safeguards it against forces of destruction. However, the authors lamented that the greatest casualty of democracy in Nigeria is the extant laws of the country. Disregard for the constitution is at the highest level, particularly among politicians and political office holders who undermine the laws with impunity. In any political society where the laws are respected and enforced by those empowered by law to do so, all forms of lawlessness such as election violence, rigging, political killings and corruption are brought under the scrutiny of the law and punished severely.

Talking about corruption, this study agrees with the submissions of Pring and Vrushni (2019:1), which stated that:

*...strengthening institutions that provide democratic checks and balances, bridging the gap between laws and their implementation, and supporting public accountability and press freedoms, are interventions that can contribute to not only fighting corruption but also to the preservation and consolidation of democratic institutions and norms.*

No doubt, to fight corruption there is a need for synergy between strong institutions that exercise checks, balances, and responsible leadership because they will help bridge the gap between laws that are formulated and accountability in governance. The truth is that corruption and corrupt practices are very prevalent in most democracies. Steve *et al.* (2019:83-84) identify corrupt acts to include: bribery, fraud, manipulation of the voter list and any other illegal, dishonest or callous behaviour considered inimical to the moral standing of the society. The authors revealed that corruption had been identified during registration, campaigns and transmission of results. This paper shows that it has been very common, especially among officials of the electoral commission and some security agents who have often been compromised by politicians through greed. The authors noted that corrupt acts of any kind had played a reversal role in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria.

This study also proposed that for election violence to be tamed there is the need to introduce morality into politics in Nigeria and South Africa. Findings from this study show that most politicians believe that after gaining entrance into political positions they are above the law and therefore have no moral obligation to either respect the law or have any sense of decorum in their behaviour. Thus, the data revealed that politicians lack discipline and therefore, must have self-disciplined and party disciplined among themselves if democracy must be consolidated. Meaning, they should be able to see life beyond the mere fact that they are politicking. There should be humanity in politics. In addition, they should know that human value (life) is far more important than material gains. Reacting to the need for morality in politics, Ebegbulem (2011:249) decried the way politicians have bastardised elections by throwing morality to the trash bin just because of their desperation to win elections. In any democracy where moral credibility is missing or absent, all forms of lawlessness can be exhibited. Without a doubt, democracy cannot be sustained in such an atmosphere as the will of certain entities and individuals may be too strong and powerful to contain. Therefore, this study found that political morality and decency is crucial and necessary for democratic consolidation.

Lastly, the findings of this study also suggested that the youth in both Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa should be provided with quality education and skills that will make them employable. In addition, the government should equally ensure that they are provided with jobs opportunities upon graduation in order to keep them out of the influence of the political elite who have used them for wrongdoing over the years. Okoro (2017) lamented the involvement of the youths in most political and election related violence in Africa. The author in a paper titled “Youth Involvement in Political Violence/Thuggery: A Counter-Weight to Democratic Development in Africa” noted with dismay how their involvement is responsible for the lack of democratic development. To achieve development therefore, this study believes that government should create the enabling environment for the youths to create jobs for themselves. This could be achieved through skill training, provision of loans to the many unemployed graduates to start some form of businesses. Ojok and Acol (2017:100-101) agrees that creating a robust framework by governments for youth empowerment will be a very good recipe for countering their manipulation into different forms of violence. Without a doubt, poverty is both the cause and the result of violence, especially in developing political societies. To deal with this menace in Nigeria and South Africa, the findings of this study show that there is a dire need to create multiple economic opportunities for youths of all categories in all sectors. Eneji and Ikeorji (2018:13) note that such economic opportunities will play an essential

role in ensuring that all conditions that predispose the youths to engage in violence such as poverty, unemployment, self/social insecurity are significantly reduced. However, Adebayo (2018) warns that any further attempt by African leaders to exclude the youths from active participation both in politics and by extension, the economy will spell doom for the continent. This is because Africa as a whole (Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa inclusive) has more than sixty per cent of its population as youths, most of whom fall below 25 years of age (Kweitsu, 2017:1). This then makes a case for the political and economic empowerment of the youth an urgent priority.

Altogether, this section has identified the implications of election violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. At the same time, the study has crucially discussed the mitigation strategies needed to address the menace of election violence in order to promote democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. These together, if carefully and meticulously taken into consideration, could effectively arrest the spate of election violence and put Nigeria and South Africa's democracies on the full path of grade A consolidation.

**Matrix 9.3: Summary of research questions, emergent themes and the literature on: The Implications and Mitigation Strategies for Election Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal**

Research question /s	Emergent theme/s	Interaction with literature	Sources
The Implications and Mitigation Strategies for Election Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa</li> <li>- the mitigation strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Deepened division and ethnicisation of politics</li> <li>-Lack of electoral credibility and increasing lawlessness</li> <li>-Inducement of political stagnation and absence of fresh ideas in governance</li> <li>-Worsening economic situation and political apathy</li> <li>-It slows down the pace and space of democracy</li> <li>-Emphasis on extensive voter education and respect for the rule of law</li> <li>-Fight corruption and ensure credible elections through good governance</li> <li>-Introduction of morality and decency into politics</li> <li>-Youth education and employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ashindorbe (2018)</li> <li>- Onuoha and Ufomba (2017)</li> <li>- Aluaigba (2016)</li> <li>- Beuer and Elson (2017)</li> <li>- Innocent (2018)</li> <li>- Bonanno (2018)</li> <li>- Botchway (2018)</li> <li>- Okpotu (2015)</li> <li>- Darby (2004)</li> <li>- Steve <i>et al.</i> (2019)</li> <li>- Pring and Vrushu (2019)</li> <li>- Ebegbue (2011)</li> <li>- Okoro (2017)</li> <li>- Ojok and Acol (2017)</li> <li>- Eneji and Ikeorji (2018)</li> <li>- Adebayo (2018)</li> <li>- Kweitsu (2017)</li> </ul>

## 9.5 Chapter Summary

In line with the research questions regarding the implications and mitigation strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal, this chapter has analysed the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation and the way out for Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter began by looking at the general perception of respondents on elections in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively. This was followed by providing an understanding of political parties and their role in election violence in KGS and KZN. It was discovered that political parties do not only instigate election violence but that it is the strategy they adopt for winning elections. A further examination was carried out on the failure to tame the politicians for being behind most election violence in KGS and KZN. It was revealed that the politicians live above the law as besides their wealth, connections, influence and the control they exercise over institutions of the state it becomes practically impossible to sanction them. The chapter also assessed the possibility of conducting free, fair and credible elections in KGS and KZN. The data showed that it is possible, but that it would take a while

to accomplish. Similarly, any change would have to be approved by the politicians who have repeatedly shown that they are opposed to the idea of reforms that will not protect their interests. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the implications of election violence on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. The implications include stalling of good governance, growth and development of the economy, and a lack of injection of fresh ideas into the political system as opposed to the ones of the 'old guard'. There will be political stagnation and slow pace of electoral process owing to violence. The political divide will deepen among the different political and ethnic nationalities. Using frustration and aggression, games as well as elite theories, the chapter identified that the elite has continued to play a negative part in most election uprisings in both KGS and KZN. Through hate speech and intolerance, they incite the people against one another, leading to aggressive actions that manifest in the form of violence at election time.

## CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

### 10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to interrogate if for any reason(s) election violence contributes or undermines attempts at consolidating democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. The main aim of this chapter is to provide an outline of this study and in addition, to reach inferences concerning the objectives of this study. It is also to examine the role of violence in the electoral processes of KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa. Therefore, the following chapter debates the results and implications based on the conclusions of the investigation conducted.

### 10.2 Summary of Research Objectives and Research Questions

There are specific research objectives as well as research questions that are pivotal to this study. These were articulated in the first chapter of this doctoral thesis. Table 10.2 provides a summary of the research objectives and research questions.

**Table 10.1: Summary of Research Objectives and Research Questions**

	Research Objectives	Research Questions
1.	To identify the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa	What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa?
2.	To examine the role of violence in the electoral processes of Nigeria and South Africa.	What is the role of violence in Nigerian and South African electoral processes?
3.	To unpack the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS and KZN.	What are the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?
4.	To investigate how electoral violence undermines democratic sustainability in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa using illustrations from KGS and KZN.	Drawing inferences from KGS and KZN, how does electoral violence undermine democratic sustainability in Nigeria and South Africa?
5.	To analyse the implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria, and KZN, South Africa.	What is the implication of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in, Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa?
6.	To propose strategies for addressing the impact of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Africa.	How can electoral violence be effectively addressed in Kogi State, Nigeria, and KZN, South Africa to ensure democratic consolidation?

### **10.3 Overview of the study**

This section provides an overview of the discussions of each chapter and the content of each, beginning from chapter one to chapter ten. Details of the review are presented below:

#### **10.3.1 Chapter One: Background and outline of the research problem**

The first chapter focused on the background of the study and outlined the focus of the research, which is democratic consolidation and electoral violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively. The chapter further outlined the statement of the research problem. This was followed by an outline of the six research questions and the six objectives of the study. The chapter concluded by presenting the layout of the chapters of the dissertation.

#### **10.3.2 Chapter Two: Theoretical understanding of election violence and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

The second chapter began with a review of literature that relates to election violence and democratic consolidation. Similarly, the chapter was organised into the following sections: the first section focused on the definitions of concepts relevant to the study such as election, electoral process, electoral violence, political violence, democracy and democratic consolidation. The next section discussed the causes of election violence from the existing literature drawing influence from Kristine Hoglund's (2009) analysis. Following this, the nature of politics, the nature of elections and then the electoral institutions were all discussed. This explained how election violence has persisted in Nigeria and South Africa as well as the ways through which it continues to undermine democratic consolidation. The last section of the chapter then examined the theoretical frameworks upon which the study is anchored. Four theories were adopted for this study; they include elite theory, post-colonial constructivist theory, frustration-aggression theory and then games theory. Despite the weaknesses inherent in these theories, they were found to be useful in analysing the links between democratic consolidation and electoral violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively.

#### **10.3.3 Chapter Three: Contextual Perspectives of Election Violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa**

The objective of this chapter was to discuss the contextual perspectives of election violence in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South Africa. This became necessary considering the fact that KZN has been embroiled in a series of electoral and political violence since the introduction of democracy in 1994. To be able to comprehend the contextual origins of violence

in KZN, this chapter undertook a historical overview of KZN with reference to its ethnic composition, electoral processes, the economic position of the province, and the politics of the people. All these were relevant in understanding the dynamics of violence, be it electoral or political in nature. Lastly, the chapter concluded with an assessment of the political assassinations in the province of KwaZulu-Natal since the return to democracy in 1994. These were instrumental in providing this study with an insight into electoral violence.

#### 10.3.4 Chapter Four: Historical perspectives of election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria

This chapter examined Kogi State with a specific focus on its heterogeneous nature, especially the animosities among the three major ethnic groups. There have been political contestations among these ethnic groups on the appropriate formulae needed to administer the state, but there has not been any breakthrough. This chapter, therefore, discussed electoral violence in Kogi State, Nigeria. The chapter began with an overview of the brief historical perspective of Kogi and was further followed by an examination of the political configurations of Kogi State and election violence. On a wider scale, the chapter looked at the Nigerian electoral system, the electoral institutions, the historical perspective of election violence in Nigeria and how all these influenced election violence in other states of the federation. Additionally, the chapter discussed political assassinations/killings and their impact on election related violence in Nigeria.

#### 10.3.5 Chapter Five: Research Methodology and Methods

Chapter five focused on the description of the methods and the tools that were used in carrying out this research. Using a qualitative research technique, the study was executed through a case study method and the description of the research paradigm as well as the philosophical context upon which the study was underpinned. Interpretivism was adopted as a philosophical paradigm to aid the analysis of data generated. Also, the chapter examined the research design upon which the study was built, the research population and the research approach adopted. Being a qualitative study, the study employed purposive sampling techniques in selecting the research participants in the collection data. It also featured the data collection methods, data quality control and data analysis method used to collect data. A detailed outline of the data and instruments that were employed in this study was discussed in this chapter. The method included interviews, document analysis and a focus group discussion. This study identified the qualitative method as the most suitable technique for this research as it allowed the researcher



to get first-hand information from those who are active participants in election violence in the democracies of KZN and KGS respectively.

#### 10.3.6 Chapter Six: Understanding the factors slow pacing democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa

The main focus of chapter six was to carefully analyse ways in which democratic consolidation and election violence are linked in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. This chapter equally discussed and gave some clarification to the findings of the data collected both from the conduct of interviews and the focus group discussion. The chapter began by examining how ethnicity and religion have been and are being manipulated by the elite (especially the political and religious elite) for the furtherance of election violence. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the formation of political parties and governance patterns, and bad leadership and its effect on democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. Efforts were made to understand how illiteracy and a lack of educational and political education among the politicians, increased levels of killings and the misuse of political power all constitute to the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN. Lastly, the place of greed and lack of political integrity among the politicians as well as the monetisation of politics were all discussed along with their contribution to the slow pacing of democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN.

#### 10.3.7 Chapter Seven: Analysing the role of violence in the electoral process and the trends of violence in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal

Chapter seven discussed the responses of respondents relating to the two research questions which sought to understand the role of electoral violence on the democratic process and the trends/nature of violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal respectively. In seeking to understand the role violence plays on the electoral processes of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, this chapter undertook an examination of how election violence lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections. The findings of the study revealed how the motivation for political businesses, resources and the prevention of inclusiveness in governance in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa triggers election violence. In addition, the chapter explored the issue of the challenges of electoral credibility occasioned by violence and the kind of enmity it creates in the polity, as well as the ways it thwarts the realisation of democratic goals. More importantly, the chapter took a critical look at how violence disenfranchises voters during elections and the monumental effects of such on the choices of

the people. While discussing the observable nature or trends of election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, the study identified the act of imposition of candidates on the electorates, the incidences of intra- and inter-party violence, killings and destruction of life and property as well as general uncertainties, which all serve as a hindrance to the growth and development of democracy. The findings of this study equally revealed that there is a general level of fear and uncertainty, a manifestation of cultism, clannish and family crisis; vote buying using material inducement and manipulation of lists; and cases of intimidation, destruction and snatching of ballot boxes. Lastly, the chapter discussed the problem of the funding of thugs and political assassinations by the political elite in Nigeria and South Africa. In conclusion, the findings of this study showed that electoral violence has a negative place in the democratic processes of KGS and KZN, respectively. It has also contributed to and is still contributing to the slow pace of consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal.

#### 10.3.8 Chapter Eight: Interrogating the ways election violence undermine democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa

In chapter eight, the focus was more on the research question that sought to interrogate the ways through which election violence undermine democratic consolidation in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter undertook an examination of a pictorial description of how the absence of free and fair elections increase the chances of election violence. Also, important to note from the findings of this study, is the prevalence of destruction of life and property during election violence, the increasing levels of instability and the spate of lawlessness in the society. The chapter further discussed the sharp divisions and unhealthy rivalries among the political gladiators; intimidation of oppositions and political killings. Finally, the chapter concluded with the examination of the loss of credibility in the electoral processes of Nigeria and South Africa by some citizens and the politicians, as well as the nature of political parties and their leadership style in a detailed discussion of the data collected.

#### 10.3.9 Chapter Nine: Analysing the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation and the way out in Kogi State and Kwazulu-Natal

This chapter examined the two research questions which sought to know the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, and the proposed strategies on addressing the menace. One of the implications of electoral violence is the manifestation of more violence and deep divisions among the electorates and the politicians in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter also identified other implications to be the lack

of electoral credibility and an increased level of lawlessness, the inducement of political stagnation and the absence of fresh ideas in governance. There is also the implication of monumental destruction of life and property, worsening economic conditions and high levels of political apathy especially among the youths who are supposed to be the engine house driving democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, there was an analysis of the implications of the way election violence slows down the pace and space of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. On the proposed strategies for addressing the spate of election violence and its impact on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa, the research recommended that there should be more emphasis placed on extensive voter education and total respect for the rule of law. The chapter equally proposed that for election violence to be effectively addressed, there is a dire need to ensure that corruption is fought vigorously in order to guarantee credible elections followed by good governance. More importantly, the chapter discussed the imperatives of introducing morality and decency into the politics of Nigeria and South Africa as a sure way towards development and consolidation of democracy. Finally, the chapter provided suggestions on how to educate the youths and ensure that they are either provided with employment opportunities or that an atmosphere is created for them to create it for themselves in Nigeria and South Africa.

#### **10.4 Summary of Findings**

This particular research was conducted to understand how election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. The study had six broad research questions as well as six research objectives which were (collapsed into four in the course of the analysis) meant to investigate democratic consolidation and electoral violence in KGS and KZN. This section, therefore, outlines the conclusions for each objective, drawn from the findings of the preceding chapters, and discloses the implications and limitations of the study as well as recommendations for further study.

##### **10.4.1 Research Objective One and Research Question One**

- **Research Objective:** To identify the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa.
- **Research Question:** What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa?

#### **10.4.1.1 The factors and obstacles slow-pacing democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

The first objective of this study was to identify the factors or obstacles responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. The findings of this study have identified bad leadership as one of the major obstacles responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN. The findings in this study have shown that bad leadership does not only hinder development but prevents citizens from realising their potential in a democracy. The implication of this trend is that individuals without leadership qualities could emerge as leaders and will continue to circumvent rules, institute corruption, while mismanagement takes centre stage. Besides the problem of bad leadership, the study equally identified that there is a lack of democratic principles and widespread injustice that has characterised the politics of KGS and KZN. Democratic principles are those values such as fairness, transparency, the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, which are completely missing. Crucial to these principles are the consent of the governed (representative government); individual rights and, checks and balances. Either during elections periods or in actual governance, these principles that guide democracy should be adhered to and respected by all and sundry.

Another obstacle identified by this study for slow pacing democratic consolidation has to do with such issues like widespread corruption among public officials, election violence, human rights violations and flagrant disregard to the laws of the land, among others. The study further showed how ethnicity, religion and a lack of political integrity are some of the obstacles and factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. More worrisome, is the absence of integrity in politics and the political landscape, especially among the political elite who would go to any length to get what they want irrespective of the means through which such a thing was obtained. Political killings and politically motivated assassinations, the study revealed, undermines the capacity to consolidate democracy and ensure good governance in KGS and KZN.

Lack of adequate educational and political education or qualifications among politicians and greed was also revealed as obstacles to the entrenchment of democracy and its values as well as its ideals in KGS and KZN. Of course, this is a huge problem when those who are leading occupy very sensitive political positions but are either uneducated or have a low level of education and knowledge about governance. The implication is that this could make

governance a herculean task and potentially lead to the collapse of government and other institutions of the state. Political parties and their failed promises have been attributed to the slow pace of democratic consolidation in this study. Parties such as the ANC and the PDP as political movements, having enjoyed the privileged position of being elected into power since the introduction of democracy in the selected study locations, but have not been able to transform their societies as expected thereby leading to democratic retrogression. There is a lack of internal party democracy, corruption within the rank and file of the party hierarchy, monetisation of elections and politics, and problems with the nomination and appointment of leaders within the organisations, which has often led to internal cracks, fictionalisation etc.

#### **10.4.1.2 Conclusion**

In effect, the evidence from the qualitative data from this study has shown that the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation are myriad, but prominent among them are the manipulation of ethnicity and religion among the elite, a low level of education (this could by extension be related to illiteracy) and political education among the politicians, political parties and their unfulfilled promises, increasing levels of killings, greed among the politicians, bad leadership and the monetisation of elections and politics, among others. In general, therefore, this study has contributed to the understanding of why democracy in KGS and KZN has been undermined and is slow to consolidate. One of the limitations of this study has been the limitation in scope. A much larger and wider area of scope could be very relevant in helping discover more factors bedevilling the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. Notwithstanding the relatively limited sample, this work offers valuable insights into the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of the Republic of South Africa. Taken together, these findings strongly support the recommendations for responsible leadership and good governance, for democracy in Nigeria and South Africa to be consolidated within a short period of time.

#### **10.4.2 Research Objective Two and Research Question Two**

- **Research Objective:** To examine the role of violence in the electoral processes of Nigeria and South Africa.
- **Research Question:** What is the role of violence in Nigerian and South African electoral processes?

#### **10.4.2.1      The role of violence in the electoral process of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal**

The second objective of this study was to examine the role of violence in the electoral processes of KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa. The findings of this study identified a number of roles that violence plays in the electoral processes of KGS and KZN; among some of the roles is that it lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections. This has revealed that electoral violence is retrogressive to democracy and does not increase the pace and space of democracy. Violence itself instils fear in the minds and hearts of the people (electorates) and some politicians towards politics and future elections. As a result of this, some politicians develop a fear for politics because of the possibility of being killed or assassinated owing to the volatile nature of the process. This scenario shows a clear defeat to democracy, and a threat to human existence as the right to choose the type of government the people want to be ruled under has been denied them.

Another role that violence plays in the electoral processes of KGS and KZN is that violence has been used as a political gain (business), and it has also prevented inclusiveness. There are economic benefits and other incentives that drive or motivate the continuous escalation of violence during elections as the study discovered. The findings of this study have revealed why eliminating/eradicating election violence is becoming more difficult by the day because of the benefits derived by those who are championing its cause. It blocks all the chances of growth and inclusiveness as democratic consolidation could be slim since the voices of the majority are never allowed to prevail above those of the few. This clearly explains why most of the electorates, especially the youths in Africa, do not take elections seriously any longer owing to the continuous neglect they suffer from elected leaders. Consequently, the study concludes that this leaves the ‘old guards’ to be recycled year in and year out without fresh ideas being injected into the system, thereby allowing no tangible development. The implication is that political apathy sets in easily as the passion and the drive for strengthening the democracy is killed. This thesis has provided a deeper insight into the reasons for election violence and the political doldrums from the electorate’s point of view in the democracy of KGS and KZN.

Another role that violence plays in the electoral processes of KGS and KZN is that it challenges the credibility of elections, electoral processes and outcomes. The study shows that elections that lack credibility will determine and affect the quality of the leadership and will constitute a threat to existing laws. The findings of this research have shown that any election that lacks

credibility will not only determine or tell on the quality and calibre of leaders elected, but the service expected to be delivered thereafter. Besides the memories of destructions, killings and assassinations, the findings of this thesis show that violence has to some extent shaped and continues to shape the politics of KGS and KZN through policy formulations, and enactment of laws both positive and negative.

This study also found that the role of violence in the electoral process is that it creates enmity and thwarts the realisation of democratic goals. Findings from this research revealed that most of the political killings had arisen principally because politicians have failed to respect collective decisions taken either at a party level or even at group levels. This increases the animosity, enmity and division among politicians leading to the formation of factions. This study has shown that election violence has thwarted the realisation of democratic goals, and so long as this persists, democratic consolidation cannot be attained.

The last role that violence plays in the electoral process of KGS and KZN is the disenfranchisement of voters and the effect on the choices of the people. Election violence literally alters the figures of votes that are supposed to be cast as voters would often run away for fear of being attacked. Consequently, voters are disenfranchised from exercising their fundamental right to vote. This trend scuttles the choices and the will of the people as the best candidates never get the chance to be elected as suitable representatives of the people. This, the study found, could result in more violence, killings and destruction of property. Regrettably, the study discovered that due to the violence, it opens the door for political integrity, decency and morality to be completely jettisoned from politics, especially in KGS and KZN. This has suddenly become a trend or worse still, the very nature of election related violence in most elections conducted during the period under review in Kogi State, Nigeria and the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, Republic of South Africa.

#### **10.4.2.2 Conclusion**

The qualitative data from this study has revealed that election violence has no real significantly positive role in the electoral process of Nigeria and South Africa. This is because election violence lowers the pace, space and the smooth process of elections in KGS and KZN. Besides, the study has shown that election related violence is motivated by certain interests such as business and resources, which the political elite tend to get out of it, and due to this, it poses a serious threat to electoral credibility, the electoral process and its outcomes. The evidence from this study suggests that an election devoid of credibility and transparency is bound to

disenfranchise some voters as the candidates of their choices are never voted into power. Consequently, this scenario could create an atmosphere of enmity among the political gladiators, thereby making governance more of a challenge. The general implication is that the chances of realising the democratic goals originally set out to achieve are thwarted. This thesis has provided a deeper insight into the role that election violence plays in the lack of consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of the Republic of South Africa. Though the limitation of this section is that the findings of this research objective and question relied mostly on the role of violence and the political elite alone without due recourse to the socio-economic constraints that may contribute to election violence or democratic consolidation. No country can survive with a bad socio-economic condition threatening the corporate existence of such a society. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to the understanding of the role of election violence in democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN.

#### 10.4.3 Research Objective Three and Research Question Three

- **Research Objective:** To unpack the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS and KZN.
- **Research Question:** What are the observable trends of electoral violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?

##### **10.4.3.1 The observable trends/nature of electoral violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa**

Election violence in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal has over time followed a certain nature or trend that requires careful, and perhaps special mention in this study. Prominent among the trends/nature associated with election violence as identified by the findings of this thesis include impunity and imposition of candidates during an election. This, in most cases, as revealed in the findings of this study, lead to disagreements often with a violent ending. The study found that impunity and the political imposition of candidates are very common in the politics of Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Further to this is that it occurs due to a lack of internal democracy among political parties as the financiers and the political power brokers determine who gets what, when and how. This is followed by Intra- and inter-party violence as the main target is to eliminate opponents either by killing them or weakening them in order to guarantee the chances of winning the election. Surprisingly, as the violence becomes messier,



it could generate into the manifestation of cultism, clannish and family crises, particularly among the Ebira speaking people of Okene, Kogi State, Nigeria. Therefore, the findings of this study have shown that clannish interests and disagreements often leave a bitter experience of violence and deadly destruction in Ebiraland with cultists having a field day.

Another observable trend relating to violence at elections is the issue of vote buying, material inducement and manipulation of lists. This research has confirmed that vote buying, though a recent development, is a common occurrence in most elections in KZN and KGS. Vote buying could come in the form of inducing the voters with material gifts in order to influence their voting pattern at the polls or to influence them to vote in favour of certain/specific political parties. Surely, the use of material/gifts to induce voters could potentially influence the voting pattern which may be contrary to the will of the people, and where there is resistance to this, the political elite could employ the tactics of intimidation, destruction and snatching of ballot boxes. This is made possible by the funding of thugs and the use of assassinations to scare off opposition, thereby enabling the course of the powerful elite to be realised.

#### **10.4.3.2 Conclusion**

In conclusion, this research has found that the trend/nature of election violence is very detrimental to the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. The findings of this study have shown that among the nature that election violence assumes is impunity and the political imposition of candidates, which is in itself counter-productive to democratic sustainability, which is why the vestiges of violent killings, destruction of life and property has been the order of the day amidst several uncertainties. As this persists, the study found, that a general level of fear sets in, especially among the electorates and more importantly, some top politicians too. More intriguing is that this research discovered that in the Okene area of Kogi State, Nigerian cultism, clannish and family crises assumes a central position in this violence. The general implication of the trend or nature of violence, as shown in this study is that vote buying takes centre stage. In a desperate attempt to capture political power, this research has found that some politicians end up funding thugs as tools of destabilisation, while at the same time, the same thugs are used for the assassination of perceived political opponents. This thesis has therefore provided a deeper insight into the trend and the nature of election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. One limitation, though, of these findings is that the trends and the nature of violence did not show the frequency of its occurrence as well as its ranking. This would have aided in measuring whether the trend is on the decrease

or the increase. Notwithstanding this limitation, this study has shown that election violence does not only hinder the sustainability of democracy but is a danger to national security and peaceful coexistence in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa.

#### 10.4.4 Research Objective Four and Research Question Four

- **Research Objective:** To investigate how electoral violence undermines democratic sustainability in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa using illustrations from KGS and KZN.
- **Research Question:** Drawing inferences from KGS and KZN, how does electoral violence undermine democratic sustainability in Nigeria and South Africa?

##### 10.4.4.1 Interrogating ways election violence undermines democratic consolidation in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa

The fourth objective of this study was meant to investigate how election violence undermines democratic consolidation in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa. The findings of this study revealed that a lack of free and fair elections, political apathy and victory for undeserved politicians undermine democratic consolidation, not just in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal, but post-colonial South Africa and Nigeria as a whole. The inability to meet the basic democratic standards of acceptable elections has put democracy and elections under severe strain, particularly in KGS and KZN. In general, therefore, apart from the fact that violence has often facilitated the emergence of undeserving candidates as winners of elections, the study has shown that political apathy too has created the platform for such politicians to emerge as winners. Another finding of this study showed that the relationship between Africa and their former colonial masters is a serious problem to the sustainability of democracy in Africa. For instance, thesis research found that the incorporation of Africa into the international capitalist world through colonialism contributes significantly to conflict and electoral violence in Africa and that this fact cannot be divorced from the current relations with the international system, especially the capitalist west. This is a real setback to democratic consolidation.

Other findings from the study revealed that instability, destruction of life, property and complete disregard to the rule of law and constitutionalism undermine the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN. Violence and destruction pose a great challenge to the constitution, electoral act(s), electoral laws and the electoral institutions. More interestingly,

the rule of law is put to question; the democratic culture and values are badly affected and destroyed, as well as serving as a big test on the institutions of the state. The consequences of this are fear, tension, divisions, and unhealthy rivalry among the political elite. This the study has shown this to make the conduct of elections more difficult by the electoral commission owing to the tension which could potentially lead to violence. More revealing is that political parties, choices and quality of leadership, and the lack of credibility of the electoral process constitute a huge setback to democratic consolidation in post-colonial Nigeria and South Africa. The type of services rendered by any government is dependent on the choices of leaders and the leadership quality of such political party. In effect, this study has revealed that the chances of conducting free, fair and credible elections, apart from the role played by the electoral commission, largely depends on the role played by political parties and their quality of leadership. This research thesis has again revealed that electoral violence has further deepened the divide, not just among the politicians, but more so among the people, often along religious and ethnic lines rather than ideological issues. As this persists, the findings of this study show that there will be a lack of a common shared goal and vision, but rather the desire by some to have control over the affairs of the political party and its structures to their own advantage.

#### **10.4.4.2 Conclusion**

The discussion of the research question and objective of this thesis section has been on the various ways through which election violence undermined, and perhaps continues to undermine, the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Findings from this study have shown that a lack of free and fair elections, loss of life and destruction of property has been some of the ways in which election violence undermines attempts at consolidating democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal Province. More findings from this study have revealed that the increasing levels of instability and lawlessness among the citizenry, the intimidation of political opponents and voters, as well as killings, also undermine efforts at consolidating democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Further revelations from this thesis have indicated that a loss of credibility in the electoral process and the place of political parties and the kind of leadership they provide are among the many reasons for election violence constituting a real constraint to democratic consolidation in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. This chapter has therefore given a deeper insight into the many ways through which election violence constitutes a significant threat to any meaningful efforts at consolidating democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. One major limitation of this study is that

it only identified a few ways through which election violence undermines the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal but failed to list all the numerous ways. In spite of this limitation, this thesis has been able to provide evidence showing that election violence no doubt undermines the consolidation of democracy in KGS and KZN.

#### **10.4.5 Research Objective Five and Research Question Five**

- **Research Objective:** To analyse the implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria, and South Africa.
- **Research Question:** What is the implication of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in, Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa?

##### **10.4.5.1 Analysis of the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa**

The research objective and research question number five of this study were meant to analyse the implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Besides the fact that election violence allows for the absence of credibility in elections, undermines the rule of law, deepens the divisions among political parties and politicians, creates political party, this study found out that it further leads to political stagnation, absence of credible leadership with governance that is devoid of fresh ideas. Political stagnation is when the same policies are routinely being recycled, no significant progress is made, as well as the same style of administration being in place. Virtually, the same leadership is at the helm of affairs with the same governance structures. It is no surprise, therefore that no fresh ideas are visibly seen or injected into the governance system with the intention of bringing about tangible development. The implication of election violence on the consolidation of democracy is that it leads to democratic retrogression and regrettably with some elements of authoritarianism. Democratic authoritarianism, and human rights violations become the new norm while some, or most, of the vital institutions of the state such as the police, the judiciary, the army, the media and all civil society organisations are controlled by the state. At this level, democratic consolidation becomes a mirage as the vestiges of the past regimes begin to resurface again. Electoral violence, as this study has shown, affects the development and growth of the economy, hinders the flow of foreign investment into the country thereby leading to high levels of unemployment and a massive poverty explosion. More disturbing is the increase in the manifestation of more violence and deepened divisions

that open up the political society into centrifugal politics. Meaning, centrifugal politics introduces the politics of ethnicity and ethnic chauvinism which to a large extent has been the bane of Nigerian politics over the years. Lastly, the findings of this study have revealed that election violence slows down the pace as well as the space of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. Collectively, this does not allow for what this study terms democratic inclusiveness. Meaning, this gives room for political marginalisation of certain elements and ethnic entities within the society.

#### **10.4.5.2 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the research objective which sought to analyse the implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Kogi State, Nigeria, and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Findings from this study have shown that among some of the implications of election violence on democratic consolidation includes: a deepened division and the ethnicisation of politics. Further findings have also revealed that the absence of electoral credibility and increasing levels of lawlessness, especially among the politicians, is worrying. Additionally, this research has identified that election violence induces political stagnation, bad governance, absence of accountability and hinders the injection of fresh ideas into governance. Of course, the general implications of all this will be the worsening economic situation, unemployment, increases in the rate of poverty and then political apathy. Worst of all, it slows down the pace at which democracy is supposed to run, space it is supposed to have covered and its lack of inclusive capability. The findings of this study have clearly shown that election violence has implications that are very detrimental to the substance of democracy in both Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. In effect, this study noted that democracy could be consolidated if the recommendations provided herein are taken into cognisance.

#### **10.4.6 Research Objective Six and Research Question Six**

- **Research Objective:** To propose strategies for addressing the impact of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa.
- **Research Question:** How can electoral violence be effectively addressed in Kogi State, Nigeria, and KZN, South Africa to ensure democratic consolidation?

#### **10.4.6.1 The mitigating strategies for electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa**

In this section, the discussion revolved around the research objective number six (6) which sought to identify the mitigating strategies for election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. For any realistic attempt at achieving democratic consolidation, this thesis has proposed that election violence would need to be addressed effectively. One of the most effective ways to do it would be through extensive voter education for the electorates and even some politicians. This has become necessary because there is a lack of understanding on how to choose leaders among the people during elections. Often times, these electorates are swayed by material items from the politicians, thereby sabotaging the very sanctity of the electoral process. This research has further proposed that for democracy to be consolidated in Nigeria and South Africa, there is the dire need to fight the corruption of all kinds, and then ensure the credibility of elections through good governance. Added to this, the findings of this study have shown that there is a need for respect for the constituted authorities, the constitution and all extant laws in the country by all citizens. To bring sanity into the politics and democracy of KGS and KZN, there is also the urgency for introducing morality, decency and total hygiene in the politics of Nigeria and South Africa. Thus the findings of this study will greatly help bring some control/sanity over the behaviours of the political elite who, in most cases, have been undermining laws with impunity. Lastly, the numerous unemployed youths would need to be provided with better employment opportunities in order to stem the tide of youth involvement/manipulation into election violence. The findings reported herein shed new light on some of the mitigating strategies of electoral violence on the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal Province of the Republic of South Africa.

#### **10.4.6.2 Conclusion**

This section has discussed the mitigating strategies put forward for election violence on the democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa. Among some of the mitigating strategies which this thesis has identified includes; a strong emphasis on extensive voter education and the sensitisation of citizens to show unconditional regard for the rule of law. Therefore to achieve this objective, besides the need to strengthen institutions of the state, a vigorous war on corruption and corrupt elements must be fought with ruthlessness. Added to the fight against corruption, this study equally revealed that morality and decency should be introduced into politics in Nigeria and South Africa as this will go a long way to taming the untoward behaviours of some randy and unscrupulous politicians from destroying democracy in KGS

and KZN. Lastly, the findings of this study have proposed that to prevent the youths from being involved in election related violence and crimes; employment opportunities would need to be provided for them. Similarly, the study suggests that an enabling environment should be created for them to either create jobs for themselves or acquire some skills that will help them to be self-employed. One of the limitations of this study was that it failed to raise the issue of sport as a tool to rescue some of these youths from the manipulative clutches of the political elite. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of some of the mitigating strategies for dealing with election violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria and South Africa.

## **10.5 Implications**

The implications of this study for theory and government are discussed in this section. The following implications are proposed for governments and electoral management bodies to guide them in policy and decision making.

### **10.5.1 Implications for theory**

The evidence from this study using the post-colonial constructivist approach shows that the issue of violence and electoral violence in Nigeria and South Africa generally cannot be divorced from both Africa's colonial history and current relations with the international community, particularly the West. The gulf between Western democratic theoretical expectations and on-the-ground cultural practices can in itself be a source of conflict. Generally speaking, election violence in Africa is a combination of product and productive forces of post-coloniality. Clearly, this can be gleaned from factors such as the enormous socio-economic and political challenges like; resource disputes, economic inequality, poor economic opportunities, and electoral illegitimacy, coupled with post-colonial realities created in Africa, which enable the platform for possibilities of violence. The findings of this study endorse the views of Okpotor (2015) that the historical relationship between former colonial states, their colonial masters and the present relations with the international capitalist world coupled with their high expectations of African societies is in itself a factor of conflict and violence. And since African countries are poised to meet the standards of western liberal democracy, its ideals and values, the political elite are then forced to do what would be considered acceptable to their western allies in order to avoid being alienated. It is this attempt to win international acceptance and approvals that motivates these leaders to manipulate both the elections and the electoral processes to their advantage. And African leaders do this knowing fully well that there is no

perfect election, as such their emergence would be accepted either way by the international community in disguise with the slogan “for the sake of peace and stability” in favour of the acclaimed winner of the polls.

These factors highlighted above tend to exacerbate frustration, and the likelihood of aggression as the expectations of the people are not met. This has equally justified and explained the choice of frustrations-aggression theory in extrapolating the interplay between election violence and the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa. The findings have also supported those of Deene (2005) who submits that to be frustrated suggests that an individual’s access to getting what he wants is being thwarted by another person or possibly by another circumstance. He, therefore, concludes that the reaction that follows that of being thwarted is one of annoyance and could be manifested in aggressive behaviour. Masango (2004) also agreed with the frustration aggression submission that the aggression from the angle of social disorganisation of the people has a negative effect on the people as they are left predisposed to aggressive tendencies. Iheanacho (2015) shared a similar view revealing that electoral violence discourages the election of credible leaders. Therefore, the findings of this research agreed with Masango and Iheanacho’s submissions, however, this study still believes that KGS and KZN need an entirely new crop of leadership with a focus on the people and not self-serving leaders.

Theoretically, the elite and games theory comes into play whereby the elite use every available opportunity to either impose themselves in power or influence it using their economic power. Besides the fact that they have been instrumental in fueling elections violence through financing thugs as this study has uncovered, they are also into manipulating the youths and the electoral lists; and to the elite, this is a game where the smartest wins. This explains why the elite often use money to either buy votes or influence the voting patterns, and sometimes the outcomes of elections. While these findings agree with Kagwanja and Southall (2009:261-263) and Burchard (2016) that the frequent explosion of election violence is a brainwork of the elite, it, however, discovered that the elite had exerted so much influence over the years without being checked because the state lacks the capacity to enforce its laws on individuals and all citizens. Thus, due to the weaknesses inherent in the institutions of the state and their incapacity to enforce obedience, the elite have taken it upon themselves to fill this void by perpetuating themselves in society. Therefore, to interrogate this menace, this study requests further research, perhaps using more quantitative techniques, that focuses particularly on democratic consolidation and election violence with an emphasis on vote buying.



### 10.5.2 Implications for government

The body of literature is awash with empirical studies on how to address election violence and perhaps, draw a line on the possibility of consolidating democracy in developing countries. Regrettably not much has been done by most governments across the continent to adopt some of the recommendations presented in some of these findings. There is the need, therefore for reforms in the way that elections are conducted in order to guarantee the credibility of the polls. Similarly, there is also the need to ensure that free and fair elections are encouraged so that there can be the recruitment of credible leaders capable of bringing about transformation and development, not only in KGS and KZN but in Nigeria and South Africa at large. To achieve this, there is the need for reform of electoral laws to meet the needs at hand, as well as the electoral management bodies.

## 10.6 Overall Recommendation of the Thesis

The recommendations as shown in the result of this research are the proposed strategies needed to stem the tide of election violence and to ensure the speedy consolidation of democracy in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and Kogi State, Nigeria. While some of the recommendations are directed at the electoral management bodies, the elite, and the electorates, others are aimed at the security forces and the entire political system.

### 10.6.1 Extensive campaign against election violence

For any significant progress to be made on the consolidation of democracy, its values and ideals, there is the urgent need to fight the spate of election violence in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. This can only be made possible through a responsible leadership devoid of sentiments and partisanship. Similarly, the law enforcement agencies who have often been used by the political elite, especially those of the ruling party, would need to be more professional in the discharge of their duties without being partisan. Election violence and all forms and strategies often employed by the politicians to instigate violence, be it before, during and or after the elections, must be resisted by all. Failure to address the menace of election violence could potentially lead to an escalation of violence that could evolve into a much larger problem, as already witnessed in some countries in Africa.

### 10.6.2 Conduct of free, fair and credible elections

The findings of this study have shown that the conduct of elections that lack credibility has often been the frequent cause of election violence in democracies, especially in Nigeria and

South Africa. Free and fair elections are the grease to the growth and development of democracies and as a result, must be prioritised and practised as a guarantee for election credibility and responsible leaders that promote good governance. The electoral management bodies must ensure that elections are conducted based on the laws and electoral acts as stipulated in all extant laws. The officials in charge of the conduct of elections must never be partisan in their official duties nor be card carrying members of a particular political party as their loyalty to the commission will be in doubt. Besides moral integrity in the conduct of elections by officials assigned to conduct this exercise, they must be educationally qualified and competent enough to conduct elections of national importance.

#### 10.6.3 The demonetisation of electoral politics

The politics of money and materialism has taken over the democracies of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa over the years. Politicians have used the money to induce some officials of the electoral management bodies, the electorates, and even the security personnel to provide an enabling environment for them to win elections with ease. This study recommends that the use of money to influence voting patterns among the electorates should be outlawed and all violators of such laws are severely dealt with. Money should also be outlawed for vote buying, especially by the ruling class. Although money is needed to run campaigns and other logistics during elections, there should be limitations to the amount of money that should be generated by political parties and how the money should be spent. This will help reduce the rate of vote buying and material inducement that influences the voting patterns of the electorates.

#### 10.6.4 The introduction of morality and decency into electoral politics

Although this may be argued as a common trademark of politics, it is central to the consolidation of democracy and its values and ideals. Democracy in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and Kogi State, Nigeria has fallen behind the pecking order owing to an absence of morality and decency commonly being practised by the politicians. Cases abound where politicians have flagrantly flouted the law with impunity and without any repercussions. Some have openly been seen to have committed acts that breach the moral norms without any form of punishment. Even the cases of rampant corruption in government departments and agencies is considered as immoral and indecent. More worrisome are incidences of sexual misconduct by high ranking politicians, most of whom are rarely investigated independently, nor are the perpetrators punished. Thus, this study recommends that all acts of indecency and immorality

by politicians should be dealt with. In addition, a law should be enacted to ensure that morality and all forms of decency are included in the politics of Nigeria and South Africa.

#### 10.6.5 Constant voter education and total regard to constitutions and all existing laws

To address the problem of election violence, this study recommends that constant voter education is needed for all voters irrespective of their background, political persuasions and age. This is a significant and vital way of ensuring that voters understand their rights and the duty expected to be performed by them during elections. Through voter education, voters will also be taught learn to respect the constitution and all extant laws of their countries. The mark of a patriotic citizenship is when such a citizen is found to be obedient to the laws of the land, as well as ensuring that such laws are also protected by the citizens. And any politician found disrespecting the constitution should be severely punished to serve as a deterrent to others.

#### 10.6.6 Good governance and improved leadership style

Central to the problems confronting electoral democracies in Africa generally is the problem of bad governance and the leadership style. Good governance is key to the growth and sustainability of any democracy, and this is an element that is lacking in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa and Kogi State of Nigeria. To improve governance, the quality of leadership and the style of leadership would need to change significantly. Leadership should be pro-people, far above certain cabal or specific interests. The interests of the state must be above all individual and group interests as far as leadership is concerned. Thus, this study recommends that good governance and good leadership style would address the problem of election violence that has had a real setback to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and South Africa.

#### 10.6.7 Strict punishment for the manipulation of the youth, ethnicity and religion

Perhaps because there has been no serious punishment for the violators of basic laws and rules in society, the violators have continued to increase among the politicians. This study recommends that strict punishment should be imposed on any politician found to be manipulating the youths into perpetuating election violence. Similarly, all those in the habit of manipulating ethnicity and religion for political gain should be arrested and prosecuted. Though in politics there is no permanent friend or permanent enemy, but merely permanent interest, there should at least be decorum in politics. This should not be a platform for heating

up the polity; instead, the youths should be provided with employment opportunities and other technical skills to steer them away from being influenced by corrupt and desperate politicians.

### **10.7 Limitations**

The major limitation to his research was the inability to have full access to and the attention of all the respondents in this study. Whereas some made themselves available for the interview and focus group discussion, others gave limited time for both. As a result, the researcher could not spend the quality time needed to generate responses from every question and to probe further for more details as one should. This was more applicable to the politicians who were always in a hurry or busy with meetings and other political engagements. Notwithstanding, data was collected adequately enough for the completion of this study.

Another limitation of this study was the inability to source funding for this study. While it may be difficult to find evidence of the intervention impact of research grants, Langfeldt, Bloch, and Sivertsen (2015:256) aver that competitive grant schemes are set up with the intention of improving research performance. For this particular study, the researcher did not access any research grants, thus limiting the research process. The research could have covered more if funding was available to go beyond the present scope and could perhaps have achieved much more than what has been achieved. Additional research is required, perhaps quantitative to determine the extent to which election violence constitutes a setback to the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. This would help expatriate on the nexus between democratic consolidation and electoral violence.

### **10.8 Conclusion**

The main aim of this chapter was to provide a summary of the study as well as conclusions about the study's objectives, and recommendations based on the findings of the study, as well as recommendations for further research in assessing the extent to which election violence constitutes a serious setback to the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Results obtained from the study indicated that election violence truly undermines the consolidation of democracy in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal. Further to this is the research identified that election violence affects the pace and space of democratic consolidation not just in KGS and KZN but in Africa in general. Similarly, election violence does not only affect the credibility of elections but is also responsible for the quality of leadership and governance in Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and to some extent, Africa. Adding to the constraint, more importantly, is the incorporation of Africa

into the international capitalist world through colonialism, which explains why conflict and electoral violence in Africa cannot be divorced from the current relations with the international system, especially the capitalist west. The study further discovered that most of the politicians in Africa (especially the current crop of politicians) lack the required qualifications (both political and educational qualification) and the competence to rule, which best explains the irrational behaviours among the political elite as well as the lack of vision for development. This best explanation of why most of these politicians are deeply involved in primitive accumulation is the introduction of centrifugal forces rather than promoting development. The study, therefore, recommends that for any meaningful development in KGS and KZN and the consolidation of democracy as well, election violence must, as a matter of urgency be addressed in order to achieve the goal of development.

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## **LIST OF APPENDICES**

### **Appendix A: Interview Questions**

#### **1: Kogi State**

1. Have you participated in an election before?
  - What is your view of elections in KGS, Nigeria?
  - How would you describe the politicians during elections in your area?
2. What do you know about democratic consolidation?
  - Would you say that democracy in KGS, Nigeria is consolidated?
  - What have you observed as some of the obstacles to democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria?
  - What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria?
  - How can democratic consolidation be fast-tracked in KGS?
3. What is the role of election violence in your democratic process?
  - In your view, what are the causes of election-related violence?
  - What are acceptable means of challenging elections, in your opinion?
  - Would violence be one of these means?
  - Is there any link between election violence and democratic consolidation?
  - Are there any observable trends in election violence in KGS, Nigeria?
4. Does electoral violence in any way undermine democratic sustainability in postcolonial Nigeria?
  - In what ways does election violence undermine democratic consolidation in KGS?
  - How would you describe the conduct of politicians in KGS?
  - What role do they play in the electoral violence?
  - Does your historical past play a central role in aggravating election violence?
  - How does that impact on the possibility of democratic stability and maturity?
  - In your view, does factionalism and the quest for supremacy among the elites play any role in election violence in KGS?
5. Do you agree with the insinuations that youths have been active in most election violence in KGS, Nigeria?

- If yes, what in your opinion, are the reasons for their involvement?
- Must the youths be used by the politicians always? Can't they use other sexes or groups to achieve their goal?
- How can that be addressed?

6. Do political parties and politicians play any role in electoral violence?

- Can you please give me insight into how they go about achieving this?
- Why have the politicians succeeded in triggering violence without being checked?

7. Women in Africa have always been at the receiving end of most conflict, electoral violence inclusive. Why do you think this is?

- Suggest ways in which women can be protected from violence before, during, and after elections in KGS?

8. Does the colonial history of KGS have any relation with election violence?

- Why have the post-colonial political elite failed to address the historical past?
- It is possible to conduct peaceful, free, fair, and credible elections in KGS?

9. Have you observed any implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Nigeria?

- Do you believe in democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria?
- Why do you want democracy consolidated?
- What suggestions do you have that would see to democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria?

10. In your opinion, what do you think can be done to generally address the problem of election violence in KGS, Nigeria?

## **2: KwaZulu-Natal**

1. Have you participated in an election before?

- What is your view of elections in KZN, South Africa?
- How would you describe the politicians during elections in your area?

2. What do you know about democratic consolidation?

- Would you say that democracy in KZN, South Africa is consolidated?
- What have you observed as some of the obstacles to democratic consolidation in KZN, South Africa?
- What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KZN, South Africa?
- How can democratic consolidation be fast-tracked in KZN?

3. What is the role of election violence in your democratic process?

- In your view, what are the causes of election-related violence?
- What are acceptable means of challenging elections, in your opinion?
- Would violence be one of these means?
- Is there any link between election violence and democratic consolidation?
- Are there any observable trends in election violence within KZN, South Africa?

4. Does electoral violence in any way undermine democratic sustainability in postcolonial South Africa?

- In what way does election violence undermine democratic consolidation in KZN?
- How would you describe the conduct of politicians in KZN?
- What role do they play in electoral violence?
- Does your historical past play a central role in aggravating election violence?
- How does that impact on the possibility of democratic stability and maturity?
- In your view, does factionalism and the quest for supremacy among the elites play any role in election violence in KZN?

5. Do you agree with the insinuations that youths have been active in most election violence in KZN, South Africa?

- If yes, what in your opinion, are the reasons for their involvement?
- Must the youths be used by the politicians always? Can't they use other sexes or groups to achieve their goal?
- How can that be addressed?

6. Do political parties and politicians play any role in electoral violence?

- Can you please give me insight into how they go about achieving this?
- Why have the politicians succeeded in triggering violence without being checked?

7. Women in Africa have always been at the receiving end of most conflict, electoral violence inclusive. Why is it so?

- Suggest ways in which women can be protected from violence before, during, and after elections in KZN?

8. Does the colonial history of KZN have any relation with election violence?

- Why have the post-colonial political elite failed to address the historical past?
- It is possible to conduct peaceful, free, fair, and credible elections in KZN?

9. Have you observed any implications of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in South Africa?

- Do you believe in democratic consolidation in KZN, South Africa?
- Why do you want democracy consolidated?
- What suggestions do you have that would see to democratic consolidation in KZN, South Africa?

10. In your opinion, what do you think can be done to generally address the problem of election violence in KZN, South Africa?

## **Appendix B: Focus Group Discussion Guide**

### **1. Have you participated in an election before?**

- What is your view of elections in KGS, Nigeria/ KZN, South Africa?
- How would you describe politicians during elections in your area?

### **2. What do you know about democratic consolidation?**

- Would you say that democracy in KGS, Nigeria/ KZN, South Africa is consolidated?
- What have you observed as obstacles to democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?
- What are the factors responsible for the slow pace of democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?
- How can democratic consolidation be fast-tracked in KGS and KZN?

### **3. What is the role of election violence in your democratic process?**

- In your view, what are the causes of election-related violence?
- What are acceptable means of challenging elections, in your opinion?
- Would violence be one of these means?
- Is there any link between election violence and democratic consolidation?
- Are there any observable trends in election violence between KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?

### **4. Does electoral violence in any way undermine democratic sustainability in postcolonial Africa?**

- In what way does election violence undermine democratic consolidation in KGS and KZN?
- How would you describe the conduct of politicians in KGS and KZN?
- What role do they play in electoral violence?
- Does your historical past play a central role in aggravating election violence?
- How does that impact on the possibility of democratic stability and maturity?
- In your view, does factionalism and the quest for supremacy among the elites play any role in election violence in KGS and KZN?

### **5. Do you agree with the insinuations that the youths have been active in most instances of election violence in KGS, Nigeria / KZN, South Africa?**

- If yes, what in your opinion, are the reasons for their involvement?

- Must the youths be used by politicians always? Can't they use other sexes or groups to achieve their goal?
- How can that be addressed?

6. Do political parties and politicians play any role in electoral violence?

- Can you please give me insight on how they go about achieving this?
- Why have politicians succeeded in triggering violence without being checked?

7. Women in Africa have always been on the receiving end of most conflict, electoral violence inclusive. Why do you think this is?

- Suggest ways in which women can be protected from violence before, during, and after elections in KGS/KZN?

8. Do the colonial histories of KGS and KZN have any relation to election violence?

- Why have the post-colonial political elite failed to address the historical past?
- It is possible to conduct peaceful, free, fair, and credible elections in KGS and KZN?

9. Have you observed any implications of electoral violence regarding democratic consolidation in your country?

- Do you believe in democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?
- Why do you want democracy consolidated?
- What suggestions do you have that would see to democratic consolidation in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?

10. In your opinion, what do you think can be done to address the problem of election violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa?

## Appendix C: Ethical Clearance



23 April 2019

Mr Ibrahim Yusuf 216075844  
School of Social Sciences  
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Yusuf

Reference number: HSS/2310/017D

Full approval - Change in project title

Your application dated 15 April 2019 in connection with the above, the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the application and the research protocol has been granted **Full Approval**.

- **Change in title** from: Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An analysis of Kogi State, Nigeria, and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 1994 to date.
- **New project title:** Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An analysis of Kogi State, Nigeria, and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 1994 to 2017.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach/Methods must be reviewed and approved through amendment/modification prior to its implementation. Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 1 year from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

Best wishes for the successful completion of your research protocol.

Yours faithfully

  
Dr Rosemary Sibanda (Chair)

/px

cc Supervisor: Dr Olusola R Ogunnubi  
cc Academic Leader Research: Prof Maheshvari Naidu  
cc School Administrator: Ms Nonhlanhla Radebe

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Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee


Dr Rosemary Sibanda (Chair)






Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

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Telephone: +27 (0) 31 261 3507/3516/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 261 4601 Email: [sibanda@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:sibanda@ukzn.ac.za) / [srymanm@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:srymanm@ukzn.ac.za) / [mabup@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:mabup@ukzn.ac.za)

Website: [www.ukzn.ac.za](http://www.ukzn.ac.za)



Founding Campuses:  Edgewood  Howard College  Majestical School  Pietermaritzburg  Westville



**Appendix D: KwaZulu-Natal Gatekeepers Permission**

<b>AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS</b>		
<b>Contact Address</b> Ithala Centre Shop D Malandela Road P O Kwa Mashu 4360  <b>Contact Number</b> 031 503 3169		<b>Contact Persons</b> <b>Secretary</b> Bheki Msani 074 194 6282  <b>Chairperson</b> Nhlanhla Shezi 072 216 5191
<b>CURNICK NDLOVU ZONE</b>		

TO : ANC REGIONAL OFFICE  
ATT : THE AUDITING TEAM

Date : 08 Febraury 2018


**RE : MEETING WITH ANC MEMBERS**

Good morning Mr Ibrahim Yusuf

Reference to your request seeking to have a discussion with members of the African National Congress (ANC), I write informing you of our willingness to welcome you.

We look forward to meeting you.


Best Regards



Bheki Msani (Branch Secretary)



## Appendix E: Kogi State Gatekeepers Permission



**PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)**  
(POWER TO THE PEOPLE)  
*MOTTO: Justice, Unity and Progress*

**KOGI STATE CHAPTER**


Zone '8'  
Along Okene/Kabba Road  
Lokoja, Kogi State

Our Ref..... Your Ref..... Date..... 7<sup>th</sup> March, 201

**MR. IBRAHIM YUSUF**

Reference to your request to interact with members of our Political Party, Kogi State People Democratic Party (PDP) write to inform you that your request has been approved. You can come at your convenient time to have interaction with us.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,  
For   
Engr. Samuel Uhotou  
State Chairman



# ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS

## KOGI STATE

Opp. Dunamis Church, Ganaja Road, Lokoja, Kogi State.

7<sup>th</sup> March, 2018

**Mr. Ibrahim Yusuf**

Reference to your request to interact with members of our political party, we write informing you of our approval. You are free to come at any time to interact with us.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Hadi Ameteur  
State Chairman

APC

## **Appendix F: Informed Consent Document**

### **Informed Consent Document**

Dear Interviewee,

My name is YUSUF, Ibrahim with student number: 216075844. I am a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College, Durban, South Africa. The title of my research is “Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An Analysis of Kogi State (KGS), Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South Africa”. Since the introduction of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria in the 1990s, the democratic journey has been very tumultuous with countless numbers of electoral violence. The spade of electoral violence (particularly in African countries), is assuming a dangerous dimension. Rather than working toward consolidating their democracies through the conduct of credible elections, good service delivery, promotion of peace and stability and job creation, the reverse seem to be the case as they are being confronted with the threat of election violence. Hardly are elections conducted without witnessing one form of violence or the other as the experiences of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South Africa and Kogi State (KGS), Nigeria have shown. Given the recurrence of electoral conflicts and violence within Africa and as the instances in Kogi State and KwaZulu-Natal show, this study seeks to undertake an analysis of the incidences of electoral violence in KGS and KZN by attempting to understand how this menace constitute a significant setback to the consolidation of democracy in the chosen area of this study. It will further seek to unpack the interplay between electoral violence and democratic consolidation in Africa using the Frustration-Aggression theory, Post-colonial constructivist approach, the elite theory as well as game theory. Importantly, from the examples of KGS and KZN, the research hopes to unearth the factors that predispose these sub-state units to election violence and slow down the pace of consolidating democracy. The study will in addition examine trends in election violence, its nature and types, similarities and differences in KGS and KZN. This study will equally help us understand if democratic consolidation could play a crucial role in reducing or possibly ending election violence in KGS, Nigeria and KZN, South Africa.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used purely for academic purpose.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research at any point. You will not be penalized/victimized for taking any decision.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor personal details will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about 30-40 minutes
- The recordings as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed of by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: [didamson@gmail.com](mailto:didamson@gmail.com) or [216075844@stu.ukzn.ac.za](mailto:216075844@stu.ukzn.ac.za) Cell: +27781569649, +2348035518929. My supervisor is Dr Sybert Mutereko who is located at the School of Management, IT and Public Governance, Westville Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email: [sybert@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:sybert@ukzn.ac.za) Phone number: +27843080699. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: [ximbap@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ximbap@ukzn.ac.za), Phone number +27(0)78 193 3022.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

## DECLARATION

I..... (*Full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate. I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE

.....

## Appendix G: Language Editing

# Barbara Dupont Language School

37A Hilltop Road  
Hillcrest  
3610  
Cell No: 0846668351

19th October 2019

To Whom It May Concern


### EDITING OF ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

I hereby confirm that I, Barbara Dupont, edited the thesis written by **Ibrahim Yusuf** titled “Democratic Consolidation and Electoral Violence: An Analysis of Kogi State, Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 1994-2017” and commented on the grammatical anomalies in MS Word Track Changes and review mode by the insertion of comment balloons prior to returning the document to the authors. Corrections were made in respect of grammar, punctuation, spelling, syntax, tense and language usage as well as to sense and flow. Reference guidelines and additional comments were provided to assist with corrections.

I have been teaching English for the past 12 years and have a Cambridge CELTA diploma in teaching English as a foreign language. I am also employed by the British Council as an official IELTS examiner for Southern Africa. I have been editing academic and other documents for the past four years, regularly editing the research dissertations, articles and theses of the School of Nursing, Environmental Studies and various other schools and disciplines at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and other institutions, as well as editing for publishing firms and private individuals on a contract basis.

I trust that this document will prove acceptable in terms of editing criteria.

Yours faithfully



Barbara Dupont

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Small Giants (Pty) Ltd  
Registration No: 2012/000621/07  
Directors: Riccardo Benedetti, Barbara Dupont  
Registered Address: 37a Hilltop Road, Hillcrest, 3610

## Appendix H: Turnitin Report

PHD thesis for final turnitin				
ORIGINALITY REPORT				
1%	0%	0%	1%	
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS	
PRIMARY SOURCE				
1	Submitted to University of Zululand			1%
Student Paper				
Exclude sources	On	Exclude matches	1%	
Exclude bibliography	On			